Democratic procedures in foreign policy decision-making: aid or handicap

¶ … Democratic Procedures an Aid or Handicap in Foreign Policy Matters?

The relationship between the U.S. Congress and the executive branch of government is, in most cases, spelled out clearly in the U.S. Constitution. But when it comes to foreign policy, there is not a clear definition as to what role each branch should play. This lack of Constitutional clarity has led to a great deal of friction between Congress and the White House, and this paper reviews and critiques those tensions and power-based battles. It is the opinion of this presentation that the democratic process should play out fully when matters of major foreign policy are on the table. That is, Congress should be fully informed by the executive branch -- and there should be transparency and collaboration with the executive branch -- prior to any policy relating to the use of force against -- or in support of -- a sovereign nation. But the reality is, and the answer to the question posed in the title is, democratic procedures can be -- and have been -- both an aid and a hindrance to American foreign Policy.

The Literature -- History of Congress vs. The White House on Foreign Policy

Granted, when a president of the United States has a well-thought-out idea about what policy he wishes to employ, and his administration has done its homework and believes in a certain reasonable path to take based on verifiable intelligence, Congress can get in the way and potentially delay or defeat a present's best intentions that would truly benefit the nation. This is the constitutionally mandated push-pull resulting from the separation of powers. But on the other hand, if Congress allows the executive branch cart blanche to conduct foreign policy with no oversight -- or if the president refuses to consult with Congress, citing his executive privilege -- that approach can result in a situation where the president becomes an authoritarian leader rather than a person sharing power with the legislative branch.

Jeffrey J. Malanson reviews one of the first major challenges that Congress presented to the foreign policy of executive branch in American History. Writing in the peer-reviewed journal Diplomatic History, Malanson points out than in 1825, when President John Quincy Adams accepted an invitation to send a U.S. delegation to Panama to participate -- in an informal way -- with the Congress of Panama, it did "…more than jus enrage" some members of Congress (Malanson, 2006, 819) . On the surface, at issue was Adams' executive authority to accept an invitation without Congressional approval. But beneath the surface of this contentious issue, Malanson explains that Congress was "looking for a fight" with Adams, and this was the right issue to use in that regard (Malanson, 820).

First of all, Adams had been elected "…in the absence of any coherent political parties," which made him a target of hard-line party loyalists in the Congress, Malanson explains (819). And secondly, Congress was still clinging on to memorable portions of the Inaugural address of President George Washington, in which the first president stated that the U.S. had an obligation to "…cultivate peace and honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none" (Malanson, 821). The "entangling alliances" portion of the speech by Washington was the pivotal passage that was used to block Adams' plan to participate in the Panama idea. The Congress obviously saw the advisory mission to Panama as an "entangling alliance," hence what Washington had said was by way of becoming official American foreign policy.

In the end, notwithstanding "…all the posturing and hand wringing that went on during the debates" (Malanson, 837) over Adams' proposal, Congress approved the sending of representatives to participate in this Latin American mission, albeit nothing of substance emerged from the mission.

Former U.S. Senator John Tower published a piece in the respected journal Foreign Affairs in 1982 in which he asserts that there is an "…almost universal consensus" that the Congressional "intrusion" into executive decisions prior to World War II was "a disaster" (Tower, 1982, 229). Tower is actually complaining about the fact that the Senate rejected President Wilson's Versailles Treaty in 1920, and that in the 1970s, Congress initiated a "rash" of legislation -- over 150 separate "prohibitions and restrictions" imposed on the executive branch -- that was "ill conceived" and "detrimental" to America's national security and foreign policy interests (Tower, 234).

The most important point Tower makes comes in two parts. One, he insists that the president "posses a national mandate" to conduct foreign policy because he is the only official of government elected by the whole nation. And two, the legislature is elected to represent "separate constituencies" and best serves the country by formulating "domestic policy… on one discrete piece of legislation at a time" (Tower, 232-233). Hence, he believes the Congress should basically hand over foreign policy decisions to the executive branch.

Former Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, Douglas Bennet writes that when a president plays the role of a bully -- under the guise of "executive authority"

-- he can sometimes get his way by putting Congress on notice that the country will be in peril if it doesn't authorize the president's desire to go to war (Bennet, 1978, 40). In fact in 1964 President Lyndon Johnson told Congress that a U.S. Navy ship in the Gulf of Tonkin had been attacked by a communist warship -- which later turned out to be a false assertion. However, by sheer force of his personality, and without presenting verifiable intelligence to back up his assertion, Johnson coaxed 98 out of 100 U.S. Senators to sign off on the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution (Bennet, 40).

Later, in 1973, as the Vietnam war dragged on and Richard Nixon -- who had promised to bring the war to an end but instead escalated it -- was conducting his own foreign policy with no oversight from the legislature, Congress passed the War Powers Resolution (Bennet, 40). Though Nixon vetoed the Resolution, the public was so angry about the war that Congress used its muscle to over-ride Nixon's veto. The bottom line for Bennet (44) is that public displeasure over an executive branch's war policies can kick Congress into gear to challenge a president's policies. Indeed, when public outcries (promoted by the media) are loud, and Congress responds to the public's disenchantment with a policy, "the result should be greater stability and predictability in American foreign policy -- a benefit not only to us but to the world" (Bennet, 44).

Proving once again that Congress can assert it's will -- based on backing from public opinion when controversial foreign policy issues are part of the national dialog -- Kate Delaney recounts the legislative rebuff of President Ronald Reagan's approach to South Africa and to apartheid (Delaney, 2006, 437). Delaney, who was serving as a foreign service officer in Johannesburg, South Africa in the 1980s, recounts how Reagan's stubborn insistence on an "…active, constructive engagement" with the regime in South Africa was blown out of the water by Congress (Delaney, 438).

In 1986, in response to public outcry against the repressive, racist apartheid policies in South Africa, Congress passed the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (CAAA). Reagan, who wanted to handle this issue with his own executive order, vetoed the CAAA. However, Congress exercised its legislative strength by over-riding Reagan's veto (the House voted 313-83; the Senate voted 78-21 to over-ride Reagan) (Delaney, 438-39). This rejection of presidential policy making was "…a textbook demonstration of the separation of powers and the system of checks and balances," Delaney explains on page 439.

How and when did it happen that the president had his bully pulpit power reduced? Former Washington Post Editor Sebastian Mallaby explains that it happened during Reagan's second term when "…technological advances" changed television from "…a presidential megaphone into a presidential scourge" (Mallaby, 2000, 3). In that second term of Reagan cable TV channels came into prominence, Mallaby reports, and instead of just the big three networks (ABC, NBC, CBS), there was CNN and other networks, reducing a president's impact the public to "brief sound bites on the evening news" (Mallaby, 2). Indeed, Congress can now "obstruct administration policy" by using public opinion -- which can be promoted by cable news networks that puts enormous pressure on administrations -- as the basis for legislation that can cut off funding for pet presidential projects.

William D. Hartung -- a senior fellow at the World Policy Institute -- weighs in on the Congressional Democrats' plan to cut off funds for President George W. Bush's misadventure in Iraq. The public by 2006 was already very restless -- and many were publicly outrage and took to the streets in massive protest demonstrations -- about the continuing policy of occupying Iraq, especially after it became obvious that there were no weapons of mass destruction to be found (Hartung, 2006, 44). The Bush Administration had asserted loudly and in many venues, including the Security Council of the United Nations, that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction, but no weapons were to be found. The Democrats took over Congress in the 2006 mid-term elections, and while the party wished to have the administration adopt a policy to either "get out now" of Iraq, or "stabilize, then withdraw."