Ohio Corrections Through Just Desserts:

Ohio Corrections

Corrections Through Just Desserts: A Multi-Agency Collaborative Approach

The orientation of our government is essentially a composite of agencies whose capacity to function both independently and in concert with one another serves as a key determinant of the effectiveness of the policy implementation of our public officials, the dexterity of the government in engaging criminal pattern and the ability of the people to access the policy realities of their elected representatives. Any negative connotation appended to such bureaucracy as manner of conduct, policy or procedure may find its roots in the elected leadership by which it is oriented or the sway of public opinion. Still, this is a form which ultimately enables the high level of coordination that will emerge between government agencies operating there within. Conversely, the bureaucracy will often form the basis for the failure of agencies to consort with the closeness necessary to achieve shared goals. Bureaucracy will often beset internal agencies with roadblocks to implementation or effectiveness that can take myriad forms.

Among them, obstruction of effective inter-agency coordination is likely to be among the most persistent of challenges, with agencies of often deeply paralleled interests failing to interact according the intercession of shared interests. Correctional philosophy serves as an effective example of this issue, with the high level-demands caused by politics, public will and encompassing ideology coming face-to-face with the critical parameters of constitutional justice. Namely, it is crucial that policy approach reflect a consistent and positively oriented philosophical grounding while simultaneously answering to the practical demands of civil order. Where criminal justice and corrections are concerned, this is a highly contentious divide. The sentencing aspect of criminal justice garners perhaps the widest array of controversial talking points concerning severity or compassion with which we should address those who are found guilty of violating the law.

This discussion concerns the implications of this debate in the state of Ohio, which contends like many other highly urbanized regions with high levels of criminality and the demand for a streamlining and definitive approach thereto. Considering several aspects of the issue such as concern the relationship between law enforcement and corrections, the sentencing of minors and the general modes by which corrections must be grounded, this discussion endorses the use of the 'just desserts' philosophy through a multi-agency collaborative framework as a means to making consistent and fair the terms of applying corrections.

The bureaucratic pressures which are generally relevant to the law enforcement tend to create unnecessary divisions between agencies and groups of common interest. And indeed, it should be acknowledged here that the word 'bureaucracy' typically carries with it a negative connotation to many. The immediate reaction for most is to characterize an entity referred to thusly as slow, outmoded and inefficient. This is, however, an impression fostered by the quality of the governmental umbrella under which a bureau operates. In the state of Ohio, citizens have the right expect that effective government will steward bureaucracies to more effective modes of interaction. Where the conviction of criminals is concerned, this type of interaction is tantamount to the carriage of justice.

An important exemplifying instance in which this idea of just desserts becomes more complex is where those who are below the age of adulthood commit crimes, especially violent one. In Ohio, as in many states facing the industrial declines of the 21st century, dealing with crime has come to mean finding answers for the untenable situation concerning the state's youth. The increasingly prevalent issue of minors who commit crimes which are considered to be of an 'adult' nature is shaping the application of sentencing to this category of defendant. There is the appearance, given the seemingly -- though not actually -- common incidences of school-shooting, teen-on-teen violence and an increased juvenile susceptibility to drug abuse, that pre-adult violence is a pressing sociological problem for which the appropriate legal measures must be implemented. The distinctions between juveniles and adults with regard to specific types of crime is being blurred in order to better serve a perceived desire by the population to see harsh penalties carried out for such crimes, regardless of age. In the case of crimes such as murder, rape/sexual assault, armed robbery or any number of crimes that are of a particularly violent nature, it has increasingly become the disposition of the American court system to try minors as adults. To some extent, this is meant to apply to juveniles who have presented evidence of the likelihood of perpetually recurrent criminal behavior. "Supporters of adult sentences for minors argue that when a child with a history of serious trouble with the law goes on to commit a violent crime, society has the right to expect a more significant sentence than just a few years in a juvenile facility. Their view is that society must be protected from the most dangerous offenders, even if they are children." (Glassner, 1) as Branham and Krantz explain in their text, this proceeds from a dual interest in creating a deterrent to such crimes in an effort to stem the rising tide of violent juvenile offenders and to instill a standard by which such offenders will not continue to be a threat to society by way of temporary, or if justified, permanent or semi-permanent through incapacitation by incarceration.

