Corruption and resource wealth in Angola

Corruption in Angola: “Relatives in the Kitchen”

Introduction
Today, Angola stands at a critical juncture in its history. On the one hand, the country enjoys abundant oil reserves and is the second largest oil producer in sub-Saharan Africa. Moreover, Angola provides the United States with a significant percentage of its energy needs. On the other hand, though, Angola is still recovering from aftereffects of a costly 27-year bloody civil war that only ended in 2002.[footnoteRef:2] The recovery process, however, has been severely hampered by widespread corruption that extends to the highest levels of Angolan government. While there have been some modest signs of progress in recent months, the challenges facing Angolans in restoring confidence in their political system are severe and will not be resolved overnight. To determine the antecedents of the current situation, this paper provides an overview and background of Angola’s recent history followed by an examination of corruption in this nation today. Finally, a discussion concerning what can be done to combat the endemic corruption that constrains Angola’s economic development and civil liberties is followed by a summary of the research and important findings concerning these issues in the conclusion. [2: Alex Vines (2013, April). “Crude Existence: Environment and the Politics of Oil in Northern Angola.” African Studies Review, vol. 56, no. 1, p. 197.]

Review and Analysis
Overview of Angola
Today, Angola is a country of paradoxes. Although the country has abundant natural resources with an enormous value on the global market, Angola remains among the poorest nations in Africa.[footnoteRef:3] Certainly, riches abound but only among the political elite who continues to exert an inordinate amount of influence in this oil- and diamond-rich nation. Like many other African nations, Angola’s economic development was adversely affected by colonialism, having been a territory of Portugal until 1975 when it gained its independence. The legacy of colonialism on the Angolan people has largely mirrored other similarly situated African nations that languished under colonial rule while their natural resources were ravaged for the benefit of their European overlords and a few select high-ranking Angolans in a process termed the “resource curse.” For instance, according McFerson, “A number of African countries evidence the ‘paradox of plenty’, by which deep poverty of the vast majority of the population coexists with abundance of valuable mineral resources—oil, gas, gemstones and scarce industrial minerals.”[footnoteRef:4] The “paradox” involved, of course, relates to the high levels of corruption in these otherwise resource-rich countries. In this regard, McFerson points out that: [3: Sherelle Jacobs (2012, June). “Angola Rise of a New African Superpower?” African Business, no. 387, p. 48.] [4: Hazel M. McFerson (2009) Governance and hyper-corruption in resource-rich African countries. Third World Quarterly, vol. 30, no. 8. p. 1529.]

The answer lies in the extreme corruption in these countries, where most of the revenue from extractive industries has been and continues to be appropriated by unaccountable ruling elites. In fact, it is precisely this large revenue that allows the elite to buy control, keep the security apparatus happy, repress moves toward political participation, and preclude a minimally decent distribution of resources—a syndrome known as ‘the resource curse.’[footnoteRef:5] [5: McFerson, p. 1529.]

As can be readily discerned from the map depicted in Figure 1 below, the “resource curse” inordinately affects sub-Saharan African nations with a history of colonization and abundant natural resources that can be used in value-added industries abroad.

https://www.globalwitness.org/media/images/Corruption_graphic_hi_re s.width-800.jpg
Against this backdrop, it is easier to understand Angola’s current dilemma. In spite of having the revenues from its enormous oil reserves to help rebuild the country following the devastation caused by the 27-year civil war that only ended in 2002 and cost the lives of as many as 1.5 million people with another 4 million left homeless, Angola lags behind on many important economic and social development indicators. [footnoteRef:6] Although a majority of the Angolan people subsists on less than $1 a day, the country is among Africa’s leading oil producers but has a United National Developmental Program Human Development Index (HDI) of just 0.446, ranking it 162 out of 177 nations around the world.[footnoteRef:7] [6: “Angola government” (2017). CIA World Factbook. [online] available: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ao.html, p. 3.] [7: McFerson, p. 1532]

