Counterterrorism strategies and policy approaches

Counter-Terrorism

Terrorism takes up a good deal of our foreign policy apparatus today, not only in dealing directly with terrorist threats but with the need to develop and implement measure for counter-terrorism. Such programs are also much in view domestically through actions by the Homeland Security Agency and other government agencies dedicated to protecting the citizenry. This emphasis has been strong since 9-11, widely perceived to have been not only a terrorist attack but an example of the failure of counter-terrorist measures at the time. Since then, a number of security measures have been instituted, some meeting more resistance than others, and some more successful than others. Given the nature of the 9-11 attacks, which involved the hijacking of three commercial airliners and their use as weapons, it is natural that airline security be one of the first orders of business. Most flyers report that they feel safer now as a result, but they also note the degree to which many of these measures are disruptive, time-consuming, and in some cases misdirected.

Counter-terrorist moves are nothing new and have a long history, coming to the fore now and again as circumstances warrant. The danger of terrorist attack is such that the legislature has responded with a number of regulations for airline security, for procedures in cases of suspected terrorist activity, and for enhanced punishments for acts against common carriers. The history of aviation security shows that the danger has been increasing rather than decreasing, in part because of the great increase in frequency of flights and in part because of a perception of vulnerability that attracts those who want to commit a terrorist act to gain publicity for their cause. Early in the era of international air transport, it was perceived that there was a need for uniform regulations, and to meet this need the Aeronautical Commission of the 1919 Peace Conference drew up the Paris Air Convention, an agreement that established the International Commission for Air Navigation (ICAN) and provided for the collection and exchange of information among ICAN's member States. The United States was not originally a signatory to this agreement. After World War II, civilian aviation grew rapidly. As world tensions increased during the Cold war, aviation was seen as the industry most vulnerable to international terrorist attack. In 1948 there were seven hijackings, six in Europe and one in Asia, all perpetrated by persons seeking desperately to escape from a stifling and severely repressive political regime. Unlawful activity escalated in subsequent years leading to increased acts of sabotage, kidnapping, assassination, drug trafficking, smuggling, illegal immigration, and theft (Dorey, 1983, pp. 1-2).

In 1944, fifty-two representatives of allied and neutral States met in Chicago to discuss the problems of civil aviation, leading to the Convention on International Civil Aviation signed on December 7, 1944. This document established the privileges and restrictions of all signing States and provided for the adoption of international standards for air navigation (Dorey, 1983, p. 3). In the ensuring years, a number of international organizations have come into being to regulate air traffic, including addressing security concerns: The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the International Air Transport Association (IATA), the Airport Operators Council International (AOCI), the International Civil Airports Association (ICAA), and others. Early recognition of the need to deal with acts directed against air travelers was seen in the ICAO sponsored Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft signed at Tokyo in 1963, a Convention that dealt with the punishment of offenses committed on board aircraft, singling out hijacking as a particular offense (Dorey, 1983, p. 17). The hijacking issue was addressed again by the ICAO in 1971. The Protection of Aircraft Act of 1973 was another effort to suppress unlawful acts against the safety of civil aviation (Dorey, 1983, pp. 27-28).

In the United States, the principal legislative enabling instrument is the Federal Aviation Act of 1958. The FAA promulgates mandatory Federal Aviation Regulations, including rules for aviation security (Volume VI Parts 107, 121, and 129). Public law 93-266 contained two Acts, the Antihijacking Act of 1974 and the Air Transportation Act of 1974, the effect of which was to amend various Sections of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (Dorey, 1983, p. 39).

As the danger seemed to increase for air passengers as a result of hijackings and bombings on air carriers, as well as threats of further violence, new laws and regulations have been passed. Screening procedures were instituted at airports to prevent passengers from bringing weapons or explosives onto an aircraft, as provided for in 49 USCS 1356. This regulation calls for all passengers and all property intended to be carried in the aircraft cabin in air transportation or intrastate air transportation to be screened by weapon-detection procedures prior to boarding. It was also required that the Administrator submit to congress each year a report concerning the effectiveness of screening procedures.

In 1989 an amendment was passed (Pub.L. 99-83, 103 Stat. 110) requiring the use of explosive detection equipment meeting minimum performance standards. Pub.L. 100-649, 260, Nov. 10, 1988, 102 Stat. 3817 provides that the Administrator of the FAA will conduct such research and development as is necessary to improve the effectiveness of airport security metal detectors and airport security x-ray detectors. Approval of airport security systems is placed under the purview of the Administrator.