As a result, almost half of the states in the U.S., including Ohio, have a statute whereby a prosecutor can seek -- and be granted at a juvenile judge's ruling-to have an offender who is fourteen or older tried in an adult court. The text's delineation of this standard though, illustrates that the pragmatism with which such a statute needs to be carried out in order to serve these purposes is instead being supplanted by a value based assessment of an individual crime's heinousness. As a result, poor and misappropriated application of this type of statute tends to assess a defendant on a bad decision rather than on his threat as a recurrent offender or as being an individual beyond rehabilitation. However, "since the neurons in a teen brain are not mapped out yet, the brain has a more difficult time retaining information, such as consequences. Having a harder time connecting actions to consequences makes the act of trying minors as adults harsh. These differences in the functioning of the brain can make a difference in decision making." (Humiston, 1) We are provided here with a sufficient argument against the application of incapacitation as a way to deal with minors. This distinction between adults and minors is especially evident in such as cases as that of the recently convicted Christopher Pittman, for which a guilty verdict and a sentence of imprisonment were applied.

Pittman's case is made all the more complicated by the defense's argument that he was inclined to murder his grandparents due to the negative emotional impact of the anti-depressant Zoloft, which he'd recently been prescribed. As highlighted in a New York Times article, the judge chose to side with the prosecutor, who asked that the defendant be tried as an adult due to the levity of his actions. This precluded Pittman from a degree of leniency that would have at least taken into account the shortcomings in the decision-making capacity which are inherently possessed by a minor, much less one under the influence of prescription drugs. Among such leniencies is the principle that "if a minor is not tried as an adult, his or her case is heard by a judge - no jury - in a juvenile court. The judge decides what is in the best interest of the child - and of society - and may sentence the offender to a reform school or a juvenile facility, with rehabilitation and release as the goal." (Glassner, 1) This is not a reservation that was made for Pittman, according to the Times article, in spite of the fact that he was only twelve during the time of the crime and was experiencing the negative behavioral effects of the anti-depressant. The judge's harsh sentence on Pittman, which will not see him released from prison until he is 45 years of age, speaks to that condition.

Fifteen at the time of sentencing, the exceedingly young age of the defendant at the time of the crimes in question might have been invoked not to assert that he was not guilty of the crime but to incur discussion over whether or not it was appropriate to try and convict Pittman as an adult, especially considering his incapacity to reject the prescription drug precipitously involved in the murders. "Before the trial, Christopher's lawyers tried to have his case heard in a juvenile court where, if found guilty, he would have been released at 18. But a judge agreed with the prosecutors that he should be tried as an adult.." (Dewan, 2) as a result, an adult trial yielded a set of two thirty year sentences. Though the judge applied the sentences to be served in concurrence, a nod of leniency most likely encouraged by the defendant's age (though no motive for this decision is mentioned in the article) the family of the boy was devastated by the heavy term of imprisonment for the unusually young convict.

This highlights one of the clearest philosophical drawbacks for a correctional focus which is geared toward incapacitation. Indeed, we might regard this as an example where 'just desserts' might be an approach affiliated with the overlooked demands of Pittman's case. Particularly, we can see by the language which was used to convict him, the Pittman's case incited an interest in incapacitation based on the sense that his crimes presented a clear threat to society were he not contained. In the case of Pittman, we may make the argument that his crimes are significant enough to warrant the use of incapacitation. However, from a precedent standpoint, it is a disturbing indication of the individual and systemic flexibility given to members of the judiciary to evaluate the viability of trying a minor as an adult. The clear psychological, emotional and experiential differences between developing and developed individuals suggests that there is a clear and rational philosophical underpinning to the maintenance of a distinction between minor and adult. This is, more than anything else, a demonstration of the importance in establishing a philosophical grounding on a statewide basis with inherently protective conditions. The notion of just desserts recommends a correctional approach that is properly commensurate with the details of the crime, including the contextual and biographical elements of importance. This grounding would demand that sentencing answer to such matters as the age of the defendant and the likely impact of this and related conditions on the current and future emotional state.

This is why a core element of correctional philosophy is one which calls a number of relevant organizations in to play where shaping the approach is concerning. The multi-agency correctional framework denotes a reliance upon inter-locking public, community-based and governmental groups in defining this philosophy. This ensures that policy groups with concern toward civil liberties and the proper measure of justice and mercy are at the same table as those with concerted interest in law and order.

