Darfur in 2003, Horrific Violence

Darfur

In 2003, horrific violence and barbaric civil war broke out in the Sudanese providence of Darfur. The conflict has resulted in tens of thousands of deaths, millions of individuals displaced, and still other tens of thousands refugees. While the conflict arose from racial tensions in the area between two or three primary groups, the involvement of the Sudanese government in the genocide of Africans has added a layer of complexity to the fighting that would otherwise have been unachievable. This paper will discuss the Darfur conflict in terms of the terrorism of the Janjaweed, or Arabic fighters of southern Darfur, and the crimes against humanity committed by those individuals. This discussion will show clearly that although the Sudanese government denies involvement with the Janjaweed, the situation in Darfur is clearly governmental supported terrorism.

In order to understand the complex issues in Darfur, it is important to understand the conflict in Sudan as a whole. Sudan is the largest country in Africa, with wide variations in religion, ethnicity, tribe, and economic activities. Nearly 70% of the country is of the Muslim faith, 25% are animist, and five percent are Christian. Ethnically, the population ranges from African to Arab to English. From an economic and social standpoint, the population of Sudan is split between nomadic and sedentary cultures (ICG, 2006). Clearly, the area is diverse, and a breeding ground for tensions and conflict.

Late in the 1880's, the Ottoman administration of Sudan collapsed. By 1898, British forces took over, and separated the North from the South until 1947. Political power was originally given to the north, but in 1955, a collection of southern army officers revolted, forming the Anya-Nya movement. By 1958, General Abboud seized power, and began to institute Islamisation. However, in 1964, an uprising forced Abboud to flee office, and a series of coups occurred until General Nimieri took over rule in 1969. Following a failed Communist coup in 1971, Nimieri began to ally with southern rebels and armies from Ethiopia and Uganda. As a result, the Addis Ababa peace agreement was signed in 1972, which allowed the Anya-Nya to join the national army, and allowed the south full autonomy (ICG, 2006).

However, this was not the end of the conflict. Violations of the peace agreement by the north, an increasing Islamic presence, and the discovery of oil revitalized the civil conflict within Sudan. By 1977, the peace agreement had been unconstitutionally revised, and by 1983, the south mutinied again against the north. Simultaneously, Addis dissolved any constitutional rights of the south, and made Arabic the official language, and named Islam the official religion (ICG, 2006).

The leaders of the upheaval in the south were the Sudan People's Liberation Army, or SPLA, led by John Garang. By 1985, Nimieri was overthrown, and a democratic government, led by Sadiq al-Mahdi, was put into place in 1986. While peace was again, it was again thwarted by a coup in 1989, led by the National Islamic Front. As the NIF took power, the constitution was revoked, any opposition parties were banned, and Islamic justice systems were again put into place. Simultaneously, the NIF proclaimed jihad, or a campaign against non-believers of Islam, against the south, which was primarily animistic (ICG, 2006). For the next decade, Sudan struggled with war, and severe fighting in both the north and south. Combined with isolation due to accusations of assassination attempts on the leaders of neighboring countries, and attacks on U.S. embassies resulting in cruise missile attacks by the United States, the country fell deeper into war (ICG, 2006).

In 2003, rebels in the province of Darfur rose up against the government within the area, stating the region was neglected in terms of politics, economic growth, and social marginalization (BBC, 2007). There were two primary rebel forces, those of the Sudan Liberation Army, those responsible for the uprising in 1985, and the Justice and Equality Movement, or the Jem. Both groups claim the government of Sudan is oppressing Africans in favor of Arabs. In part, this conflict is due to years of tension surrounding land and grazing rights in the region between nomadic Arabs and the farmers of the Fur, Massaleet, and Zagwa communities (BBC, 2007).

Following the initial uprising in the south, government forces armed the Arab "Janjaweed" militia to clear the southern regions of any populations thought to be supporting the African tribes (IGC, 2006). This is where the true troubles of Darfur began. The term "Janjaweed" in Arabic means "a man with a gun on a horse" (Koerner, 2005), and this term is quite fitting for the group. The militia is made up of the same Arabic peoples at odds with the local Africans for water rights for decades. Following the uprising of the Jem and the SLA, the Janjaweed began to pillage towns and villages inhabited by Africans (Koerner, 2005).

Once thought to be a small, unassisted force, the Janjaweed are now believed to be nearly fully supported by the Sudan government, although government forces deny the association. Victims and international observers alike have claimed witness to events proving such beliefs. For example, a Human Rights Watch field researcher informed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in June of 2004 that the Sudanese army was recruiting horse owning Arab males, and hiring them for $116 a month to join. Further, other international workers testified that ground attacks of African villages by Janjaweed armies were supported by aerial attacks by Sudanese government (Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 2005).

Still further proof of the Sudanese's government support of the Janjaweed came from testimony of workers from the International Crisis Group. According to their testimony, the money paid to the Janjaweed forces came directly from the looting of African villages, and the guns used were supplied by the Sudanese government (Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 2005). Further, reports were given that the Janjaweed were living in garrison towns, and that their clothing matched the uniform of Sudanese regular army (Koerner, 2005).