At present, about 90% of the country’s exports, 70% of governmental revenues and half of Angola’s gross domestic product (GDP) are generated by its Angola's oil production and ancillary activities, but diamond production also contributes another 5% to its exports. While the majority of the Angolan people are engaged in subsistence agricultural pursuits, nearly 50% of Angola’s food must still be imported.[footnoteRef:8] Notwithstanding the chilling effects that endemic corruption has on the nation’s economy as discussed at length further below, there have been some bright signs in Angola’s economic development in recent years. For example, during the period from 2004 through 2008, oil production contributed to an annual average growth of more than 17% and demand for housing to accommodate the millions of Angolans displaced during the civil war has resulted in ubiquitous construction through the country’s urban areas, including most especially its capital, Luanda (see map at Appendix A).[footnoteRef:9] [8: “Angola government,” p. 3.] [9: “Angola government,” p. 3.]

Despite these noteworthy areas of progress, Angola is still faced with some truly daunting developmental obstacles. For example, the current construction boom is taking place during a period in Angola’s history when some of its basic infrastructure remains undeveloped or damaged as a result of its civil war despite billions of dollars in infrastructure rebuilding and construction credits from European countries and China. In addition, tens of thousands of deadly landmines left from the civil war still pepper the Angolan countryside. Further, because Angola’s economic remains heavily reliant on its oil reserves, it is highly vulnerable to downturns in the global economy and oil pricing levels. In this regard, U.S. analysts report that, “The global recession that started in 2008 stalled Angola’s economic growth. In particular, lower prices for oil and diamonds slowed GDP growth to 2.4% in 2009, and many construction projects stopped because Luanda accrued $9 billion in arrears to foreign construction companies when government revenue fell.”[footnoteRef:10] [10: “Angola government,” p. 3.]

In late 2009, Angola entered into an agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for $1.4 billion to help shore up its international reserves, a move that helped reverse the country’s hyperinflation rate of 325%, reducing it to below 9% in 2014; however, Angola’s inflation rate began increasing once again the very next year to 10.3% in 2015 and a troubling 26.9% rate by 2016.[footnoteRef:11] Other constraints to economic development have included the depreciation of the nation’s currency, declining global prices for oil, and sluggish performance in non-oil GDP sectors.[footnoteRef:12] Taken together, it is apparent that Angola is truly a land of paradoxes, but the cause of these paradoxes is well known as discussed below. [11: “Angola government,” p. 3.] [12: “Angolan government,” p. 4.]

Corruption in Angola
Although corruption is rife throughout the Angolan economy, it is particularly pronounced in its extractive industries such as oil and diamond production and remains a major constraint to the country’s long-term economic development. [footnoteRef:13] In this regard, McFerson emphasizes that, “Corruption has been substantial, with over US$1 billion per year of the country’s oil revenues—25% of state revenue—unaccounted for since 1996.”[footnoteRef:14] Indeed, according to the corruption index maintained by Transparency International, Angola is one of the most corrupt countries in the world today, ranked as 164th out of 176 countries with a score of just 18 out of 100.[footnoteRef:15] Despite anti-corruption efforts by international organizations and an Angolan legal framework that criminalizes corruption, Angola actually lost ground in recent years while other African nations have made substantive progress as shown in Table 1 below. [13: “Angola government,” p. 4.] [14: McFerson, p. 1532] [15: “Angola corruption ratings” (2017). Transparency International. [online[ available: https://www.transparency.org/country/AGO (Somalia ranks last at 174th.]

