Cultural Impact on Politics Political

Cultural Impact on Politics

Political action does not take place in a separate realm and so is always influenced by cultural concerns, forces, developments, history, and so on. Political activity is intended to gain a consensus on what action government should take, which involves the arts of education, persuasion, and compromise. The form of the society shapes the way politics is pursued in that society, and this occurs at several levels. A social order can be matriarchal or patriarchal, which would represent how gender is manifested in political action. The form of government has an influence, with political action being different for a democracy as opposed to a more authoritative system. The prevalent religion may affect politics, more so in a theocratic system than one that tries to separate politics and religion, though even in the latter case religion has an influence. Leadership style affects politics, with some styles being more authoritative and so restrictive of political action, while others are more freewheeling and so encouraging to political action. Indeed, arguably the leadership style that is found in a society is one of the best indicators of what sort of politics the society will manifest, for a democratic leader emerges from a very different sort of political structure than a dictator. Different types of leadership and different social structures will be considered as they impact politics.

Gender

Gender identifies certain types of leadership within certain specific types of social order. A female-dominated social order is a matriarchy, and a male-dominated order is a patriarchy. The patriarchy is the dominant form of society in most of the world, and usually this calls for an aggressive style of leadership, often with war-like tendencies, and usually in a social order in which women are relegated to a secondary status and may be treated as property more than as fellow citizens. History shows many such societies, including our own, with a trend over time in the West toward increased equality, though without altering the basically male competitive political structure.

For instance, early America derived from the patriarchal form prevalent in Europe, and though this would change over time as women achieved greater degrees of equality, the political structures of the time were largely patriarchal and would remain so in some ways until the granting of women's suffrage:

Patriarchy was the organizing principle of family life. Parents, ministers, and magistrates instructed young people that they had a duty to marry and multiply. Sometimes parents arranged pairings; increasingly, young people chose their own spouses. Either way, the vast majority of young men and women consented to enter into a fixed marriage contract that granted a husband nearly absolute authority over his wife's body, behavior, and property. A husband's authority was supported by the law of coverture, which specified that a husband legally "covered" or subsumed his wife's identity: he ruled her in private and spoke for her in public. Ideally, a husband treated his wife as a partner but, clearly, he was the senior partner. He governed family morality, managed family property and labor, and supervised children's upbringing and education as well as represented female family members and other dependents in counting houses, courts, and government offices (Kann, 1999, p. 4).

Starrat (1993) notes that there is a biological component to this sort of social order as the "underpinnings of patriarchy are buttressed by biological metaphors which culturally sanction male dominance because of inherent biological differences where males are superior biologically" (p. 72). One reading of patriarchy suggests that it emerges as a natural consequence of supposed male biological superiority in terms of size and strength, while another reading shows that patriarchy is dependent on achieving the oppression of females by making females inferior and keeping them from advancing. The elevation of the male is usually accompanied by the suppression of the female in any case.

Certainly, this colors the concept of politics by making the male the natural participant in politics and by denying that role to the female, a theme repeated in society after society. In our own society, for instance, women were treated as chattel and were not given the right to vote or even to participate in most commerce outside the home. Many see this as a universal situation, while others raise doubts. Harris (1983) considers the issue of whether male supremacy is universal. This question is at the heart of the gender-role shifts taking place in Western societies, with the view that the traditional social structure saw male supremacy as a given while contemporary Western society is at least questioning that idea if not becoming openly antithetical to it. Harris cautions that it is not possible to go from the statement that women are subordinate as regards political authority in most societies to the statement that women are subordinate in all respects in all societies (Harris, 1983, p. 252). Leacock (1978) further notes that the very concepts of equality and inequality may be an ethnocentric misunderstanding Westerners bring to an analysis of sex roles in non-Western societies (p. 247).

One of the most important ethnographic researcher offering data on sex roles and gender socialization was Margaret Mead, who conducted research in Samoa in the 1930s and further research later in New Guinea. Mead carried her research over into Western civilization and could write in 1949:

There has long been a habit in Western civilization of men to have a picture of womanhood to which women reluctantly conformed, and for women to make demands on man to which men adjusted even more reluctantly. This has been an accurate picture of the way in which we have structured our society, with women as keepers of the house who insist that men wipe their feet on the door-mat, and men as keepers of women in the house who insist that their wives should stay modestly within-doors (Mead, 1949, p. 296).

