Compare Operational Art and Operational Design

Operational Design & Art

Operational Design is a methodological approach used by U.S. military command personnel to make it possible for officers and soldiers to know how to be creative in their use of combat and confrontational tools and tactics. It's a learning, assessment and re-learning structure that allows for space for Operational Art in the command structure, or the freedom to use creativity grounded in understanding and experience (Joint Operation Planning, 2011). With Operational Design, a solid framework for understanding and comprehending a situation is provided. With Operational Art, personnel from top to bottom are provided the decision-making elements for using flexibility in the face of unexpected and often unpredictable circumstances.

The struggle with these two companion approaches centers on ensuring that they each accomplish their goal and still allow for the military to sustain authority and control. It remains possible that adding many layers of command and operational complexity will go too far, or that in offering flexibility, command authority will be compromised. As one writer put it: "Military leaders may value individual creativity, critical thinking, continuous learning, and adaptability in their staffs and subordinate commanders, but individual traits do not necessarily add up to collective abilities needed for the best outcomes" (Wass de Czege, 2009:2).

Pressures to come up with a new way to address these concerns led to the development of this particular two-prong strategy. Pressures to try different strategies came from two general directions. New communication and monitoring technologies now provide for fast and nearly instantaneous feedback in very real-time settings, thereby permitting much greater degrees of command flexibility. Top leaders can see more quickly and reliably what is actually happening and lower-level operational personnel can respond to variations that fall outside of the expected decision structure (Joint Operation Planning, 2011).

But a second reason why the new design and artistry elements have been developed arises from the fact that past models have simply come up short; top-down, even complex planning strategies are not working (Wass de Czege, 2009:12). Historically, it has basically been taken for granted that either military force would not be introduced into seriously ambiguous conditions, or, if there were, it would happen because the intention was to use massive firepower to fundamentally change the nature of the conditions. Military force would be directed to use its muscle to overwhelm or obliterate any ambiguity to the point where command order and control could once again prevail. In either case, there was no need for introducing the seemingly uncontrollable risk associated with flexibility and freedom in decision-making.

Recent confrontations in Iraq and Afghanistan, however, quickly proved that this mindset was outdated. The setting and circumstance were too complex because of various relationships and the "gravitational pull" of a number of stakeholder interests (Joint Operation Planning, 2011). Still, military planners tried to adjust their past practices. They first turned toward "effects-based planning," which essentially tried to account for larger "operational net assessments" or "system-of-system analyses" grounded in highly detailed maps of expectations and responses. It quickly turned out, however, that as fast as these maps were created they became outdated. The combat conditions were simply too variable (Wass de Czege, 2009).