Table 1
Corruption perception rankings, selected resource-rich African countries: 2004–2008

Country
2004
2008


Score
Rank
Score
Rank

Angola
2.0
133
1.9
158

Botswana
6.0
31
5.8
36

Republic of Congo
2.3
114
1.9
158

DRC
1.9
152
1.2
171

Equatorial Guinea
1.9
152
1.7
171

Gabon
3.3
74
3.7
96

Nigeria
1.6
144
2.7
121



Source: McFerson, 2009, p. 1531
Note: *Low score (1–10) and high rank (out of 145 in 2004, out of 180 in 2008) indicate worse corruption. The TI indicators are based on perceptions. Indeed, there are no fact-based corruption indicators, although a growing body of research points to the connections between corruption and the modalities of exercise of various state functions. Because perceptions lag behind reality, a country may rank high in corruption although improvements may have taken place recently and vice versa. (TI indicators were not available before 2005 for many of the countries reviewed here.)
The lingering aftereffects of colonialism and a drawn-out bloody civil war have resulted in the Angolan government adopting a victimization perspective that is has leveraged to limit the rule of law including due process, and well as the quality of governance and regulation that have limited its ability --- and motivation – to control corruption.[footnoteRef:16] An analyst at the U.S. Naval War College characterizes Angola as “the sleeping giant where billions of dollars have disappeared and where government maintains deep distrust of and distance from the international community,”[footnoteRef:17] but the common denominator for all of the country’s woes remains tied to widespread corruption.[footnoteRef:18] [16: McFerson, p. 1532] [17: Richmond M. Lloyd (2007, Autumn). “Untapped: The Scramble for Africa's Oil.” Naval War College Review, vol. 60, no. 4, p. 142.] [18: Alex Vines (2013, April). “Crude Existence: Environment and the Politics of Oil in Northern Angola.” African Studies Review, vol. 56, no. 1, p. 197.]

In fact, in any type of “follow-the-money” analysis, corruption is inextricably associated with all of the problems facing Angola today. For instance, according to one international watchdog organization, “Corruption remains widespread in Angola due to a lack of checks and balances, insufficient institutional capacity and a culture of impunity.”[footnoteRef:19] The broad legal definition provided by Black’s Legal Dictionary states that corruption is “an act done with the intent to give some advantage inconsistent with official duty and the rights of others.”[footnoteRef:20] Applied to an Angolan context, the definition assumes a wide array of these types of illegal practices, affecting virtually all levels of Angolan society. For example, the GAN Anti-Corruption organization reports that, “Practices of nepotism, cronyism and patronage pervade procurement rendering the procurement process opaque and corrupt. The oil and mining sector in Angola are considered especially high risk areas for corruption.”[footnoteRef:21] [19: Angola Corruption Report (2016, August). GAN Anti-Corruption. [online] available: http://www.business-anti-corruption.com/country-profiles/angola, p. 1.] [20: Black’s Law Dictionary (1990). St. Paul, MN: West Publishing Co., p. 345.] [21: Angola Corruption Report, p. 1.]

Even though some of these illegal practices are highly localized and involve relatively small amounts of money (i.e., alcohol used to bribe Angolan border officials), other cases involve tens of millions and even billions of dollars that have been diverted through sophisticated criminal networks. These criminal networks are largely ignored by the government because many officials are involved, and a culture of acceptance of corruption pervades the country. In this regard, the analysts at GAN note that, “Clientelistic networks generally govern the way business is conducted in Angola with many Angolan companies functioning as front organizations for government officials whose integrity and accountability are frequently questioned by observers.”[footnoteRef:22] This is not to say, of course, that anti-corruption laws are not on Angola’s books. For example, according to Nadorff: [22: Angola Corruption Report, p. 2.]

Public Probity Law is Angola’s primary legislation regulating the behaviours of public officers, who are generally deemed to be ‘any person who exercises an authority, office, employment or function in a public entity’. Its most relevant provisions concern: principles relating to public service and proper conduct of public officers; prohibited acts; conflicts of interest; reporting requirements; and enforcement.[footnoteRef:23] [23: Norman Nadorff (2015, December 2). “Angola’s Probity Law: The will to combat corruption.” Journal of Energy and Business. [online] available: https://www.howwemadeitinafrica.com/angolas-probity-laws-the-will-to-combat-corruption/, p. 3.]

