Deterrence theory and applications

Deterrence in the Post-Cold War Era

The same types of deterrence strategies that were used to good effect in the Cold War may not be as effective against non-state actors as with nation states in the 21st century. This paper discusses the factors involved in developing timely and effective responses to non-state actors to determine whether the concepts of cumulative deterrence and/or tailored deterrence can also be effective against non-state actors today. A summary of the research and important findings concerning security and deterrence in the post-Cold War era are provided in the conclusion.

Many military and political strategists today may lament the "good old days of Communism" when the actors were well-known and their geographic locations were established with certainty. At that time, it was a straightforward matter to convince political leaders in Western Europe of the need for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to counter the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact threat. As a result, missiles were arrayed against missiles, divisions against divisions, and the Berlin Wall remained a tangible symbol of the vast ideological chasm that existed between East and West. As a result, actual military hot spots in the Cold War were rare and were kept isolated and the status quo was expensive but relatively predictable and everyone knew their jobs.

By sharp contrast, many of the forces arrayed against the United States today are comprised of various non-state actors that are far more difficult to identify than the country's enemies in the past. These non-state actors can take advantage of the civil liberties in free societies to move freely within and between countries, and modern telecommunications help them keep in contact around the globe. Indeed, it is reasonable to suggest that many of the non-state actors who are actively involved in global terrorism today live and work in the United States and Saudi Arabia but remain unknown to authorities but are ready to strike when given the command. In other cases, though, the United States has a much clearer picture of who is leading terrorist groups and can then take appropriate counterterrorist measures. These changes from the Cold War era mean that in some cases, the same resources that were used in the Cold War may be appropriate today, such as using the 101st Airborne Division in Iraq, but in other cases, unmanned drones to take out terrorist leaders are the tool of choice. These cumulative responses that build on previous successes and take into account the latest intelligence are superior to tailored responses because the battlefield remains dynamic and the threats nebulous.