Counterintelligence in Terms of National

Counterintelligence

In terms of national security, counterintelligence remains an essential component of maintaining a firm and secure hold upon potentially dangerous information. It is widely recognized that within a setting in which competing intelligence organizations are continually attempting to infiltrate the ranks of other intelligence agencies, deciding who is privy to what is often a dangerous gamble. Intelligence agencies must be conscious of the type of individuals they put in possession of delicate bits of information; this applies not merely to the background, past affiliations, and political views of these people; the individual psychology of intelligence officers is often the source of leaks and betrayal. In two of the most famous breeches of United States intelligence agencies -- those involving Aldrich Ames and Robert Hanssen -- one of the major causes of the failure of the counterintelligence efforts was the CIA and FBI's failure to identify the two moles' somewhat mundane reasons for selling information to the Soviets.

Of course, every member of the FBI and CIA is forced to undergo some level of psychiatric evaluation prior to being permitted to possess any potentially harmful information to national security. Yet, while it might be something of a straightforward matter to identify individuals who possess ties to Russia, militant Muslim groups, or antigovernment organizations, it can be significantly more difficult to identify potential leaks who are driven by simply a love of money, or a lack of acceptance within one's original organization. Ames and Hanssen were intelligence officers who were both born in the United States, appeared to live ordinary lives prior to their involvement in the CIA and FBI respectively, and possessed no prior affiliation with, nor any clear political sympathies for the Soviet Union. Yet, both agents sold information to the Soviets for rather substantial sums of money. For years, both individuals flew under the radar of counterintelligence efforts, largely because all of these most obvious symptoms of a mole were absent. Nevertheless, their unique personal psychologies made them successful double agents.

Ames, in all of these respects, was the sort of agent who was unlikely to draw much attention from counterintelligence efforts. He was born in a small Wisconsin town in 1941, and worked for the CIA since 1962, where he began his career with a low-level position. He gradually worked his way up the ranks in the CIA for over twenty years before ever selling any information to the Soviets. This is an interesting aspect regarding his betrayal, simply because it reveals that if we were to characterize a double agent as an individual holding deep-seeded sympathies for the nation or organization they are selling information to, Ames should have more than proven his devotion and worth to the United States and the CIA with more than two decades of faithful service. This eliminates him as an obvious suspect both because of his background and his clean, and extended, track record.

However, Ames ran into personal issues that gradually started to test his loyalties. Ames, during his time stationed in Mexico, became involved with a woman, Rosario Dupuy, whom he eventually married. This relationship caused him to break ties with his then wife, but it also came along with financial difficulties brought on by his new wife. Dupuy plunged Ames into debt during their time together by insisting upon a lifestyle that Ames' ordinary CIA agent's salary was incapable of maintaining. This, combined with the financial situation surrounding his divorce, resulted in Ames seeking out new ways to earn money. Naturally, since his entire background and experience was in intelligence and counterintelligence, Ames was well-positioned to sell information to the right people.

In 1985 Ames began selling some of the CIA's secrets to the Soviets. At this point, Ames was reassigned to a European branch of the CIA, in which he was in charge of counterintelligence operations. This new position placed him in an ideal location to begin selling information to the Soviets about moles within their intelligence agencies -- particularly the KGB. The information he was privy to made him almost invaluable to the Soviets, who ended up paying him a total of more than four and a half million dollars over the course of the nine years Ames worked for them. Additionally, Ames impact upon United States operations in the Soviet Union was devastating: "Ames single handily shut down the CIA's eyes and ears in the Soviet Union by telling the Russians in 1985 the names of every "human asset" that the U.S. had working for it there," (Court TV). This included some twenty-five United States agents working within the KGB and other Russian agencies; all twenty-five of these agents were arrested by the Russians and ten were subsequently executed.

To Ames, choosing to become a double-agent was more of a scheme to collect money that he would otherwise have never attained, than it was a vengeful reprise to the United States or an act of sympathy for the Soviet Union. After all, a CIA agent is unlikely to ever earn millions of dollars in salary from carrying out operations for the United States. Ames had proven a mediocre agent when it came to recruitment, but discovered a true talent for covering his tracks as a double-agent. The first three moles he exposed to the Soviets happened to be the individuals located in Europe who were most likely to expose him. Ames is quoted as saying, "All of the people whose names were on my list knew the risks they were taking when they began spying for the CIA and FBI. If one of them had learned about me, he would have told the CIA, and I would have been arrested and thrown in jail. Now that I was working for the KGB, the people on my list could expect nothing less from me. It wasn't personal. It was simply how the game was played," (Court TV). To Ames, it was a game -- a simple plan for making money and keeping his new wife content. Although he was known to have some reservations about how the United States conducted itself abroad, none of his coworkers ever seriously suspected him as a mole.

Hanssen, on the other hand, was motivated less by the prospect of money for his betrayal, but more out of a feeling of rejection from his peers at the FBI and throughout his career. After failing in three separate career attempts, Hanssen became a police officer in charge of uncovering internal corruption. Although he was moderately successful in this task, many of his fellow officers continually suspected him of not being one of them, and accordingly, kept him at arms length (Court TV). The assignment made Hanssen few friends, and was exceedingly stressful both for Hanssen and his wife. This remained a theme as he moved from the police force to the FBI -- he was not particularly well-liked, and felt underappreciated. Hanssen's boss noted that although Hanssen seemed to possess a significant amount of intelligence, he lacked the personal skills to make him very successful in the FBI or the most effective agent.

From Hanssen's perspective, he believed his skills as an agent were not being used to their full potential, and he began to resent the way he was being treated by the FBI. By 1984, according to Hanssen, he began to pass information on to the Soviets without ever revealing his identity to them. The first three agents he exposed to the KGB were the very same three Ames had already exposed (Court TV). Although this first act of betrayal did not directly benefit the Soviets, the accuracy of his information proved to them that he could become a valuable asset.