It is to say, however, that these laws are rarely if ever aggressively enforced. Indeed, as the analysts at GAN conclude, “Active and passive bribery, illicit enrichment and conflict of interest are criminalized by the Probity Law, but offences are rarely prosecuted. Gifts and facilitation payments are a common part of doing business in Angola.”[footnoteRef:24] [24: Angola Corruption Report (2016, August). G A N Anti-Corruption. [online] available: http://www.business-anti-corruption.com/country-profiles/angola, p. 1.]

Given this widespread culture of acceptance among Angolan politicians and businesspeople as well as by foreign investors and multinational partners, it would be reasonable to suggest that the true extent – and impact – of corruption remains unclear. In this regard, Calvin intimates that Angolan officials purposely provide incomplete or inaccurate accountings of state money and foreign investments, and vast sums of money simply vanish with no reasonable explanation. For instance, Calvin reports that, “Ordinary ineptitude and inefficiency make it difficult -- some would say deliberately difficult -- to assemble a true picture of the nation's finances. It is hard to know how much is lost to corruption and how much is simply lost [but] corruption is at the core of the country's economic problems.” [footnoteRef:25] [25: Henri E. Calvin (2009, November 30). IMF skewers corruption in Angola. The New York Times. [online] available: http://www.nytimes.com/2002/11/30/world/imf-skewers-corruption-in-angola.html, p. 2.]

It is clear, however, that corruption has a profoundly negative effect on the average Angolan citizen. With a majority of Angolans subsisting on less than $1 per day and one of the world’s highest infant mortality rates, the diversion of huge sums of state money represents a crime of truly momentous proportions. Writing in African Business, Ford emphasizes that, “In terms of oil, Angola is one of the world's richest countries. All the big oil companies have a presence there, and Angola may surpass Saudi Arabia as the world's foremost oil producer.”[footnoteRef:26] While the citizens of many oil-rich countries in the Middle East enjoy some of the world’s highest standards of living, the same does not hold true for many resource-rich African nations today. As Ford points out: [26: Neil Ford (2017, March). “Lower Rates of Growth Forecast for Angola: A Big Jump in Oil Prices Would Fix Angola's Government Finances, but This Looks Unlikely at Present.” African Business, no. 439, p. 48.]

Yet today, hundreds of thousands are starving; a child dies every 3 minutes and three quarters of Angola's population lives on less than a dollar a day. But by rights, these people should be prospering: under the Angolan constitution, they own the valuable reserves that are making the multinationals ever richer.[footnoteRef:27] [27: Andrew Brackenbury (2009, February). “Rich Land, Poor Land: Experts Are Predicting That Angola May Soon Overtake Saudi Arabia as the World's Principal Oil Producer. So Why, Asks Andrew Brackenbury, Are Its People Dying of Hunger?” Geographical, vol. 75, no. 2, p. 37.]

These empirical observations suggest that the source of the Angolan paradox is readily apparent, with greed fueling these practices at every level of government and business.[footnoteRef:28] Some of the more damaging – and revealing -- evidence to emerge from investigations by the IMF include the enormous sums of money being paid by multinational oil conglomerates that find its way into the pockets of corrupt government officials. For example, Calvin notes that, “The huge bonus payments that oil companies must pay to secure drilling rights for Angola's offshore reserves have been a particular concern of critics.” [footnoteRef:29] [28: Neil, p. 49.] [29: Calvin, p. 2.]

A report published by the IMF concerning the extent of corruption in Angola suggests that the causes of the Angolan paradox are not all that mysterious after all. According to the IMF’s report, “Rarely is the expenditure of bonus money detailed in fiscal accounts, and even then, the amounts received are sometimes grossly underreported.” As a salient example, the IMF cited the $285 million in bonus payments made by companies to secure rights to Angola’s deep-sea oil fields reported by Angola’s government, but the oil companies claim nearly $400 million in bonus payments were made, which means that more than $100 million was diverted into the chasm of corruption that is Angola today.[footnoteRef:30] [30: Calvin, p. 2.]

