David Hume's Treatise of human nature

Hume -- Morals

Crasto

In today's world, the purveyors of what is right and wrong often bandy about the words Morals and Morality. The issues of morality are brought up when modern life as we see it progressing becomes untenable for those of an earlier generation, who are uncomfortable with how this progress manifests itself. To take one contemporary example, when motion pictures first came about in the late nineteenth century, participating in the movie making process was considered anathema. Not only would respectable women not want to participate, even prostitutes thought it beneath their sense of morality to act, so much so that men had to portray the roles of women. If one fast-forwards to the present times, it's not difficult to see that movie-making and acting epitomizes glamour, fame and fortune. And any numbers of people are willing to debase themselves in different ways just to have a chance at Hollywood stardom. One often hears that the increasingly popular reality programming on television contains would-be actors looking for exposure that will launch their careers.

There is then the question of moral equivalence or moral relativism. Can what was immoral in years past be considered as moral today, in keeping with the times? On the opposite end of this argument are the moral absolutists who believe that the core of a moral being is immutable. As a follow-up to this, one needs to ask an additional question: what constitutes morality. And what is moral behavior? What aspects of our lives, internal or external, does morality cover? Consider honesty. Is honesty a moral trait that needs to be preserved? Clearly, the notion of honesty has to stand the test of time. And under what circumstances is dishonesty allowed, if at all. Would honesty then give way to pragmatism, if a set of circumstances necessitated it?

The more one considers the issue of morals and morality, the more one realizes that the issues surrounding it are not cut-and-dry.

Many philosophers have come up with different principles of morality. One of these, David Hume's treatise "Of Morals" is the subject of this essay.

It would be both premature and presumptuous to aver that there exists a universal set of moral codes that is the beacon for every human being. The natural extension and corollary to this would be a religion that would be universally accepted. This is clearly not true. Even within Christianity, fractions arose because its adherents could not conform to a set of precepts.

The philosopher, David Hume, in his work "Treatise of Human Nature" (Hume, 1740) attempted to articulate formalisms for morality. Book 3 of this work is titled "Of Morals." The first part is relevant to this essay. Section 1 is titled, "Of virtues and vice in general." Section II is titled, "Moral distinctions deriv'd from a moral sense." For this essay, a portion from the two sections has been selected for in-depth analysis. It includes four paragraphs from section 2 of Part 1 in "Of Morals." This section deals with Hume attempting to trace the origins of morality in nature to 1) prove his thesis; 2) show that reason cannot be used to qualify morality because it leads to several confounding situations.

But a general summary of the two sections is necessary in order to provide a backdrop of Hume's thesis against which the key section will be analyzed. From the outset, Hume, perhaps having thought about, and found that, the issue of morality is non-trivial makes a declaration giving us a notion that this is not an easy topic, or things don't seem as black and white as might superficially appear.

He starts out by informing the reader that in trying to propose "abstruse" ideas to someone who might be opposed to it there are several dangers. The intent of the proposal should be to convince one's opponent of the correctness of the idea (over anything the opponent might believe or be a proponent of himself (or herself). This means that the proponent has to be thoroughly convinced of this idea and have a complete understanding of this idea and its consequences.

The main point that Hume tries to make is that morality is a combination of that which comes from within and its action from outside an individual. Superficially, Hume's theory on morals appears mainly to be action-oriented. But a closer perusal reveals that the outward actions mirror the inward. For Hume, actions fall into two categories, those that arise from virtue and those that arise from vice.

Throughout the two sections in "Of Morals," Hume's depiction of actions (moral or otherwise) includes a cascade that involves three key entities: the one who extends (vice or virtue), the one who is the recipient of this extension, and the third is the spectator. The action creates a feeling of well-being or "agreeableness" in the spectator. This feeling is one of moral approval. For example, if one performs an act of charity towards another individual and this person is aided by this act of charity; the observer of this act will then categorize this as a moral event. If an act that is motivated by vice is witnessed, then this act is classified, by the spectator as an amoral event.

Even the above has to be further classified; Hume defines virtuous acts as natural and artificial. And interestingly, the acts that are natural are also intangible; and while the morality as the giver-receiver-spectator triumvirate is concerned is not in doubt, the type of morality certainly is. For example, Hume defines the virtues of kindness, reticence and philanthropy as natural. Justice, sexual purity, loyalty and keeping promises are considered artificial.

