Delegation of Authority to Other Branches of Government

Schechter v United States: What is the constitutional doctrine of the non-Delegation of legislative powers?

Over the course of his first terms in office, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt enacted a series of measures designed to extricate the nation from the Great Depression. A number of these actions, including his attempts to create a series of new federal agencies, caused him to engage in open conflict with the U.S. Supreme Court, to the point that Roosevelt even considered increasing the number of Supreme Court justices to ensure his legislation stood unchallenged. Although ultimately he was dissuaded from this plan, the question of when it was legal for Congress to delegate its powers to some of the other branches of government was at the heart of the conflict.

The doctrine of non-delegation of legislative powers holds that even if Congress wishes to delegate its legislative authority to another entity it cannot do so under the constitution. The specific law at stake in Schechter v United States was the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) "a law passed by Congress to regulate companies as a means to combat the Great Depression" (McBride). As part of its provisions, the law limited the number of hours a poultry employee could work, set a minimum wage for the poultry industry and banned unfair competition (McBride). Because the code had been written by President Roosevelt alone, the U.S. Supreme Court deemed it to be unconstitutional, even though Congress had not raised an objection. The Court found the phrase in the NIRA law "unfair competition" particularly objectionable, stating it seemed to give the president tremendous power, given the ambiguity of the concept. The NIRA also allowed the President to create new regulations as he saw fit in the future to limit unfair competition, which the Court saw as a means of side-stepping the need for Congressional approval to enact new laws (McBride). In contrast, the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914 had specific procedures, including a juridical body set up by Congress, to determine when unfair competition was taking place (Schechter v United States). NIRA had no such outside legislative body and merely invested all of its powers in the hands of the president to determine what constituted fair and unfair competition, which the Court deemed dangerous.

Does Chief Justice Hughes's opinion absolutely forbid delegation or does he suggest support for delegation under certain circumstances?

Hughes' opinion did not completely forbid delegation. The Court noted that in the case of the Panama Refining Company "the Constitution has never been regarded as denying to Congress the necessary resources of flexibility and practicality" to Congress when some delegation was necessary for logistical purposes (Schechter v United States). However, Hughes found the delegation which had been permitted under the NIRA to be excessively broad, given the vague and sweeping nature of the range of powers which seemed to be granted to the President. As stated in Hughes' opinion, "the constant recognition of the necessity and validity of such provisions, and the wide range of administrative authority which has been developed by means of them, cannot be allowed to obscure the limitations of the authority to delegate, if our constitutional system is to be maintained" (Schechter v United States).

What must Congress do to make delegation pass muster?

The Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914 was used as an example in Schechter v United States of a more appropriate way of delegating authority. In this instance, there were specific procedures in the form of a "quasi-judicial body" to determine when and if unfair competition was taking place (Schechter v United States). In other words, there must be a series of checks and balances to ensure that the delegation does not lead to the abuse of power by any of the other involved branches of government.

How did Congress accommodate delegation in Yakus v. United States?

While the U.S. Supreme Court struck down a number of major provision of Franklin Delano Roosevelt's New Deal, it did uphold the establishment of price controls in the wake of World War II. Roosevelt instituted a number of control mechanisms during wartime to ensure that the U.S. was a more effective fighting force, including price ceilings so foods that were scarce did not reach astronomical prices. Yakus was a seller that had been found in violation of setting the price of beef above that of the maximum mandated by law. Yakus alleged that Emergency Price Control Act's establishment of the Office of Price Administration "under the direction of the Price Administrator, appointed by the President" was unconstitutional ("Case Central"). The Court was more sympathetic to the President in this instance, however, given that the Act was clearly temporary in nature. There was also a less vague definition of when the Price Administrator could exercise his authority, namely when "prices have risen or threaten to rise to an extent or in a manner inconsistent with the purpose of this Act" and the President was likewise directed to "stabilize prices, wages, and salaries so far as practicable on the basis of the levels which existed on September 15, 1942, except as otherwise provided in the Act" ("Case Central"). This policy was deemed to be clearly defined and thus, in the estimation of the Court, not open to abuse unlike its rulings regarding FDR's New Deal legislation.

One of the additional reasons the Court was not particularly sympathetic to Yakus was that he had had not "availed themselves of the procedure set up by the Act by which any person subject to a maximum price regulation may test its validity by protest to and hearing before the Administrator, whose determination may be reviewed on complaint to the Emergency Court of Appeals and by this Court on certiorari" (Yakus v. United States). In contrast, the National Industrial Recovery Act did not have specific standards whereby unfair competition in the poultry industry would be determined, nor was there an outside entity to ensure that the law was enforced with discretion and objectivity.