" Those suggestions were met with patriotic, even nationalistic opposition from Bush and his very vocal vice president, Dick Cheney (Hartung, 44-45). "However reasonable the merits" were of Congress cutting off funding for the war in Iraq, Hartung continues, Cheney and others supporting the administration held a hammer over their heads in the form of jingoistic phrases like, if you vote to cut off funds you are "voting against the troops" (Hartung, 44). Leaving American troops hanging out there in Iraq would be unthinkable, it was argued from the Bush point-of-view.

Meanwhile, author Lewis B. Smith points out that arguing against the Bush invasion of Iraq was pointless for Congress, due to the sense of patriotism in the country after the 9/11 terrorist attacks (Smith, 2004, 44). So in this era, unlike other moments in history, Congress could not impose its will on the executive branch simply because "The president…made it seem unpatriotic to question his decisions."

It seems "unthinkable for one to start a war on false assertions, as President Bush did," Smith writes on page 49, but that is precisely what happened, according to the author.

In conclusion, as noted in the introduction, the executive branch should inform Congress -- and there should be open dialog and collaboration with the executive branch -- before a president launches a major foreign policy action. Whether it is putting American troops in harm's way, or negotiating an important treaty with another nation, cooperation and mutual respect should be the watchword between Congress and the White House. However, as pointed out in the introduction, in a democracy the making of foreign policy with Congress and the executive branch both involved can be a helpful situation but also it can be a handicap. Success or failure vis-a-vis foreign policy making depends on the international situation at that moment in time, on the political makeup of the Congress, on the

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