As noted above, the true extent of corruption in Angola remains unclear, but even the most damning estimates may be grossly underestimating the amounts of money that are involved. It is possible, though, to gain some indication of the enormity of these monies by reviewing other instances that have come to light through investigations by international watchdog agencies and admissions by multinational corporations themselves. A Brazilian conglomerate, Odebrecht, for example, admitted bribing Angolan governmental officials to the tune of $50 million for various contracts during a trial in New York in December 2008 for these criminal practices.
Nevertheless, the admission in open court was ignored by Angolan governmental officials despite the conglomerate’s chief executive officer being sentenced to prison for 19 years for bribery. Moreover, although the company admitted to engaging in widespread bribery in a number of African countries, Angola was the only African nation identified during its trial. One anti-corruption advocate responded to the Angolan government’s silence on this admission by stating, “The point is that there is no official interest in fighting corruption, or even pretending that there is an interest in fighting corruption. The Angolan judicial system wants this to go away because of the involvement of senior officials (emphasis added).”[footnoteRef:31] [31: Angola Silent despite Firm Admitting to Bribes. Contributors: Not available. Newspaper title: Cape Times (South Africa). Publication date: March 22, 2017. Page number: 19.]

With this level of involvement on the part of high-ranking government officials, it is little wonder that only superficial progress has been- - or can be – made in the Angolan context. As noted above, the few concrete examples of corruption that have been exposed only represent the tip of a very large monetary iceberg, and the sums may even run into the trillions of dollars. This kind of money, of course, would go a long way in alleviating the suffering of the Angolan people, but it is apparent that Angolan governmental officials at every level are highly motivated to protect their interests simply because of all of the money that is involved.
The international watchdog agency Global Witness has charged the Angolan government with concealing around $1 billion a year for the past 5 years, accusations that are supported by the findings of the aforementioned IMF report. In reality, though, these levels may be grossly underestimated because the only hard evidence has been the rare example of Odebrecht cited above wherein a multinational was compelled to confess at trial. As a report in the South Africa Cape Times recently noted, “With about 90 per cent of Angola's gross national product coming from oil, it is clear that much of this `lost' money came from oil company payments. Yet the oil giants refuse to publicly disclose details of their financial transactions with the Angolan government, citing `corporate confidentiality', despite the fact that similar information is routinely published in the West.”[footnoteRef:32] [32: “Angola silent,” p. 19.]

One of the reasons that many multinational corporations may be highly reluctant to divulge full disclosure concerning their dealings with Angolan officials is the fact that high-ranking government officials in other countries are involved as well. According to a study by Brackenbury, this was the case with the so-called “Angolagate” scandal that involved high-placed French citizens. In this regard, Brackenbury reports that:
To understand the links between the oil industry and corruption in Angola, it is necessary to look to France's most infamous political scandal of recent times, `Angolagate'. This complex affair involved the elite of France and Angola diverting oil revenues to buy arms for the Angolan government and led to the arrest of, among others, Jean Christophe Mitterand, son of the then French president. [footnoteRef:33] [33: Brackenbury, p. 37.]

This already tangled web became even more convoluted as additional details about Angolagate and the involvement of French businesspeople became known. One prominent French business leader, Pierre Falcone, was charged with facilitating arms deals between Angolan and French governmental officials as well as arranging for a number of loans from international banks that were backed by future oil production. The long-term effects of these shady dealings are not yet known because, as usual, the amounts of money that are involved are also unknown, but what is known is that the deals:
. . . effectively mortgaged future oil production and provided the Angolan government with another vast and as yet undisclosed source of revenue. Where this money went, and where it's going today, remains a mystery. What is clear is that in this shadowy world of kickbacks and oil-greased palms, the Angolan people were robbed of their inheritance.”[footnoteRef:34] [34: Brackenbury, p. 37.]

By any measure, then, corruption is well entrenched in Angola at every level including the highest levels of government and many industries, most especially the extractive sectors. Anti-corruption watchdog Global Witness discovered $1 billion in Angolan assets in a British Virgin Island account, and though the organization is reluctant to reveal the names of the account holders due to the sensitive nature of the discovery, Brackenbury emphasizes that “they are at the very apex of Angola's political elite.”[footnoteRef:35] [35: Brackenbury, p. 38.]