Mead in 1950 reported on three New Guinea tribes existing within a one-hundred-mile area. She found that the ideologies concerning sex roles were quite different among the three in spite of their relative proximity. The Arapesh, Mundugumor, and Tschambuli showed in their attitudes that how people think about being masculine or feminine is highly variable and is determined by culture rather than by some absolute of biology. The Arapesh showed gender role differences, but no basic temperamental differences were thought to exist between males and females. Neither men nor women were found to be driven by spontaneous sexuality, and while violence was tolerated, it was not linked with either sex. Men were expected to be gentle, unacquisitive, and cooperative, and women were taught to accept anything out of the ordinary without showing curiosity. From childhood, women were discouraged from asking questions about anything unusual and from engaging in speculative thought. Boys, on the other hand, were encouraged to think speculatively. Among the Mundugumor, very different attitudes concerning sex and gender were found. This tribe consisted of headhunters and cannibals. The life of the male was a life of fighting, characterized by the competitive acquisition of women through warfare. The people thought that there was a natural hostility between members of the same sex, so the inheritance of most property crossed sex boundaries in each generation, from father to daughter and mother to son. Both males and females were raised to have violent social personalities and to place no value on sensuality. This began at birth -- breastfeeding of infants was performed in a utilitarian way, with no hint of pleasure, and nursing was only to give out food and never to comfort the child from fright or pain. The third group in the region, the Tschambuli, made a distinction for personality differences between men and women. These expectations differed from role expectations such as would be found in North America, but they also differed from the Arapesh and Mundugumor. This tribe preferred marriages in which a man had many wives, and ancestry was traced through the men of the family exclusively. Men owned property and officially "owned" their wives, but at the same time women in practice held the main power in society, made most of the economic decisions, and took the initiative in social life. For instance, the women were socialized to be sexually aggressive, while the men were not (Crapo, 1993, p. 197).

It should not be assumed that a matriarchy would simply be an inversion of the patriarchy, for this is not generally the case. One definition offered for a matriarchy is that it is "that form of social organization in which descent is reckoned through the female line, where the mother is the head of the household and the children belong to the maternal clan" (Fluehr-Lobban, 1979, p. 341). Others se this definition as referring only to a matrilineal society, while they state that a matriarchy also requires "that power and authority be exercised by the women in decisions concerning community and foreign relations, social standards and values, including the sexual conduct of the men" (Jay, 1996, para. 3). At one time, a number of anthropologists supported the theory that "matriarchy advanced humanity from barbarism to a higher evolutionary stage through the 'mother-right,' or the mother's bond to her child, thus predating patriarchy in the general evolution of society" (Jay, 1996, para. 4). This idea has since been abandoned. The mythology of the Amazons, a matriarchy of warrior women, has been discounted as no more than a myth, one deriving from the deep-seated fear on the part of males that they might lose their power and authority. In matrilineal societies, men tend still to monopolize the rights of power. Some Chinese anthropologists believe the stories of true matriarchal societies in some regions of China in the past, but this is uncertain. A matriarchy would be presumed to be less warlike and more nurturing as a social order and would not subordinate men in the way men have done to women in the patriarchal society.

The formulation and operation of power in the largely patriarchal social order in the world today divides along other line than gender, with political action influenced most by ideology, religion, divisions of power, and other aspects of group dynamics. While the West has tended to become less rigid in its patriarchy, parts of the developing world have tended to maintain the traditional gender divisions and to keep women isolated and out of the public arena. In part, this has occurred because of the working of some of the group dynamics just noted.

Group Dynamics

The influence of certain social realities on politics is considerable, with some societies more affected by one element or another. Theocracies are clearly most affected by religious doctrine and religious leaders, though religion may be an element in the politics of even the most secular societies to a degree. The structure of a society is likely to be influenced greatly by some form of social stratification that effectively places one group over another in the social order and which thus may determine the locus of power and the influence that politics can have on public action.

Different theories of social and political organization can often be applied to the same system, as is found among theorists trying to explain the workings of democratic systems, explainable by either pluralist or elitist models of political action. The elitist perspective holds that there is a power structure that is perpetuated. In practical terms, those with property -- meaning those who have money and are members of a certain elite -- have greater access to government than do the poor and otherwise disenfranchised. One of the models of government that has been used to explain how power is wielded in contemporary American society is elite theory. This theory holds that important government decisions are made by an identifiable and stable minority sharing certain characteristics, such as vast wealth and business connections. The members of this elite hold power because they control key financial, communications, industrial, and governmental institutions and that an inner circle composed of top corporate leaders provides candidates for positions from which they can further promote their interests.

