Counterintelligence Primarily, Counterintelligence Operations Entail

Counterintelligence

Primarily, counterintelligence operations entail two major focuses: keeping intelligence organizations clean of outside penetration, and "trying to turn members of hostile intelligence services abroad into American moles. Of the many tools employed by most intelligence organizations, the polygraph has remained one of the most commonly used and most effectively applied ways to weed-out and prevent moles from infiltrating these organizations, as well as determining the legitimacy of information received from foreign moles. Counterintelligence, obviously, is a risky business; and it is rarely a straightforward task to determine which individuals within an organization might potentially be moles, and abroad, which individuals are worth trusting or rewarding for information. Fighting against foreign infiltration typically relies heavily upon the polygraph, but it is important to recognize that this tool is not flawless, and a methodical and regular investigative strategy must be continuously employed within any intelligence organization.

Perhaps the most commonly used method of weeding-out any potential security threats is to periodically investigate employees of intelligence agencies every few years, and to also conduct investigations at any time when their reliability comes into question. The expressed technique of the CIA is "to reinvestigate CIA employees every five years, whether they need it or not, as well as when questions arise about the individual's behavior." This, of course, relies upon both the use of the polygraph and general collection of information on the individual. However, this sort of generic approach is not always guaranteed to identify moles that are well placed, are capable of manipulating regulations, and those that have been trained in how to overcome traditional investigative techniques -- such as the polygraph. There is the additional problem that these rigid approaches toward uncovering potential moles are easily recognizable and well-understood within the organization. This means that an intelligence officer, every five years, will be well aware of the fact that he or she will be coming under increased scrutiny; accordingly, they can alter their behavior or take increased security measures to avoid identification and capture.

Of course, even through the years, although the track record of most intelligence agencies in identifying moles has revealed the weaknesses of relying too heavily upon these blanket searches, they nonetheless remain essential toward minimizing the risk associated with hiring intelligence officers. It should come as no surprise that the CIA and FBI identify a number of personality traits and past practices that either eliminate an individual from the possibility of becoming an intelligence officer, or place an increased level of scrutiny on him or her: "The Office of Security, whose principal (indeed almost its sole) tool is the polygraph, screens people before they become CIA employees. It asks whether the individuals have been agents of foreign intelligence services, whether they have habits that would make them vulnerable to recruiting (drugs, homosexuality, fraud), and whether they are truthful in their answers to the U.S. government." Although this is clearly a somewhat passive approach to identifying moles, the use of the polygraph in internal investigations vastly decreases the level of risk involved in hiring and recruiting practices. After all, although the polygraph cannot be considered to be definitive proof -- it cannot be used as evidence in the court of law, for example -- it is a cheap way to identify and eliminate major threats to security.

Nevertheless, the notorious instances in which the polygraph provided counterintelligence operations with unreliable information seem to loom over the head of much of the information that is gathered through them. Very routinely, the process of determining the reliability of informants in foreign agencies becomes paralyzed even after a polygraph has been administered. Typically, this has occurred within the CIA following apparent breaches of security, or instances in which it was never clearly determined whether an informant was providing legitimate information: "In the case of Vitaly Yurchenko, the CIA Counterintelligence Staff was faced with assessing whether he was a legitimate defector who changed his mind or a planet who intended to redefect from the beginning." It was eventually determined, after several years of investigation into the incident, that Yurchenko was a real defector who was put under pressured from the Soviet Union to return; this conclusion was in agreement with the polygraph administered to him.