Consider the role of each of these virtues in modern life. The first are specifically internal and define how a person behaves. It is very interesting that Hume considers the next few as artificial. One who reads about the artificial virtues might aver that a sense of justice, loyalty and/or chastity are traits that are internal to an individual; they can also be enforced by entities outside the individual. The outside effect might come from another individual or these might be constraints put on a person by culture and society. Certainly, one might consider that some aspects of natural virtue, such as philanthropy might be forced (taxation and social security might be an example). But forced philanthropy is an oxymoron and can more likely be considered as usurpation, and, in some extreme circumstances, theft.

The giver-recipient-spectator chain can also be sub-classified in other ways. The spectator, for instance, does not have to actually be an eye-witness to a moral (or otherwise) act. The morality of a virtuous act comes from the seal of approval by the spectator even if he or she has heard of this moral act indirectly. Hume also avers that the giver (or extender of a moral act) can be considered as a spectator if, while witnessing his (or her) own acts of morally motivated virtue, he (or she) perceives the act as a moral event.

Since the giver, recipient and the spectator can be interchangeable and further classified, Hume goes on to formalize the triumvirate of moral virtue as belonging to either one of four categories. These depend on who benefits (and by how much) from actions motivated by moral virtue: Those that are useful to others; those that are useful to themselves; those that are perceived as useful to others and those that are perceived to be useful to oneself. The last two appear to be superfluous, but the feeling of agreeableness is to be considered as the results of moral action, then they have to be considered.

This thus raises the important question of how the last two of the four categories might be viewed in modern times. Perceptions are about feeling good about oneself, even if they are not based in truth. Even here, one might aver, that there are gray areas. Unless perceptions result in delusions that might cause a harmful or (vice-driven) action against oneself or the recipient of an event, very often, perceptions or feel good events motivate people to share in the good feeling. Alternatively, they might force people to pursue natural or artificial moral virtues. The notion of usefulness that is borne from truth or facts and usefulness borne from perceptions will become evident when one considers how Hume categorizes moral virtues. In the first (useful to others) Hume includes, truth, justice, charity, loyalty and fidelity; in the second (usefulness to self) are included industry, perseverance and patience; in the third (perceived useful to others) are charm, eloquence and wit; and the fourth category (perceived usefulness to self) includes, pride, humor and self-esteem. Hume also declares that moral events can fall into more than one of these categories.

One of the confounding instances that can be perceived as refuting the above is: what conclusions does one draw if two spectators observing an action draw diametrically opposing conclusions. In this case, does the feeling of well being or repugnance in the action agent and/or the receiver have an additive effect on defining whether the action is a moral or virtuous one? One example can illustrate this. Parenting is a challenging occupation. Indeed, how a parent raises his or her child is the cumulative result of the mental and emotional character of the parent, the background of the parent, the financial circumstances of the parent, how the parent was raised as a child, and also the emotional character of the child or the actions of the child. Consider a situation where the parent indulges in corporal punishment. As an action agent, the parent firmly believes that this punishment is of a corrective nature, meant to discipline the child. For the child receiving this punishment, certainly it is momentarily painful. The child might resent the punishment; alternatively, the child might recognize that the punishment is in response to instances of mischief.

The spectator might as the moral purveyor of this scenario might see this as a virtue or a vice. The spectator might believe that the corporal punishment is virtuous because it is meant to correct the child. Or the spectator might see this as abusive, because society dictates the corporal punishment is never warranted. The spectator might also be confused, vacillating between the two issues.

For the purpose of this essay, the task is to explicate one specific issue associated with morals. What is the origin of morals? Following from the above, in addition to the argument detailed in Part 1 of Hume's treatise, and agreeing that morals are about feeling, where does this feeling come from? Are morals intrinsic to an individual from birth, or does it come from "without" or artificial sources. This passage starts from paragraph 6 of Section 2 and continues till the end of the section.

Throughout his treatise, and in every part of "Of Morals," Hume expounds (quite relentlessly) on the same theme. The "pleasure" and "pain" sensations that one feels on encountering with all the five senses (including senses is quite important) is directly correlated with morals, i.e., virtuous and stemming from vice, respectively. Hume goes on to say that one cannot attribute all of this to outside influences, which have to be learned from experience. His premise is that there is a strong and emphatic component to morals that is instinctual. A physical manifestation of this (though not quite the physical sense that Hume associates with pleasure and pain) is our response to stimuli. This response is immediate and unlearned. A painful stimulus can cause us to flinch or cry out loud as a response to alleviate the pain. When bruised, the response is to rub the bruised area. This response is automatic, and the result is an increased blood flow to the area of the rubbing to alleviate the pain. The sensation of scratching is the same. One alleviates an itch by scratching. We do not have to recourse to an instruction manual to perform what comes naturally.

