Bush v. Obama Foreign Policies

Bush v. Obama Foreign Policies

Neo-conservatism and Liberalism in Practice:

Comparing George W. Bush and Barack Obama Foreign Policies

In 2001 George W. Bush presided over the Presidency which had to face new kinds of challenges in American foreign policy. When Bush was the incumbent, the United States was attacked by terrorists, which killed nearly 3,000 Americans. The rest of Bush's Presidency reflected his Administration's response to that event and the period is known as the post-9/11 era. The eight years of Bush's Presidency was mired in many controversies -- chief among them was the Bush Administration's decision to go to war against the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq -- but also a period that did not witness any further terrorist attacks on American soil. Partly because of the unpopularity of many aspects of Bush's foreign policy, many Americans overwhelmingly supported Back Obama in 2008 Presidential elections. Accordingly, many expected Obama to change the course in American foreign relations. But did President Obama follow a different direction since he assumed power in the oval office? If yes, how were Obama's policies different from those of George Bush? or, did Obama simply continue a militarist policy which characterized the Bush foreign policy, as some observers have recently noted (Bacevich, 2010)?

The purpose of this paper is to address these questions. It should be noted, however, that there are certain characteristics of these two administrations that are hard to compare. For example, as mentioned, the Bush Administration acted in the atmosphere of 9/11, while the Obama Administration had to address the problem of Iraq War the popularity of which reached its nadir when Obama was elected to the White House. Also, George Bush served two terms and there were marked differences between his first and second Presidencies, as the circumstances forced the Bush Administration to change the course by the end of Bush's Presidency. The Obama Administration, meanwhile, has an experience of running foreign policy for less than three years. Nevertheless, it is possible to point at some characteristics of these Administrations that are distinct. It is the position of this paper that Bush's foreign policy was a mixture of neo-conservatism and realism, while Obama's foreign policy has been a mixture of liberalism and realism. Bush's foreign policy was characterized by neo-conservative ideology, but the limits of American power forced the Bush Administration to resort to realism. Likewise, Obama's foreign policy has been characterized by liberal ideas, but the realities of international politics forces the Obama Administration to embrace some aspects of realism. In this paper, we will briefly discuss the three ideologies mentioned -- neo-conservatism, realism, and liberalism -- and compare Bush and Obama policies dealing with Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan; and to a lesser degree, the Middle East in general, North Korea, and China.

Theoretical background

Neo-conservativism as an ideology emerged in late 1950s and '60s, in response to Washington's willingness to support detente with Moscow, but began to triumph only in 1980s when Ronal Reagan took a tough stance against the Soviet Union. Irving Kristol, a U.S. intellectual and a former Trotskyist, is credited to be the ideological father of the neo-conservative movement. In the 1990s, neo-conservatives established a Project for the New American Century, calling for an aggressive U.S. foreign policy that would guarantee American political, military, and economic dominance in the world. The main principle of the project was outlined by William Kristol, the son of Irving Kristol, who wrote in the opening pages of the group's website: "American leadership is good both for America and for the world; and that such leadership requires military strength, diplomatic energy and commitment to moral principle" (PNAC).

One of the first acts of the neo-conservatives after establishing the Project was to call the Administration of Bill Clinton to remove "Saddam Hussein's regime from power," as stated in a letter they sent to President Clinton on May 29, 1998. The letter was singed by Kristol, the chairman of PNAC and the editor of Weekly Standard, and a group of politicians who would end up serving the Bush Administration at some point between 2001 and 2008. These included Vice-President Dick Cheney, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, the director of the Middle Eastern policy on the National Security Council Elliot Abrams, Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations John Bolton, the chairman of the Defense Science Board Richard Perle, Colin Powell's deputy in the State Department Richard Armitage, and the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Zalmay Khalilzad (Johnson, 2004, pp. 227-8).

Neo-conservatives made their main principles and ideas publicly available through the Project's publication, entitled Rebuilding America's Defenses: Strategy, Forces, and Resources for a New Century (Kagan, Schmitt, & Donnelly, 2000). Does the United States, "as the world's most preeminent power," the authors of the publication wrote, "have the resolve to shape a new century favorable to American principles and interests?" The authors required that the United States needed "a military that is strong and ready to meet both present and future challenges; a foreign policy that boldly and purposefully promotes American principles abroad; and national leadership that accepts the United States' global responsibilities." To achieve these goals, the authors further argued, the United States needed a fundamental transformation, which, "even if it brings revolutionary change, is likely to be a long one, absent some catastrophic and catalyzing event -- like a new Pearl Harbor" (Kagan, Schmitt, & Donnelly, 2000, pp. 1, 51). The fact that the several members of the Project assumed influential positions in the Bush Administration and that the United States indeed experienced a catastrophic event on September 11 guaranteed that the Bush foreign policy would reflect the principles of neo-conservative ideology -- albeit constrained by the realism because of the realities of international relations.