A fine example of this balance in the context of juvenile sentencing may be found in a proposal from 2001 which began Ohio's improved orientation toward the establishment of nuanced correctional options for minors. This would represent a significant change from the uni-dimensional orientation nature of judiciary sentencing for minors, with a focus on created distinct and varying paths of sentencing to allow for the more accurate distribution of just desserts.

That change was RECLAIM (Reasoned and Equitable Community and Local Alternatives to the Incarceration of Minors) Ohio, a nationally recognized funding program for juvenile offenders that encourages courts to develop or purchase a range of community-based sentencing options." (Corrections Today, 1) by demanding that individuals who have committed crimes but are yet young enough to experience some degree of personal growth beyond the conditions precipitating criminality engage the communities which they have adversely impacted, we stand a greater chance of one day returning them to this population. This seems to be a practical application of the multi-agency approach to framing corrections, and particularly the distribution of just desserts, insofar as it demands the incorporation of community-based groups and traditional penal agencies.

Additionally, in such modes of multi-agency orientation, it becomes increasingly apparent that there is somewhat of a momentum toward this level of coordination, stimulated by the sense that government bureaucracies in their current form are generally slow and ineffective in meeting needs for change. There is an impression amongst its advocates that multi-agency collaboration will light the way to a more dynamic orientation for such systems as criminal justice, which might be seen as appropriately scaled for the scope of the responsibilities under its jurisdiction but poorly oriented toward proper information sharing or collaboration with external groups such as the community agencies called for here above..

In pursuing a fuller discussion here on the causes for a general endorsement of more effective multi-agency functionality, it should be understood that when we speak of multi-agency collaboration in the context of criminal justice, there is a foundational interest in applying checks and balances to an aspect of governance quite often impacted negatively by sharp divisions between systems. Particularly, legislative, enforcement-based, judicial, penal and parole-based agencies will often have little direct engagement even as they independently pursue common ends within a large systemic context. This may mean that the undue dominance of influence by one branch over another may hold criminal justice subject to inconsistencies. For example, if we are to allow law enforcement to practice without acknowledgment of legislative changes to the process, or without oversight by eventual judicial proceeding, than we hold those subject to law enforcement engagement also subject to the discretion of an agency disaffected from constitutional or regulatory conditions. A similar obstruction to the protection of individual rights may occur where an absence of agency collaboration allows legislative policy to undermine all other -- typically more sustained and consistent -- agencies of law enforcement. In such instances, lawmakers may likely be influenced by the political pressures which are part and parcel of public office-holding. Where such occurs, a failure of the criminal justice system to apply appropriate checks and balances through close coordination with legislative bodies may create the undue influence of political opportunity on the application of criminal justice. The victim here is the defendant, who loses an opportunity for evaluation with nuance in criminal proceedings.

Contrarily, a multi-agency scenario will involve all interested parties in the deliberation over a specific aspect of the delegation of criminal justice. In many of the examples encountered by our research, sentencing is one area in which the involvement of differing agencies will tend to reflect an opportunity for the contribution of all interested branches of the justice administration system. Under such terms, "the legislature, sentencing commission and parole board, prosecutors, defenders, courts, and corrections officials all share power over sentencing decisions, and thus serve as a check on each other (Frase, 2000). Reforms such as mandatory minimum sentencing tend to unduly concentrate power in the legislature and the prosecution." (Law Library, 1) as noted above, this is ultimately an outcome which will suggest the failure of the criminal justice system to properly protect the rights of the subject to prosecution, which we might characterize as a conflict equally as troubling as the failure of the justice system to properly prosecute those guilty of offences. To this latter end, we distinguish between the multiagency framework as a channel for the application of just desserts, which does still argue in favor of the application of punishment that is at least measured according to the offense, and something such as restorative justice. This is an approach which by contrast tends to indulge in the progressive optimism that forced confrontation between victim and perpetrator, and the application of reparations or some other form of compensation for the victim, with have a corrective impact on the dynamic created by the crime. This is, from the perspective applied here, an approach which removes too great a share of the authority from the state itself, which we recognize is necessary but must be diversified.