Dealt With the Same Topic

¶ … dealt with the same topic of electoral law in different ways. Bawn's (1993) essay dealt with German electoral law as a social choice outcome. Her hypothesis was that individuals choose electoral institutions that maximize their future policy influence.

The independent variable is the policy preference. The dependent variable is the electoral institution that results.

Bawn's (1993) conceptualizes the electoral system as one that is at least tri-fold consisting of:

a definition of what constitutes a vote…, a rule for how votes are totaled…, and a rule for translating vote share into seat allocations. (966)

As illustration of her argument that the selected electorate coincides with wishes of the party members, Bawn (1993) provides the instance of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) in the 1949 Parliamentary system in Germany. The SPD was the small party coalition and nonetheless was chosen as natural majority for choice of electoral system since it coincided with the choice of the small parties. Using mathematical calculations, some of them too abstruse for me, Bawn (1993) demonstrates that via corollaries, the SPD became the electorate as choice

Just as policy is matter of social choice, political institutions are too. Electoral institutions / systems are selected by the interests of the participants and by the institutions that make that choice therefore different electoral systems appear more prominent, or gain the spotlight in diffident eras.

Bawn's (1993) argument makes sense to me, particularly since it exemplifies Peter Bergman's thesis in sociology of knowledge about how different knowledge structures get created, developed and modified within different cultures / institutions. Not only is it the body of knowledge that appeals to the most influential set of individuals (or key prominent individuals) within a certain sphere that assumes the new hub of knowledge -- i.e. It assumes center place due to the decision of a majority or of key influential people, but this new hub of knowledge, in turn, effects the coming generation until certain key individuals change it or modify it slightly for selection of something else. The political variable of the electoral system shows a similar pattern with the political system assuming central place due to its selection by a majority -- due to its being a social choice. It then influences social choice, until it is replaced by a new political system, which is again selected by an alternate social choice.

The weakness in Bawn's (1993) argument is that social choice may not be the determinant argument in selection of the particular electorate. One or more reasons, extraneous to or supplementary to social choice can result in a selection of electorate subsystem. Social choice too, as in this context, can be interpreted as social duress where the party may feel compelled - but reluctant -- to choose the electorate as their representative party. The question then become one of whether this is choice or duress.

Gunther's (2003) hypothesis is that the perceptions, strategies, calculations, and behavior of party elicits may strongly determine electoral law and the overall shape of the party system. He bases this on survey and in-depth elite interview data from Spain in the 1970s and 1980s.

The IV here is the behavior and perception of the party elites. The DV consists of the direction and character of the Electoral system. Its shape hinges on characteristics of the elite.

Gunther (2003) conceptualizes the elite as party leaders. Those are the very tops that are heading the electorate system.

It is the elite that determine the distal effects of electoral laws and their consequent impact on the system's political direction.

The strengths of Gunther's study lie in the fact that close reasoning as well as data and statistical configurations have been used. As he says: "the distal effects, or long-term political consequences, of electoral laws involve complex interactions at several levels within the political system" (853). Therefore this makes sense that certain conditions need to effectuate change, and as Gunther (2003) shows, it seems to be the elite.

Taking the case of party elite behavior in Spain in the early 1980s, Gunther (2003) showed how some key party members were inaccurately informed regarding certain decisions producing outcomes that were irrational. Other key members also sought fulfillment of personal objectives. The result was engagement of elites in irrational behavior and behavior that contradicted the norm -- or the expectation -- of the political system.

On the other hand, Gunther's study did not involve firsthand observations, surveys and research but rather revolved around simulation and explorations of elite-level coalition-building strategies, a far less reliable technique. Whilst their reasoning sounds plausible and highly contrasted, there are still room for gaps particularly since their reconstruction is a removed and subjective evaluation of possible reasons behind eventual structure of laws and consequent formation of political system. Other weaknesses consist in alternate variables resulting in consequent law / direction of party. As Gunther shows, uncertainty too played a part. It would be difficult, therefore, to determine which of the two was the greater determiner: elitist behavior or uncertainty -- or something else totally different.

Benoit and Hayden (2004) studied institutional change and persistence in the evolution of Poland's electoral system (1989-2001). The hypothesis was that party support for particular system was linked to perceived system's effect on the party seat. The researchers modeled electoral system change and operationalized 'system change' as that driven by partisans self-interest in maximizing their number of seats and tested this model in five different sagas of electoral system change in Poland from 1989 to 2001, comparing the parties' support for alternatives of electoral law to their expectations of the amount of seats gained as a result of these alternatives. The IV was expectation of seats, the DV was selection of political system and consequent development.

The study was conducted via opinion polls, troll call votes, sejm records, constitutional committee transcripts, and interviews with agents who designed and chose the Polish electoral system. Their conclusion and findings were that the office-seeking model (that described possessiveness of seats as driver to electoral selection) best described evolution and development of political system rather than other models such as the transitional fittings explanation.