Neo-conservatism is a relatively new approach to international relations. Of various approaches to international relations, the two most frequently used are realism and liberalism. Realism suggests that states in international affairs act in their own national interests, disregarding virtually all moral considerations. Realism views states like human beings who are by nature, according to this theory, selfish and fiercely competitive. Realism, as Geoffrey Goldberg (2005) puts it, is "the idea that America should be guided by strategic self-interest, and that moral considerations are secondary at best." Liberalism, on the other hand, stresses the importance of pluralist approach, interdependence, collective international action (as opposed to unilateralism promoted by neo-conservatives), and not least importantly, humanitarianism. In American approach to international relations, liberalism is equated with Wilsonianism and is sometimes described as idealism (Mead, 2001).

These approaches to international relations are quite complex in their own terms. For example, for some analysts, especially for those from the left, realism is callous, cynical, and immoral, while political commentators from the right see realism as almost a pretext for isolationism. But as Andrew Bacevich (2005) points out, there is a distinctly American realism, championed by "prominent 20th-century public intellectuals such as the historian Charles Beard, the diplomat George Kennan, the journalist Walter Lippmann, and the theologian Reinhold Niebuhr," which can provide "a basis for seriously engaging the moral issues posed by international politics." This realism does not dismiss moral considerations altogether; rather, it realizes the limits of American power and its ability to project it. According to this theoretical approach, "world peace' is a chimera. Saving the world is God's work. The statesman's obligation is to avoid cataclysm and to place limits on the brutality to which humankind is prone" (Bacevich, 2005). Realism, in fact, may be mixed with liberalism (Starr, Tomasky, and Kuttner, 2005, p. 22), and this mixed approach has reflected the Obama foreign policy in the last two years.

Iraq

No foreign policy issue perhaps was as controversial as was the Bush Administration's decision to go to war against Iraq in 2003 at least since the height of the anti-Vietnam war movements. There was initial broad support for American-led military campaign against Iraq in the United States, but there was widespread opposition among members of international community. Emboldened by a quick military victory over Taliban, and motivated by neo-conservative principles, however, the Bush Administration disregarded international concerns -- including those of world powers such as France, Germany, and Russia -- and chose the path of unilateralism. The Bush Administration's Iraq War policy sought greater authority and power in domestic spheres as well. The Administration's approach to foreign policy was illustrated in a letter sent to Alberto Gonzales by John Yoo, an official in the Justice Department. "Congress can no more interfere with the President's conduct of the interrogation of enemy combatants than it can dictate strategic or tactical decisions on the battlefield," Yoo wrote, speaking about the new interrogation policies adopted by the Administration. "Just as statuses that order the President to conduct warfare in a certain manner or for specific goals would be unconstitutional, so too are laws that seek to prevent the President from gaining the intelligence he believes necessary to prevent attacks upon the United States" (Radsan, 2010, p. 552).

The Bush Administration, however, could not continue a unilateral approach to foreign policy in this manner for too long. The administration's disregard for international norms led to the excesses at Abu Ghraib Prison in Iraq, and attempts to circumvent congressional oversight over the activities of the Administration backfired. Faced with increasing criticism at home and the inability to stabilize Iraq, the Bush Administration began to temper its approach with realism. The Administration agreed to a bipartisan Iraq Study Group, led by former Secretary of State James Baker and Democratic Congressman Lee Hamilton (Baker & Hamilton, 2006). The report prepared by the group was quite critical of the Bush Administration's policies in Iraq, and though many of those criticisms were rejected, the Administrated still took the criticism seriously, and a year later began to pursue a new approach, which eventually helped to decrease the level of violence in Iraq.

The Obama Administration's approach to Iraq War reflects the liberal views of Obama who warned in 2002 that "a U.S. occupation of undetermined length, at undetermined cost, with undetermined consequences" was not a good strategy for the United States to adopt (Obama and Iraq, 2008). In Obama's view, the manner in which America went to war against Iraq was against the liberal tradition of conducting foreign policy in American history. Immediately after becoming President, Obama outlined a plan of Iraq troop withdrawal which would start in sixteen months so that the responsibility of maintaining order in Iraq could be transferred to Iraqi authorities. Obama's policy in Iraq thus also reflects realism as it considers the limits of American power and understanding that preserving American security is more important than spreading democracy in Iraq. "We have sent our young men and women to make enormous sacrifices in Iraq, and spent vast resources abroad at a time of tight budgets at home," Obama stated, while announcing the end of combat mission in Iraq in the summer of 2010. "Through this remarkable chapter in the history of the United States and Iraq, we have met our responsibility. Now, it's time to turn the page" (Cooper & Stolberg, 2010).