Consider another example, one that can be borrowed from Newtonian Physics. Newton was the first to identify and quantify the laws of motion that govern the behavior of macroscopic objects. An astute student of physics might know how to calculate the speed, angle and trajectory of a projectile, e.g., a baseball that is being tossed between two people. This student might be able to predict the exact position a ball that is tossed from one position will land. A really bright student might also consider gravitational effects and calculate a more accurate trajectory if he or she takes into account wind speed that provides momentum to the object or retards its motion, and even calculate the shearing effects on a windy day. However, when this student is at a receiving end of the thrown baseball, he reacts instinctively to catch it. He might adjust his position by moving forward, backwards or sideways. He will cup his hands over his head or at his chest to best grasp the ball. Unless he is physically unable to grab the ball, he will make the adjustments necessary, using his sense of sight to guide his motions. He will not sit down with a paper, pencil and calculator to make the calculations that he is capable of as the ball hurtles towards him.

This analogy though as far removed from Hume's philosophical underpinnings in identifying morals (though Newton had already made his mark in the world of physics and mechanics more than a century before Hume wrote his treatise) is an exact analogy. Hume indicates that, contrary to his thesis, if this pleasure-pain dichotomy only comes from learning and reasoning, then each sensation would have to be learned independently. And since there are an infinite number of stimuli, there would have to be an infinite number of adequate responses.

Consider the instances of learning languages. Very few people have the special ability to learn languages fluently enough to be considered linguists. But no matter how difficult the language, even sign language, a child born listening to a certain language will pick it up and become fluent in it merely by listening to those around him speaking it. Icelandic is considered to be the most difficult language to learn. It does not have origins in the typical languages and one cannot learn it by association. Yet, a child born into an Icelandic family will need no special instructions in identifying with and learning the language. Yet, that same child, several years later, will have difficulties learning languages that are significantly easier to learn than Icelandic. The same is also true for certain African tribes, whose members communicate with glottal sounds and clicks. These, to most of us, are meaningless sounds. While we might make these sounds, we have no way of associating them with any linguistic meaning.

Hume believes that the origins of the pain-pleasure response to moral motivations can be found in few responses that manifest differently depending on what reaction is sought on the part of the spectator. He cautions against attempting to find a reason for every response, especially if the attempt is made to find it from our surroundings. Hume then answers the question of a potential critic, who might aver that all this (of Hume's) obfuscating about the fact that the pain-pleasure responses ought to come from a few, general principles that govern every response. The question is: what is the nature of the response to issues that motivate morals, as determined by Hume? The answer, according to the treatise, is nature. But even here, Hume argues, that one should not be quick to attribute it to nature. Indeed, that would be the quick way out.

We have to recognize how nature ought to be defined. Hume starts out by informing that one should consider the difference between what is nature and what is natural. And while Hume does not necessarily advance the concept of "natural" as common or mundane, he does educate that just because something spectacular, unusual or un-natural or (Hume uses the term) "miraculous" should not be considered as natural. One might suppose that Hume's definition of natural has to do with whatever is acceptable to the senses (feeling) since they are the proper manifestation of a response to moral motivations.

The issue about what exactly constitutes "natural" will raise many questions, especially since Hume agrees that the word "nature" can mean many things to many people -- "ambiguous and equivocal." There is no exacting definition of natural, when opposed to what is unnatural. And here (the reader feels that) the thesis stands on ground that is not so strong. If the pain-pleasure responses find their origins in whatever is natural, moral equivalence increases if we cannot define what "natural" is. This is also becomes very stark when natural is to be distinguished from what is rare and unusual. That is because people's definitions of what constitutes rare and deviating from the natural varies. This is especially important, and Hume recognizes this ambiguity in defining natural, because at the beginning of the definition of morality and its origins in nature, he indicates that the general principles that govern morality should be all encompassing. These principles should transcend nations, people and cultures.

