Critical thinking exercises and applications

Critical Thinking Exercises

Unappetizing

The author of "The Case for Cannibalism," Theodore Dalymple, presents a rather convincing argument that cannibalism, nor any other action, for that matter, is neither morally nor legally incorrect when it takes place between consenting adults. He cites an example where a man named Armin Meiwes murdered and ate another by the name of Bernd Brandes. To confirm that this arraignment between the pair was consensual, the author cites their way of introduction (which took place over the internet), and even references some shared comedy between the two in which they jested about the fact that as a smoker, Brand's body would be preserved longer to be eaten. All of these details are included in this essay to ensure that the reader is aware of the fact that both adults readily consented to the act of cannibalism that soon took place after their meeting.

Perhaps the most convincing component of Dalrymple's assertion that this act should be permissible both legally and in terms of common rectitude is his anticipation, and thorough disproving, of the typical counterargument that most people would offer as an explanation for such an uncommon (or so we hope) occurrence. That would be the tried and true insanity plea, or what Daylrymple terms as a state of being "mad." Dissenters of his logic would argue that Brandes was mad, if for no other reason than for the simple fact that he desired to be eaten. The fact that he desired to be eaten made him mad, and the evidence for his being insane was that he wanted to be eaten. Such tautological arguments considerably weaken when considering, as Dalrymple puts it, that if everyone who had some issues of emotional stability were prevented from doing whatever he or she pleased, then virtually no one would bear the right of self-determination.

While Dalrymple's claim that both of the participants in this act of cannibalism were consenting in this matter is sufficiently proven, his usage of a counterargument both strengthens his conviction -- and weakens it, to a certain extent. Although the circularity of the logic of insanity as demonstrated by the very fact that a man desires to be eaten (because he is insane, because he wants to be eaten, because he is insane…) loses credibility due to the redundancy of such thinking, the implicit conclusion that the author comes to regarding this matter, "if every person with emotional problems were denied the right to determine what is in his own interest, none of us would be self-determining in the eyes of the law, except those of us who had no emotions to have problems with," may very well be inductive. It certainly seems to be a considerable assumption to say that people with mental (or "emotional") problems, should not be restrained from their actions, because in doing so virtually everyone -- who is at least half-crazy, if not further along on his or her way to being crazy -- would then have to be restrained. It certainly seems inductive to try to convince readers that by restraining people with these tendencies from doing what they want, there would be no self-determination because everyone is crazy in some shape or another.