Iron Triangle Defense Spending Military-Industrial Complex Briefly

Iron Triangle

Defense Spending Military-Industrial Complex Briefly explains iron triangle model policy-making involving Congress, bureaucracy, interest groups. Analyze information relationships Congress, military bureaucracies, defense industries.

Defense spending and the military-industrial complex

The 'iron triangle' model of policy-making is defined as "the closed, mutually supportive relationships that often prevail in the United States between the government agencies, the special interest lobbying organizations, and the legislative committees or subcommittees with jurisdiction over a particular functional area of government policy" (Johnson 2005). For example, in regards to the military, members of Congress benefit when a particular military project is located in their district, so they are more apt to support such military expenditures, regardless of whether the projects are truly valuable or necessary. Compounding the problem, "the middle-level bureaucrats who run the agencies may use their special friends in Congress to block the efforts of a new president or a new congressional majority leadership bent on reforming or reducing the size of their agencies" (Johnson 2005). The Department of Defense on a bureaucratic level wishes to justify its own existence and views policy through the lens of self-preservation, not simply national security interests. This makes governmental reform of any kind very difficult to instate.

The military-industrial iron triangle can be particularly difficult to question, because of the close relationship of defense contractors and government agencies, both of whom benefit from increased expenditures on defense. "Parties that are charged to manage wars (the military, the presidential administration and congress) and companies that produce weapons and equipment for war (industry)" have similar interests (What is the military industrial complex, 2012, Military Industrial Complex). On a personal level, both defense contractors and government bureaucrats sustain themselves through military engagement and financial profits off of creating defensive equipment and thus are not apt to question one another (What is the military industrial complex, 2012, Military Industrial Complex). This not only encourages 'more wars' and also more spending on the military than may be necessary, diverting funds that could be used more profitably on social programs or deficit reduction to the military. It also can result in substantial government waste, as contractors with whom government bureaucrats are 'friendly' with receive more contracts, versus the highest-quality and most qualified companies.

The 'revolving door' problem is especially acute within the defense industry. The 'revolving door' is when members of the government leave to work in private industry, capitalizing upon their experience to make a profit as contractors. Often, these same contractors go back to work within government, then leave to work for contracting agencies again (hence the notion of the 'revolving door'). Government bureaucrats, with an eye upon cashing in on their former position, are hesitant to draw the ire of defense manufactures and thus resist cuts in military spending.