Power and Weakness Robert Kagan\'s 2002 Article

Power and Weakness

Robert Kagan's 2002 article entitled "Power and Weakness" which appeared in the journal Policy Review is a fine example of an argument that takes advantage of its assumptions without discussing them. The purpose of this essay is to critically analyze this source which represents a sustained reflection on the detractions, merit and implications of the author. This essay will first summarize the article by discussing the explicit and implicit assumptions made by the author. The next section of this essay will state my personal views on the subject presented and discuss the implications that I believe the article to be putting forth.

The essential point of the article can be inferred by the subtitle of the article: Why the United States and Europe see the World Differently. This piece was written in the year 2002 which, in historical terms was a very delicate and trying time for the entire Western world as a result of the suspected terror attacks of September 11, 2001. The first line of the article sets the tone for Kagan's theory. He claimed that "it is time to stop pretending that European and American's share a common view of the world, or even that they occupy the same world." It is quite obvious that the author is making a distinction between the continent of Europe and the country of the United States.

One of the main themes of this articles which supports the author's proclamation suggests that for most if, not all, of the recorded history of the land mass known as Europe has been drenched in brutal conflict, but has recently changed it ways after finally realizing that war is generally not a very productive way to occupy time. Kagan hammers home the point many times that Europeans are more intellectual and conscious of their environment. American's are referred to as cowboys recklessly riding around firing their guns in this article implying that American's are a more violent nation in today's world. Kagan suggested that this diversion is a change and a movement away from the more natural state of things. He claimed that "despite what many Europeans and some Americans believe, these differences in strategic culture do not spring naturally from the national characters of Americans and Europeans. After all, what Europeans now consider their more peaceful strategic culture is, historically speaking, quite new. It represents an evolution away from the very different strategic culture that dominated Europe for hundreds of years and at least until World War I. "

The essay continued by discussing a power gap within these two entities. The many dramatic and shifting events from the two world wars to the cold war and finally to the balkanization of the former Soviet Union are used as examples to explain the formation of this power gap. Each instance helps build the argument that Europe, as a collective state, has transcended the battlefield into a world of diplomacy, common sense and a new age.

As the article continued it began to shift gears and discuss the psychology of power and weakness. The article, claimed that Europe is weak and presented the American stance as powerful. Kagan suggested that this disparity is a result of a collective transcendence away from violence. He claimed " Europeans have a deep interest in devaluing and eventually eradicating the brutal laws of an anarchic, Hobbesian world where power is the ultimate determinant of national security and success. " It is clear that the author is making a more deeper distinction between the foreign policy choices of America and those of Europe. Europe was presented by Kagan as a weaker state because of their high tolerance for suffering. The point is being made that Europe knows more about power and weakness than America.

After making some more historical references about the development of each party's foreign policy, the author began to sum up and conclude his argument. This conclusion centered around placing the blame of the current state of the world squarely on the shoulders of American foreign policy. Kagan concluded by noting "if the United States could move past the anxiety engendered by this inaccurate sense of constraint, it could begin to show more understanding for the sensibilities of others, a little generosity of spirit. It could pay its respects to multilateralism and the rule of law and try to build some international political capital for those moments when multilateralism is impossible and unilateral action unavoidable. It could, in short, take more care to show what the founders called a "decent respect for the opinion of mankind."

Assumptions

Kagan makes many assumptions in this piece about power and weakness. His most glaring implicit assumption suggested that power and weakness is measured in military might. Power is the ability to conduct violence upon someone else according to Kagan. The article does not mention any other sources of power besides the ability to wage violent schemes against a weaker force. The inherent assumption is that power is contained in a nation's ability to wage war.

The next assumption Kagan made dealt with the idea that Europe is a unified front. Europe is not treated as a continental land mass with its qualities rooted in geography. Rather Kagan suggested that somehow Europe, with all of its diverse culture and history contained in the nation states of the individual countries, is a homogeneous group of people significantly aligned on foreign policy issues clearly situated against the United States' military power.

The final assumption I will discuss deals with the idea that Europe is a peaceful group of countries that does not enter into conflict in recent times. The fact that many European nations belong to NATO and serve in military units side by side with America suggests that this assumption is not correct. Kagan demonstrated his bias by claiming " while Europeans and Americans ultimately stood together in the confrontation with Belgrade, the Kosovo war produced in Europe less satisfaction at the successful prosecution of the war than unease at America's apparent omnipotence. That apprehension would only increase in the wake of American military action after September 11, 2001."