Afghanistan

Prior to 9/11, the Bush Administration had no significant problem with Afghanistan. So the war the Administration unleashed against Taliban was largely a response to 9/11 which was perpetrated by terrorists who had been trained in Afghanistan. The terrorist mastermind, Osama bin Laden, was also protected at the time by the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. The Bush Administration had a clear goal of ousting the Taliban regime but had no clear strategy of exiting the Afghanistan involvement. The U.S. military quickly gained the upper hand over Taliban in 2001 and early 2002, but soon after, the Bush Administrated diverted its attention and resources to Iraq War, relegating the Afghanistan problem to a secondary significance. Because of pursuing these short-sighted goals and strategies, the United States was not able to stabilize Afghanistan. Reflecting upon the Afghanistan war, one American diplomat wrote: "Are we trying to pacify Afghanistan? Defeat the Taliban? Develop Afghanistan, its institutions, and its economy and transform its mores? If so, we are doomed to failure" (Wisner, 2009, p. 361). But the Bush Afghanistan's seven-year-long Afghan war strategy reflected precisely this strategy.

As for Obama, he considers Afghanistan war a "war of necessity" and has consistently argued that the real fight against terrorism must be conducted in Afghanistan-Pakistan border. Realizing the failure of the Bush Administration to tackle the insurgency problem in Afghanistan, Obama unveiled a new strategy for Afghan war in March 2009. The strategy outlined by Obama emphasized the importance of addressing the changing political and security realities in Afghanistan. The Obama Administration viewed the Afghan problem not as a separate issue on its own but in connection with extremism in the neighboring Pakistan. The Obama strategy also identified U.S. goal in a limited manner, focusing on destroying the al-Qaeda movement and preventing its return to Afghanistan, rather than attempting to transform Afghanistan into a Switzerland. "Such limitation in the overall strategic objective of the U.S.-led international forces in Afghanistan," as one observer argues, "implies that the United States does not intend to transform Afghanistan into a Westernized democracy, as the neoconservative discourse during the Bush Administration seemed to suggest" (Ahmad, 2010, p. 194).

The Obama strategy also seeks to co-opt moderate Taliban members who are ready to disassociate themselves from al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations. "There is an uncompromising core of the Taliban. They must be met with force, and they must be defeated," Obama stated. "But there are also those who've taken up arms because of coercion, or simply for a price. These Afghans must have the option to choose a different course" (Ahmad, 2010, p. 195). The Obama strategy in Afghanistan also stresses the importance of investment for civilian development projects rather than reliance on military goals. And because of considering Afghan-Pakistan border as the hotbed of terrorist activity, the Obama Administration has had two troop surges -- 21,000 troops in the first surge and 30,000 troops in the second surge -- to militarily deal with al-Qaeda and the uncompromising members of Taliban. The Afghanistan strategy demonstrates the limits of Obama's liberalism in foreign policy. But the Obama Administration also has sought greater participation and cooperation from regional powers such as Russia, India, and the Gulf states -- in true tradition of Wilsonian liberalism.

Pakistan

Pakistan was an ally of the United States during the Cold War. But the country became a more important partner for the United States as a result of Afghanistan War. In 2001, Pakistan was the only state in the world to officially recognize the legitimacy of Taliban government and provided financial and logistical support for the movement. When the United States and NATO began a military campaign against Taliban, the Bush Administration demanded that Pakistan make a choice: be either with the United States or against the United States. The Musharraf government of Pakistan chose the latter option, although influential forces within the Pakistani government and security forces kept supporting various extremist and anti-American groups. But for the Bush Administration, the most important issue was Pakistan's official stance. As long as Pakistan supported the U.S.-led war on terrorism, the Bush Administration saw the country as a friend -- at one time Bush describing Musharraf, the authoritarian ruler of Pakistan, as "truly . . . somebody who believes in democracy" (Bush Now Praises Musharraf, 2007).

The Obama Administrated shifted its policy on Pakistan by viewing it as part of the Afghanistan problem. The Obama Administration speaks about the Af-Pak strategy which emphasizes the importance of viewing these two countries as two separate countries but presenting one unified challenge. Like in Afghanistan, Obama's Pakistan policy stresses the importance of civilian assistance rather than the military one. For example, Kerry-Luber-Berman Act, signed by Obama in November 2009, granted Pakistan $7.5 billion in civilian aid. The Obama military strategy also focuses intensely more on Pakistan than the Bush Administration did. Under Obama, drone attacks against suspected terrorist nests in Pakistan's tribal areas have significantly increased, which affirms that the Obama Administration takes a military option on tackling Af-Pak problem seriously (Ahmad, 2010).