Pluralist theory points out that we do not seem to have a stable elite but a shifting pattern of interest groups with greater or lesser power, and such power is not derived only from money but from other characteristics or capabilities. One of the main capabilities has been the ability to deliver votes, as so-called Big Labor has been doing for some time. Representing a large segment of a candidate's constituency gives an organization a particular cachet. The system is not elite because the groups that dominate are not necessarily elites and because groups succeed in a system of shifting alliances. These models apply to local politics as to national and seek to develop a sense of the elites in power at this level or the degree to which policy is developed by the interaction of pluralist organizations.

Looking specifically to the American system, these theories find the major influence in different areas of the social order. For instance, Harrigan (1993) emphasizes that the different governmental actors operate on the basis of their biases, and these biases develop from ideology, influence, expediency, and similar forces. Harrigan sees this as operating for bureaucratic units as well as for political actors like the President and Congress, and he also sees the latter as influencing how bureaucracies respond:

Not only do different bureaucratic units reflect different biases, but federal bureaucrats are also influenced by other political actors who each have their own biases that they try to impose on the executive branch (Harrigan, 1993, p. 242).

Harrigan says that the usual view is that the President and Congress are policymakers, while the bureaucracy is made up of policy implementers. However, he notes that in practice this distinction is not so clear, and there influences in both directions. Domestic policy develops from the interplay of these political and bureaucratic realms.

In the shaping of domestic policy, it is clear that interest groups have a good deal of influence. The public sees interest group influence as excessive and out of control (Berry, 1997, 17), but an examination of the issue shows that interest groups are one way the average citizen can join together with others to increase their ability to influence legislation and policymaking and to gain the attention of Congress and the President. People join a number of different interest groups for just this reason. One of the largest of these groups is the political party, considered important in the proper functioning of a democracy:

Each party seeks to translate mass preferences into public policy by nominating a slate of candidates and endorsing a platform of policy proposals in the hope of attracting the most voters. Elections allow voters to choose which set of candidates and policies they prefer. The winning candidates then enact the policies that get them the winning votes (Harrigan, 1993, p. 154).

However, this raises the issue of whether interest groups constitute an example of a pluralist theory holding that influence can be wielded by anyone by joining a group to empower the individual or an elitist theory in that interest groups only represent an elite group that already holds power. In popular parlance, the latter view holds as politicians claim again and again not to be beholden to interest groups, though some interest groups do represent the less powerful in society.

Cognitive and Moral Development

Religion is another element that shapes a social order in society. In most democracies, religion may play a role in the lives of voters and so have a political influence, but it does not have a direct influence or wield any overt control. In some societies, however, religion can hold a much more powerful place, giving form to government and providing the rules by which people live and under which they can take political action or not take action, according to the rules set. Islamic society is often a theocratic society, which is one of the elements that separates such political systems from our own, though the "otherness" of Islam as a religion contributes to the Western sense of difference as well.

Analysts note the way society expresses its form in Islamic theocracies and the power of shari'ah, or Islamic religious law. El-Awa (1981) refers to the sources of Islamic law, the Qur'an and the Sunna of Prophet Muhammad, noting that both contain basic rules that are usually expressed in a broad manner and that are frequently capable of varying interpretations. Various theories of Islamic law have been formed. The classical conception is that Islamic criminal law recognizes six major offenses, and these offenses are known as the offenses of hudud. The six offenses generally seen as offenses of hudud are the drinking of alcohol, theft, armed robbery, illicit sexual relations, slanderous accusation of unchastity, and apostasy. All other offenses are punished in the Islamic penal system by discretionary punishments known as ta'zir (El-Awa, 1981, pp. 1-2).

Badr-el-Din Ali (1985) examines the penal policy in Saudi Arabia and the ways in which Islamic law and crime are related in that country. He notes that the penal policy is based largely on deterrence and retribution in concept and that it is characterized by certainty and speed in practice. This contrasts with the case of the United States, where the penal philosophy (governed by positive law) is based primarily on offender rehabilitation and the administration of justice and where the process is rather slow and uncertain. The author says that one way of determining the effectiveness of Shari'ah in dealing with the problem of crime is its impact on crime rates. The author sees Saudi Arabia as typical of the societies that have implemented Shari'ah, and he feels that a comparison with the United States is instructive. Such a comparison shows that crime rates in all categories are significantly lower in Saudi Arabia, based on statistics from 1981. The ratio of Saudi crime to U.S. crime in several categories is as follows: willful murder, 1:11; forcible rape, 1:105; robbery, 1:248; all violent crime, 1:131; larceny/theft, 1:99; property crime, 1:96; and arson, 1:169. The ratio for all crime is 1:98.