As if taking a lesson from Dick Cheney et al. evil cabal at Halliburton that bilked billions of dollars from Uncle Sam, Global Witness found that a subsidiary of the Falcone conglomerate, CADA Ltd., also enjoyed an exclusive contract with the Angolan government to provide all uniforms as well as medical and food supplies to its military forces during its civil war and thereafter, an arrangement that allowed the firm to overcharge the Angolan government and share an unknown amount of kickbacks to high-placed Angolan government and political leaders.[footnoteRef:36] The international aid community maintains that CADA remains active in these practices and that little substantive change can be reasonably expected from Angolan officials in the future. As a Global Witness representative conceded, these findings “suggest that the same beneficial circle that appeared to profit from a highly over-priced military procurement process during the war is now well positioned to profit from the peace.”[footnoteRef:37] [36: Brackenbury, p. 37] [37: Brackenbury, p. 37]

While additional investigations are desperately needed to determine the full extent and implications of corruption in Angola today, reports from the field indicate that virtually nothing goes in or out of Angola or consumed within the country without some type of corruption being involved. There have been charges from some international aid organizations that their humanitarian packages intended for marginalized Angolans are being stopped at ports of entry and bribes being demand for their admission into the country. Like multinational corporations desperate to gain access to the country’s vast natural wealth, these international aid organizations have found it necessary to make these payments rather than deprive the Angolan people of the aid. A representative of Angola’s Open Society Foundation confirms that such rumors are completely accurate:
It is all true. Why do you think the government has no transparent process of food procurement? Corruption rules Angola. There is nothing that can be done without corruption. Foreign aid agencies and NGOs must pressure the government to ensure that Angolans benefit from what belongs to them. This cannot be done without the help of the USA and Europe. They have access to the information. It is they that send the oil companies here and their bank accounts that have billions of Angolan people's dollars in them.[footnoteRef:38] [38: As cited in Brackenbury, p. 37]

To their dubious credit, high-level Angolan officials have developed some truly innovative ways to unjustly enrich themselves at the expense of the Angolan people. Some high-ranking military officials, for example, have created nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that allow them to exploit this tax-exempt status through lucrative import enterprise. Conversely, other honestly operated Angolan NGOs are faced with a bureaucracy that demands bribes or gifts at every turn. These practices, combined with a fundamental lack of transparency and accountability among the Angolan political and military elite and the culpability of multinational corporations has created a roadblock to any substantive progress in effecting meaningful change.[footnoteRef:39] [39: Brackenbury, p. 37]

This sad situation endures despite formal plans on the part of the Angolan president to align the country’s accounting and governance polices with accepted international practices, an eventuality that is doomed from the outset unless things change. With oil revenues already topping $70 billion a year and projected to increase significantly in the future, President Jose Eduardo dos Santos clearly has his work cut out for him if he wants to succeed in this developmental strategy, most especially since he and his family may be actively involved in the illegal diversion of tens of millions of dollars as well.[footnoteRef:40] As Onishi points out: [40: “Fear Lingers as Angola Opens Up Economy” (2013, August 5). Cape Times (South Africa), p. 19.]

Angola’s reconstruction and oil boom also presented the politically connected — those with ‘relatives in the kitchen,’ as Angolans say — with a golden opportunity for self-enrichment. In an economy driven by President José Eduardo dos Santos, his inner circle of family and allies have amassed extraordinary wealth. The president’s eldest daughter, Isabel dos Santos, has become Africa’s first female billionaire [with an estimated wealth of] $3.3 billion.[footnoteRef:41] [41: Norimitsu Onishi (2017, June 24). The New York Times. [online] available: https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/24/world/africa/angola-luanda-jose-eduardo-dos-santos.html, p. 4.]

In sum, corruption is rife throughout Angolan society, enriching a powerful few members of the political and military elite while leaving the vast majority of the Angolan people to suffer from high rates of infant mortality, malnutrition and even famine in this land of plenty.[footnoteRef:42] With the stakes so high, identifying effective ways to combat corruption in Angola has assumed new relevance and importance in recent years as discussed further below. [42: Economic Overview (2016). The World Bank. [online] available: http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/angola/overview, p. 3.]