Even if one were to take the pain-pleasure bringing situations as morally virtuous or vice-driven, then the next few examples will show how the action agent- receiving agent and observing agent is confounded -- "though not necessarily incorrect. Consider the tribal ritual on Pentecost Island in the South pacific. This is a ritual that marks the coming of age for adolescent boys as they make their foray into manhood. The men and boys in the tribe build a scaffold from available wood. On the appointed day, young boys tie liana vines to their legs, the vines being anchored to the wooden scaffold, and dive off the platforms. Diving from the platforms heralds the emotional metamorphosis of a boy into a man, because it involves overcoming the primal fear of death. There are often several platforms constructed off the scaffold: The braver the man, the higher his choice of platform. The adults normally choose the higher platforms, as if to assert their manhood. Since the scaffold is constructed of wood and vines, mistakes often occur. The scaffold collapses or the vines break. And since land-diving involves a head long dive, mistakes almost certainly are fatal.

The confounding aspect of this situation is that if an accident occurs, then the action agent sees moral good, the recipient does not receive the moral good that was intended, and the spectator does not end up with feelings of goodwill and agreeableness. Consider then that even if mistakes are taken in stride in tribes where the value on life is different from that placed in societies of the Western, developed world, the principles that govern morality or the nuances in the distinction between what is morally good and morally bad are not discernible.

Though the above example of land diving among adolescents of Pentecost Island might seem to refute Hume's notion of what is natural, we return to the universal principle of what feels good to our triumvirate, the critical term being, feel. And it is this ability to feel that transcends cultural and national boundaries. Hume goes on to say that the instinctual aspect of feeling good following a moral deed that cannot be "extirpated or destroyed."

To a thinking person, considering the moral construct as Hume defines his thesis and defends it, there are caveats and confounding aspects to consider. Hume has to constantly remind the reader that he has considered as many confounding aspects that his readers and critics would bring up to refute his dissertation. He cautions the reader that there while it is easy to distinguish, within the context of nature, that which is unnatural and rare with that which is tangible, commonplace and acceptable to the senses, what is natural should also be distinguished from what is artificial.

Earlier, in this essay, the natural and artificial constructs of moral virtuousness were introduced. To reiterate: benevolence, meekness and truth were considered natural since these characteristics manifested from within; chastity and justice were due to societal constraints -- but both produced feelings of moral goodness. Part II of Hume's treatise shows just why justice that is a most beloved concept of modern times is truly artificial. Some of this will be discussed later in the essay.

So how does Hume distinguish natural and artificial to trace the origins of the manifestation of morality? This is not to be confused with the artificial morality of justice and chastity. As one understands it, in modern times, artificial is man-made, natural comes directly from nature with as little human influence as possible. Even from a linguistic standpoint, one often uses the word "naturally" interchangeably with "certainly," "obviously" and "inevitably." There is a truism in how Hume defines chastity and justice -- "as man made. and, on closer inspection, one can see that these artificial moral virtues are indeed man made. They come from direct responses to the constraints that society and culture play on individuals

Hume again argues that in the use of the word natural -- "as not strictly coming from nature, but something that's not rare, unusual or miraculous, is adequate. It is also important to distinguish natural and artificial in that they are merely two categories of moral virtue. Hume fears that in the all the equivocation about the origins of morals and an acknowledgment of various caveats, the reader or philosophy student might confuse natural and unnatural, ascribing one to virtue and the other to vice, respectively. To clarify the issue, Hume defines three instances. In the first, he admonishes that natural and unnatural should be distinguished, but that both virtue and vice should be considered as natural. In the second instance, he goes on to say that in certain instances there is a good chance that virtue might be more unnatural. This is easily seen in a climate of debauchery where maintenance of virtue is increasingly difficult.

In fact, according to Hume, heroism as a virtue might be unnatural, as "severe barbarity" would be as a rare (but not extinct) vice.

In the third, virtue and vice are both equally artificial. Hume concludes by informing the reader that it is not possible to create artificial boundaries that will confine virtue and vice to being natural, artificial or out of the boundaries of nature.

This marks the end of the passage that needed to be explicated for this essay. Hume concludes that in exploring the origins of moral virtue and vice, the fact that both cannot be constrained by man made definitions because the definitions are equivocal brings one back to Hume's original premise that pain and pleasure in the observer, or virtue or vice in the action agent is really the result of the perception of the spectator, even if the spectator is the action agent.

Here, it is critical to identify the role of the spectator. Two different spectators might perceive a virtuous act in the complete opposite sense. The same is for a vice-driven act. Hume shows that his thesis is proved because when one tries to straitjacket morality and moral consciousness through reason and experiences, one runs the risk of complicating issues because there are no defining boundaries -- "the confounders being differing cultures and nationalities providing different barriers and constraints in identifying what is right and wrong. Hume proves that one has to be in touch with one's instincts. In the above instance, would instinctual feeling be the true determiner of whether it was a vice or virtue? Hume believes that he has adequately answered this issue.