While the Janjaweed claim only to be fighting against rebel forces, the United States in 2004 determined the Janjaweed were clearly committing genocide against the native African population of Darfur. Colin Powel, the Secretary of State at the time, made the claim based on information contained in a report by the State Department about the fighting in Darfur. According to the report, based on 1136 interviews with refugees from Darfur, which stated 61% of refugees had witnessed the killing of a family member, 16% had been raped, and nearly half had head racial epithets during the attacks. Further, nearly four fifths of the population reported their livestock stolen, and half reported the theft of personal property (Bureau of Democracy, 2004).

Additionally, it was even clearer following the survey that the Sudanese government is highly involved in the attack. One half of all respondents noted that government forces joined the Janjaweed in attacks on villages. One fourth reported government forces attack alone, while another 14% stated the Janjaweed acted alone (Bureau of Democracy, 2004). Clearly, at least in some cases, the government of Sudan attacked African native villages alone, or as allies to the Janjaweed.

Further proof came from respondents who corroborated the stories of the field workers. Two-thirds of the refugees reported aerial bombings prior to attacks on the villages, while four fifths stated they had witnessed nearly complete destruction of their entire village. According to nearly all respondents, the pattern of attack was highly similar. Attacks began with Sudanese governmental aerial attack by helicopter. Following the bombings, Sudanese soldiers arrived in trucks, followed closely by Janjaweed soldiers on horse. They surrounded the villages, and opened fire. Those fleeing the village were targeted by aircraft bombings. Following the attacks, the Sudanese government forces and Janjaweed soldiers looted the villages, and were burned to the ground (Bureau of Democracy, 2004).

During the same study, nearly 400 refugees were asked about rebel activity near their village prior to the initial attack. Nearly all reported that while tensions were high in those areas, there was no rebel activity in the area prior to the arrival of Sudanese government soldiers. All respondents noted no aid from Sudanese government (Bureau of Democracy, 2004).

Based on these reports, it is apparent that the Sudanese government and Janjaweed were not attacking to take power, but rather, to destroy the African population in a nearly exclusive genocidal attack. Further proof of this comes from the racial and ethnic epithets heard by the refugees during the attacks. Reports include statements such as "Kill the slaves!" And "We have orders to kill all the blacks!" Further, many refugees reported mass abductions, where thousands are loaded into Sudanese government trucks, and removed. Several refugees reported knowledge of mass executions and mass gravesites (Bureau of Democracy, 2004).

The situation is even more ghastly when once examines individual reports of the atrocities committed. According to one female refugee, repeated rape was common, often in front of family members. In her case, she was forcibly raped numerous times in front of her father by both Sudanese government soldiers and Janjaweed soldiers. Afterward, the soldiers dismembered her father in front of her. In another case, a woman reported repeated rapes in front of her nine-month-old daughter. When the daughter cried, soldiers beat her with rifles (Bureau of Democracy, 2004).

While there is no question about the humanitarian crisis in Darfur, we must now examine whether that crisis amounts to state terrorism. According to Oliverio (1997), state terrorism is "associated with the issues of control of territory and resources and the construction of political and ideological domination (52). There are two essential elements that terrorism require to term it state terrorism. First, the state must reinforce the use of violence as an effectual, practical, and extenuating factor for managing conflict of ideas. Secondly, this view must be reinforced by a "culturally constructed and socially organized process" (Oliverio, 1997, 53).

Prendergast (2004) classified the situation in Darfur as state terrorism based on these factors. According to his report, the use of government aid to completely devastate the infrastructure, economic base, and population of those opposing the Sudanese government meets the first criteria of state terrorism. Further, the use of political maneuvering and social isolation to limit aid to those refugees affected shows the second point of state terrorism. Relief agencies, anxious to assist, have been banned from most areas of the country, resulting in the deaths of those not killed by the initial attacks (Prendergast, 2004).

However, there are others that claim the situation in Darfur is simply marginalization, not terrorism. The Sudan People's Liberation Movement claimed in June of 2007 that "The SPLM has never regarded the issue of Darfur as terrorism; the SPLM regarded the issue of Darfur as an issue of marginalization," (Janda, 2007). Janda (2007) also noted that the rebels in Darfur can not be considered terrorists, because they are involved in peace conferences.

Young (2000) defines marginalization as "exclusion from meaningful participation in society." Mullaly (2007) notes that marginalization can cause deprivation to the point of extermination. Mullaly (2007) also notes marginalization often occurs with minority groups, since the process is often due to a more dominant group taking power within a society.

While these aspects certainly hold true in Darfur, the situation can hardly be termed marginalization. Not only are the African people excluded from meaningful participation in society, they are being systematically and brutally killed, as was shown by both relief workers in the area, as well as surveys of refugee camps. The argument that the situation in Darfur is terrorism as opposed to marginalization becomes even more apparent when one examines the statistics. As of August 2004, according to the State Report, more than 400 villages in Darfur had been completely annihilated. Further, an additional 123 villages had been damaged beyond repair. Nearly 200,000 people had sought refuge in the neighboring country of Chad, and nearly 1.2 million had been displaced, but were still residing within Sudan. While the UN World Food Program provided food to nearly 900,000 individuals in July of 2004, a total of 72 of the 154 internally displaced person's (IDP's) camps within the country had been set as off limits by the Sudan government. In those areas, malnutrition, disease, and mortality are high, reaching levels far exceeding the emergency threshold limits set forth by the U.S. Center for Disease Control and Prevention (Bureau of Democracy, 2004).