Combating Corruption in Angola
Complex problems demand complex solutions of course, but the situation in Angola has defied the most ambitious efforts to date. The overarching constraint involved is the continuing reliance on the government on its enormous oil reserves which creates an environment in which economic and political power can be concentrated among the country’s elite.[footnoteRef:43] Consequently, any meaningful changes will need to begin at the very top, and that eventuality appears unlikely given the well entrenched nature of corruption in Angolan society at present. As Jacob concedes, “With both political and economic power still heavily concentrated in the hands of very few in Angola, perhaps it is fair to assert that whether these will be tackled depends, more than anything, on the mettle and appetite for change of its government.”[footnoteRef:44] [43: Sherelle Jacobs (2012, June). “Angola Rise of a New African Superpower?” African Business, no. 387, p. 48.] [44: Jacobs, p. 48.]

Although a legal framework has been established in response to fraud, money laundering and drug trafficking, including new laws passed in 2010 and 2011 that are designed to bring the country’s accounting practices in line with international standards as well as requiring Angolan banks to notify any bank with which they conduct business concerning these standards. As a result, it is no longer possible, at least in theory, for Angolan banking officials or their international banking partners to use ignorance as a shield against prosecution for corruption.[footnoteRef:45] In addition, all Angolan banks are now required to provide independently audited accounting records concerning their efforts to implement the standards developed by international accounting organizations.[footnoteRef:46] [45: de Morals, José Pedro (2016, March 1). “Strengthening the Financial System.” Global Finance, vol. 30, no. 3, p. 52.] [46: de Morals, p. 52.]

Further, the IMF recommends that “Angola should promote economic diversification by improving the business climate and strengthening the role of the private sector in the reconstruction of infrastructure.”[footnoteRef:47] Moreover, the IMF has also recommended that any further assistance to Angola should be withheld until the government makes a full accounting for the tens of billions of dollars already poured in the event horizon of the Angolan monetary black hole and makes social spending a priority. In fact, one IMF official complained that, “Angolan authorities need to fully and publicly explain what they did with those billions in taxpayer funds before getting another cent from the IMF.”[footnoteRef:48] [47: As cited in Ford, p. 49.] [48: As cited in de Morals, p. 52.]

Finally, a series of recommendations from the Journal of Energy and Business concerning strategies for combating corruption in Angola include the following:
· Fully staff, fund, train, and incentivise the anti-corruption section of the Attorney General’s office and the Financial Information Unit;
· Enhance the ability of individual citizens to report individual acts of corruption without fear of reprisal;
· Clarify, consolidate and strengthen the laws that criminalize individual acts of corruption towards government officials (active corruption);
· Enforce the provisions of the Probity Law, in particular its conflict of interest prohibitions and financial reporting requirements; and,
· Strengthen and publicize the government’s zero tolerance policy concurrently with the announcement of eventual reforms.
In the final analysis, then, the legal framework exists to combat corruption in Angola, the political will to effect meaningful change remains lacking.[footnoteRef:49] [49: Nadorff, p. 5.]

Conclusion
Unfortunately, the research was consistent in showing that despite efforts to combat corruption in Angola in recent years, practices such as bribery and expensive gifts are still widely regarded as simply the cost of doing business in this resource-rich African nation. More troubling still, though, was the finding that corruption extends into the very highest levels of the Angolan government, including the nations’ not-surprisingly ultra-wealthy president and his family. While a majority of the Angolan people is forced to live on less than $1 a day, a few lucky elite enjoy lifestyles that would be the envy of a modern North Korean dictator. The illegal taxation of international humanitarian aid and the diversion of hundreds of billions of dollars over the years has simply been accepted as a harsh reality for dealing with the Angolans, but the time has come for the international community to step up and say enough is enough.



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Appendix A
Political Map of Angola