How does the issue of identifying the origin of morals (virtue and vice) in nature work within the context of what Hume has to say in Parts II and III of "Of Morals." After all, if the principles are universal, they ought to be universally applicable. The premise of Part II of this work is that it delves solely on separating the issues of morals and virtue into that what is natural and artificial. This is not an argument as to whether artificial or unnatural does not come under the purview of meeting Hume's standards of morality. We assume that a concept is moral.

Hume attempts to prove that virtue can be further classified into what is natural and artificial. This has been discussed in this essay; we will show how Hume goes about proving it. The issues are chastity and justice. A superfluous view of justice and chastity would lead one to believe that these are natural morals. After all, a woman who is chaste and monogamous, is clearly being directed so because of an internal sense of morality (as conventionally understood). And it is this sense of morality that enables this woman to be faithful to her husband, either eschewing situations where she might succumb to temptation or actively working against them. Certainly, conventional society would believe that this woman is virtuous. Indeed, the entire television chat show industry in modern societies is based on the assumption that women (or men) who are unfaithful are immoral instinctually, and therefore they can be easily tempted. Hume shows that the notion of chastity, while certainly virtuous and moral is an artificial construct. This construct could be narrowed down from a culture, to a society inhabiting a specific locale and then the family. For society to survive and flourish, responsibility was important. This responsibility extended to oneself and by extension to the rest of society. Within this social construct, the legitimacy of children was very important. They were the future standard bearers for a culture. The legitimacy of children came from enjoying established parentage, especially, paternity. Paternal feelings would bind a man to children and the responsibility would flow from there. For this to happen, society imposed the rules of chastity on women. Historically then, this sense of virtue due to outside influences took root and became the standard for women. Thus, it did not matter whether the woman was post-menopausal.

Indeed, the entire Victorian era is characterized by what we call an increased sense of morality, where immoral women were considered outcasts of society.

Interestingly, women authors of the Victorian times sought to push these moral constraints. Authors like the Bronte sisters wrote several books that celebrated this artificial morality. The women protagonists (and they were necessarily women) were accorded the status of heroines. They epitomized chastity, never succumbing to baser instincts, always seeking to preserve themselves. There is no women author (or at least a well-known one) of that time who decided to break the mould and create an anti-heroine who would still lead the narrative but outside the bounds of chastity.

On the issue of justice, once again, a superfluous view would lead one to believe that the sense of justice is innate. In fact, one often hears the words (beseechingly), "I appeal to your sense of justice." Hume immediately seeks to disabuse us of the notion; he shows that justice is an artificial virtue that has been shaped and has mutated over the historical eras to what we take for granted today.

For what does one need justice? The artificial nature of morality as justice belongs in the answer to this question.

There are several answers to these questions. For some people one answer might suffice. For most, justice would meet many needs. The need for self preservation is one of the most important. As protection against an action agent that is motivated by vice. In fact, most justice systems are set up for exactly such a reason. One can soon begin to see that justice as conceived thusly is a reaction to what might happen, and is not intrinsic. Would an action agent commit a virtuous act from an innate sense of justice? or, is this through learning and history.

So how is our sense of justice shaped? In the United States, laws are derived from the Constitution and the Bill of Rights -- "essentially, the right to life and the pursuit of happiness.

Violations of a person's rights constitute an affront to justice. Several of these ideals were borrowed from examples of Britain's constitution (which incidentally remains unwritten) where democracy first took hold. Most modern democratic nations have Departments of Justice, where laws enacted by the legislatures are executed. Jurisprudence is well-established. But laws have to be constantly written and re-written. This is, in a sense, proof of the artificial nature of justice. It also brings us back to the discussion where this essay attempted to explicate Hume's take on the origins of morals. If they were universally accepted, we would not have to tinker with them.

Justice has indeed evolved. In modern societies, learned men and wise men collude to create laws. In primitive societies such as the Yanomami tribes from remove regions of Brazil, if petty crimes occur -- "a moral vice, justice is attempted by means of a use of an oracle -- "an all knowing entity. This oracle more often than not is a chicken, which swallows a potion. If it dies, it signifies one out of two choices, if it survives, it signifies the other choice. Punishments are then meted out for crimes based on the decision of this oracle.