Adler (1983) tries to explain the reason why these crime rates are so different and finds a common pattern of "informal social controls" in Islamic societies (pp. 157-158). Adler's analysis is part of a major project conducted by the United Nations Secretariat in 1977 to measure the dimensions of criminality on a world-wide basis. Official figures from 64 countries were collected and compared, and countries were then ranked in order of levels of overall "criminality." The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was ranked with other countries "not obsessed with crime," including Bulgaria, Peru, Nepal, and a few others. Ali suggests that the low crime rate in Saudi Arabia may be influenced by a profound internalization of Islamic religious values among the Saudi people through an integral process of socialization that is accompanied by a firm and uncompromised implementation of the Islamic penal code through a concerned and powerful political leadership (Adler, 1983, p. 54).

Souryal (1988) also discusses the role of Shari'ah in the deterrence of criminal conduct in Saudi Arabia. This analysis is written by a Christian looking at the dynamics of Islamic religious law in an Islamic society. Souryal states that the low level of criminality in Saudi Arabia has long been noted, but he argues with elements in the aforementioned Adler analysis, finding that it was flawed both theoretically and procedurally. Souryal's study examines the crime rates in Saudi Arabia and compares them to six Islamic countries, which do not apply Shari'ah law -- Syria, Sudan, Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, and Kuwait. Souryal finds that the murder rate in Saudi Arabia is the lowest of the seven countries, being less than 1/6 the second lowest rate in Egypt and Kuwait. The rate of property crimes is also the lowest of the seven countries, ranking less than 1/3 the rate in Iraq, 1/13 the rate in Kuwait, and 1/36 the rate in Sudan. The rate for sexual crimes in Saudi Arabia is again the lowest of the seven nations. This rosy picture is doubted by Souryal, however, who says that the low crime rates seemed "too good to be true" and that corroborative sources are lacking. After considerable direct examination and survey, though, the author decides that the official crime rates for serious crimes seem to be "reasonably" reliable. Souryal suggests two major sociological theories that might help explain the low criminality in Saudi Arabia: the theory of social disorganization to articulate the current structure of the society; and the theory of social learning to elucidate the processes of social development and maintenance. The first suggests that a society is well organized if ample consensus exists regarding common norms and values, and if strong ties among its members flourish. In terms of the second, Souryal says that the predominant source of social learning in Saudi Arabia is the Qur'an, which is seen not only as a divine book of the scriptures but as a total guide for the total life in this world and in the hereafter: '"Therefore, every social practice, every intellectual thought, and every psychological disposition must conform to its teachings" (Souryal, 1988, p. 21).

In contrast, Murty, Al-Lanqawi, and Roebuck (1990) provide juvenile delinquency data from Kuwait. This data can be used for purposes of comparison to Saudi Arabia, and the data show a demarcation of types that is quite similar to comparable samples taken in the United States. The authors feel that this reflects universal similarities among urban teenagers and Kuwait's material culture, with affluence, teen-age culture, the automobile, and unprogrammed/unsupervised leisure time being the norm in Kuwait as in the United States. These similarities between Kuwait and the United States also contrast sharply with the lack of correspondence between Saudi Arabia and the United States.

Such data suggests deep-seated cultural differences in the way these societies are formed and the influences that affect them. Politics is similarly affected by the same elements so that politics in Islam is directed toward the protection of the ruling order, the hierarchy believed to be set by the Qu'ran, while the political order in a democracy is based on humanistic philosophy and is also more changeable in response to new factors.

Leaders in the West often profess a belief in some religion as a demonstration of their moral leanings, though it is not always clear if this is more lip-service than an actual demonstration of a moral understanding of leadership and its requirements. This idea has been adapted to both elitist and pluralist models. Elitist models focus on the sources of power and suggest that power derives from wealth and position, though it can also be identified with a particular moral theory as the one truth. The elitist model would also see power as being relatively stable over time, since the leadership derives from the same social power groups in society. Power in political terms can be defined as the ability to get something accomplished, whether that be positive or negative (which means it can also be the ability to stop someone else from getting something accomplished). Political power is sought by every politically oriented group in society. The perception is that the system is responsive only to the few, and this has produced calls for reform. The fact that incumbents generally have the best chance of winning elections shows how skillful the elite is at retaining power. The elite is in control of the power structure, which developed over time until it became a system that perpetuated itself very well.

The pluralist model concentrates on the exercise of power, on results, and morality may be defined in broad terms as justice for the minority as well as the majority. The pluralist sees decisions as made not by an elite but by the conflict and accommodation between competing groups. However, even when making such a claim, it is difficult to assure that there is no elite with more influence, just as the elitist would have difficulty showing that the elites are making all decisions without considering the influence of different social groups on their reasons for those decisions. It seems more likely that power is directed both by elites and interest groups competing for ascendancy, with the elitist view explaining some decisions and the pluralist others.