When security became a major concern in the 1970s, federal requirements forced the issue with the nation's airport operators. The federal effort came with the perception that airports were vulnerable to terrorists and other criminal elements. For most airports, before the federal push for increased security the security effort usually consisted of a security police force primarily engaged in traffic control and the ticketing of improperly parked cars. Little attention then was given to the security of the air operations area. Larger airports tended to have more security personnel and more options. When the FAA mandated changes, at first these changes were under the control of regional directors and so might differ from area to area (Moore, 1976, pp. 133-134).

After airport security measures had been in force for some years, problems in the system and areas where the system was not fully protecting the passengers became apparent, leading to further Congressional inquiry and the passage of new legislation to improve the system. Debate over the Airport and Air Carrier Security Improvement Act of 1985 came about because of specific terrorist acts that showed where the system was vulnerable. Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan made a statement to the Senate Subcommittee on Aviation to the effect that one concern was that foreign air carriers were not secure, as shown by the then-recent hijacking of TWA Flight 847. Moynihan states: "Our domestic experience in the 1970s suggests that the most effective way to prevent hijacking of aircraft in the air, is an effective security program on the ground" (International Airport Security and Anti-Hijacking Measures, 1985, p. 25). He suggested placing unidentified, armed marshals on all regularly scheduled and public charter flights of American carriers departing from unsecure foreign airports: "When other countries adopt adequate security measures... then this program too can become unnecessary" (International Airport Security and Anti-Hijacking Measures, 1985, p. 25).

The perception of problems was of great concern. Security measures at airports were found to be largely insufficient by many critics of the system. Both the metal-detective and x-ray devices then in use were instruments whose sensitivity could be turned up or down. For practical reasons of passenger flow, the sensitivity is usually kept at a level that would detect a large metal object like a gun or a knife. Neither x-rays nor metal-detecting portals are effective against bombs made of plastic. More secure airports would have had the passengers frisked, but this was seen as time-consuming and sometimes embarrassing (Rivers, 1986, pp. 59-60).

The Airport and Air Carrier Security Improvement Act of 1985 called for extra security measures for Americans traveling on international flights. The Secretary of Transportation was to conduct an assessment of the effectiveness of security measures from time to time at foreign airports. An analysis of statements by those testifying showed that there was a general belief that American airports were doing a good job of implementing necessary security measures while foreign airports were not. The research and development aspect of legislation that had been passed continued to operate, and in 1989 it was stated that there were new devices ready to be implemented at airports to provide even more security. Again, the announcement of these measures was prompted by a tragedy, the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Scotland, resulting in the deaths of 259 passengers and 11 people on the ground. It was evident that certain types of explosive devices could be taken past the security equipment then in use. The FAA had invested millions of dollars in developing airport screening devices to find deadly explosives and weapons. One new device then cited was the thermal neutron activation device, or TNA, which was ready to be installed as soon as a clear policy was developed for its use by the FAA. Research and development was encouraged for future developments as well to continue to make security a priority (Airport Security, 1989, p. 2).

Also in response to the bombing of Flight 103, the Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990 was passed. Senator Wendell H. Ford opened the proceedings with the statement: "The terrorist bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 in December 1988 tragically demonstrated that something more is needed to be done to protect Americans traveling by air" (Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990, 1990, p. 1).

In later hearings on implementation, it was noted by Thomas C. Kelly, Vice President of Security for the Air Transport Association, that U.S. airports were much safer than foreign airports and that this fact should be noted when dealing with this legislation: "Our primary focus in the development of this legislation was to ensure that it would contain provisions imposing the same extraordinary procedures on foreign flag carriers that the FAA currently imposes only on U.S. carriers operating in international routes" (Implementation of the Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990, 1991, p. 110). Kelly notes that U.S. carriers must either physically inspect or x-ray all checked bags, make supplemental inspections of all carry-on bags, provide guards for all aircraft on the ground, and inspect all maintenance and service personnel with access to aircraft. U.S. carriers also perform redundant interrogations of passengers fitting certain profiles, appoint and train ground security coordinators, and accept no baggage from off-site sources. Such requirements are expensive and detract from the ease and speed of processing the passenger, which leads to another reason for demanding that foreign carriers provide the same degree of security -- to see that there is a level playing field in economic terms.