Another fictitious example for a justice system comes about from Stephen King's epic novel, "The Stand." The premise is straightforward. The population of the United States is almost completely wiped out by a virus that is highly contagious and certainly kills all those it infects. The few survivors then set to rehabilitate them selves. There are two groups of survivors, which can be considered motivated by virtue and vice. In the beginning, there is no lawlessness. No property is owned. People survive as best as they can. But once they get together, the survivors begin to evolve into a community. And not soon after, this stability leads to the need of a (rudimentary) justice system. This novel is a metaphor for several personal and geo-political issues, but the idea of a system of justice evolving comes from factors without.

Hume believes that the sense of justice originally came about from a sense of self-preservation, of which respect for another's property is an important part. In order to preserve one's own property, you respect another's.

There is also an interaction of an individual with society. This individual derives a benefit from society and therefore sees his (or her) best interests in preserving this society, therefore the need for justice. In society then, man perceives a need for rules to enhance his own preservation and to let an established society thrive. One of another of Hume's artificial virtues of "keeping promises" also comes from a need to preserve society.

This is closely related to justice. Individual owe it to themselves to help society prosper to seek benefits from it. To be outcast was to not follow the rules of society. To be ridden out of town on a rail, meant that an individual had done something so egregious that he was not worthy of sharing in what society had to offer. In modern times, facilities of incarceration effectively remove an individual who undermines the social construct. Another issue that comes from the artificial motivation for justice is the transference of property. This has to be done amicably.

These artificial virtues might not be instinctual, but they are so ingrained in our understanding and govern our actions that Hume unhesitatingly calls these the laws of nature, in so far as they find their origins in nature. As societies grew and spread, the rules that governed close knit and geographically localized societies could not be effectively executed. This necessitated governments and a formalization of the judicial systems. These judicial systems then created the tools that allow people to survive in society, giving to society and deriving benefits from it. It also ensures that people who are motivated not by virtue, but by vice are effectively curbed.

If the above are artificial virtues, merely identifying virtues as natural because they happen to have an instinctual component is not sufficient. In Part III of "Of Morals," Hume attempts to formally define what constitutes natural virtue. Earlier in this work, we have identified some of these virtues as benevolence, meekness and veracity. Even here, there's enough room for ambiguities. Hume tells of two ways in which natural morals can be identified. The first condition is that the morals have to be intrinsic or innate to the action agent and directly or indirectly not coerced by the external agents: other people, society in general, cultural constraints, through reasoning, or through the lessons that history has provided. This has already been discussed previously in this work.

For the second condition, Hume places the onus for the natural morals on the spectator. The spectator has to "naturally" approve of the action agent's virtuous behavior. Alternatively, the spectator has to construe the action as virtuous by observing the effect it has on the recipient of the action. The confusion that arises by putting the responsibility solely on the spectator is that it will create a feeling of wellness in the spectator, irrespective of the nature of the virtue: natural or otherwise. The spectator has to be in touch with his or her feelings, which is in keeping with Hume's basic premise.

Confusion would occur if the spectator removes himself from the "pure" feeling aspect of morals and begins to think about it. The spectator would then be required to discern whether the action is natural or artificial. This would add a confounding characteristic to the spectators role in the determining the morality of an issue.

Another issue that might take away the spectator from tacit approval of an action is if he or she begins to distinguish whether the "good" feeling comes because the action agent performed an action from the standpoint of wellness or if he or she performed it for its usefulness.

There were many critics of Hume and his theory on morality. Hume's theory, which completely ignores any connection between morality and reason, was bound to anger critics. It is out of the scope of this work to provide a comprehensive review of each of Hume's critics -- "and there were many. Some of them went so far as to attempt to excommunicate Hume. One of the primary critics of Hume was William Paley. Paley's premise was that morality came from a standpoint of utility. Emotions were removed form discussion. The reason one might consider Paley's arguments as diametrically opposite to Hume's is because in trying to perform an action that is utilitarian. The action agent has to stop to consider not whether his or her actions might create a feeling of well being in the recipient, but whether it would be actually useful to the recipient. To provide an analogy, consider the adage: Give a man fish, feed him for a day; teach him to fish, feed him for life. If the giver of fish or a teacher of fishing or angling would be the action agent, the recipient would be the person who needs the fish or instruction in how to fish. Extending William Paley's arguments, teaching to fish would not provide the instant gratification, but the utility would come from teaching the recipient to fish.