Criminal justice systems and practices

Criminal Justice

Although Jeff's confession is voluntary in principle, there are certain facts of the case which make it inadmissible. The voluntary nature of the confession may be ascribed to the fact that Jeff made the decision to confess independent of police intervention. The officer taking the confession offered no interruptions in the form of guiding questions, promises or threats.

However, the first important element of the case against admitting the confession is that the officer provided no Miranda warning. This means that Jeff was not advised of his right against self-incrimination as provided in the Fifth Amendment. While Jeff then freely and voluntarily approached the police officer, he received no constitutional warning that this could be against his constitutional rights.

Another mitigating factor is the circumstances surrounding the confession. Jeff is deeply religious and sometimes "hears voices." This makes his rational reasoning abilities when making the confession questionable. The fact that he confessed on the advice of religious authority rather than legal authority also calls into question his ability to think clearly before making the confession.

Although Jeff may have rightly been found competent to act in his own defense at trial, I believe that his attorney was correct to motion for the inadmissibility of his confession. It was freely and voluntarily given only after receiving religious advice. Further mitigating circumstances include the reason why he committed the robbery in the first place. His mother was gravely ill, and herself played a role in encouraging Jeff to steal the money by begging for the operation.

One could view this as creating an impossible situation for Jeff, out of which he saw the only way as stealing the money. His confession should therefore not be used during his trial, and all the extenuating circumstances surrounding it should be taken into account.

Sheriff Bustem was within his rights to stop and frisk the suspect, as the latter was guilty of obviously suspicious activity prior to being stopped, as well as a display of suspicious actions after being stopped. He was also hostile and uncooperative after being stopped, and appeared unwilling to submit to the authority of the Sheriff, refusing to give his name or state his business. All these actions provided grounds for reasonable suspicion, which gave the Sheriff the right for a stop and frisk.

However, a suspect can only be frisked after a stop and prior to an arrest. This means that the police officer can only pat down the individual, searching the outside of the suspect's clothing. This is generally done if the individual is suspected of being armed, to protect the law enforcement officers involved. Any weapons or other illegal materials found on the person can then be confiscated and admitted against the person in a court of law.

A search is a more thorough investigation of the suspect's person, and is conducted only after arrest. Unfortunately, Sheriff Bustem conducted a more thorough search than only a frisk before he made the arrest. The cocaine was found not during the frisk, but rather during the search. This means that anything found in this way is inadmissible in a court of law.

What Sheriff Bustem should have done upon not finding any weapons or drug during the frisk, is first arrest the suspect. He could have done so legally upon the reasonable suspicion that the suspect was planning some sort of criminal activity. There was enough to base the arrest upon; the individual was seen at two different gas stations at two different occasions. Both premises were closed to the public at the time. Sheriff Bustem therefore made a reasonable assumption of potential guilt when he stopped the individual.

The law however protects the subject from a more thorough search prior to the formal arrest, and therefore the cocaine cannot be used against him.

Probable cause refers to a reasonable belief that a person is involved in criminal activity, which is based upon articulated facts surrounding the case. In the case of Euclid, probable cause is then based upon his history, and upon some suspicious activities as observed during surveillance. Based upon this, as well as the fact of the marijuana odor from the vehicle provides officer Archimedes with the right to briefly detain Euclid and make a brief search of the vehicle.

Against probable cause is the fact that Euclid was not engaged in any suspicious activity during the time officer Archimedes approached his vehicle. He was also not in the car at this time, which made him unable to defend himself or provide the officer with any rights. On these grounds, it might be said that any subsequent arrest may be illegal and any substance found in the car inadmissible as evidence.

However, I believe that the case for probable cause is stronger. Despite the fact that Euclid does not have a very significant criminal record, he does have a longstanding reputation as a drug user and trader. His observed activities further substantiate this suspicion. When therefore presented with the opportunity to prosecute him for such crimes, I believe that the officer's reasonable suspicion of criminal activity is strong enough to warrant an arrest.

The vehicle can then be searched after the arrest, upon which evidence will doubtlessly be found. Probably cause and reasonable suspicion therefore play an important combined role in a case such as that of Euclid. Reasonable suspicion can be based upon immediate evidence observed prior to a stop and frisk or a more thorough search after arrest. Euclid's arrest on that evening would be the culmination of both probable cause and reasonable suspicion. In the immediate sense, the physical odor emanating from the car is sufficient grounds for detention, after which a more thorough search would give evidence that substantiates the element of probable cause.

Searching a residence without a warrant is an area of criminal law that should be considered very carefully before being applied. When access to the premises is provided by a person that lives on the premises, or has control of it, a search without a warrant is legal. When evidence is in plain view during such a search, the evidence can be seized and used as evidence against the subject. The officers may also search the premises for other subjects when danger to the public is suspected. However, searching a locked room will require a warrant.

Several facts surrounding the case of Francesco and Lucrezia are problematic. The first and most obvious is the fact that allowing the officers access to Francesco's premises was not legal, as she no longer lived there. Being asked whether she "really" lived there indicates at least some suspicion that this was no longer the case. She allowed the officers on the premises only on the basis of her own vengeful feelings towards Francesco, after which she vanished.

The police therefore had no legal right to enter the premises in the first place. Everything yielded during the illegal search is therefore also inadmissible as evidence. Although the contraband in the bathroom was not locked away from view, it would be treated the same as that in the locked room, as both were found during an illegal search, only after the police entered the premises.

Had the drugs been in plain view before the officers entered the premises, this might have given them reasonable cause for suspicion, upon which a preliminary search of unlocked rooms would not be illegal. However, the whole case rests upon the status of the person allowing the officers into the premises. Lucrezia was no longer a legal occupant of the home, and therefore had not right to provide the officers with the right of entry.

All findings within the home are therefore inadmissible as evidence, on the grounds that the entire search was illegal.

The facts of the case are somewhat few to make an informed judgment on the merits of the case against Archibald Leach. It is unclear whether the police officers conducting the search had either a warrant, cause for reasonable suspicion, or probable cause to search the bus as they did. It is however clear that travelers were not informed that their luggage would be searched. If there indeed was no warrant, this violates the Fourth Amendment rights of all passengers, which makes Leach's case inadmissible.