Individual the So-Called \"Object Concept\"

¶ … Individual

The so-called "object concept" is the knowledge that objects continue to exist even when they are out of sight. This knowledge, of course, is central to all human activities; we simply cannot function without it. As trivial as it may seem, the object concept has had its fair share of claims and controversies, especially as to when and how we acquire it. This paper attempts to compare and contrast the classic Piagetian perspective of the object concept with more contemporary views such as the Dynamic Model Theory and the hypothesis on infant object concept being akin to mid-level object-based attention.

Jean Piaget proposed the earliest account of the development of the object concept in his pioneering studies in cognitive development in the 1930s. Through clever hiding games with his own children, he constructed his theory that children gradually construct the object concept over the first 2 years of life in a predictable and universal 6-stage manner (Piaget, 1954):

From birth to three months (Stages 1 and 2), infants do not truly perceive objects but rather assimilate them through reflexes and their own experience with the object. Approximately between three and seven months (Stage 3) some precursors of the object concept appear as infants can, for example, visually or manually follow the path of a toy until it disappears. Once out of his sight, the infant simply acts as if the object ceased to exist. At Stage 4 (8-12 mos.), infants can retrieve a hidden object, suggesting that objects no longer lose their existence even when obstructed. However, if an object that was initially hidden and retrieved in point A repeatedly is moved to point B. And then hidden again, the infant will continue to search for it in point A (the "A not B. error"). According to Piaget, at this stage, infants associate an object to the point where it was first discovered. Between 12-17 months (Stage 5), the "A not B. error" disappears, as the infant can retrieve an object where it was last, not first, hidden -- but for as long as the infant witnesses the transfer from point A to point B. Finally from 18 months onwards (Stage 6), the object gains permanence -- it may be out of view but the object is "conserved," regardless of its location in space or time.

Piaget's Theory is considered a classic. However, it is his Stage 4 "A not B. error" that is the most intriguing and well studied. The now canonical task has been replicated hundreds of times in various studies, the most interesting of which are those that bear very slight variations to the trial yet lead to a disruption of the error (Thelen, 2001). These variations range from visual features of the hiding location and nature of the object, to the time gap between hiding and searching and the venue of the experiment (Butterworth et al.; 1982; Diamond, 1985/1997; and Acredolo, 1979 in Thelen, 2001). If the "A not B" error is a true measure of an infant's object concept and as robust as Piaget suggests, how can it be that what infants appear to "know" depends on so many seemingly irrelevant factors?

One answer that has been recently proposed is the Dynamic Model Theory (Thelen, 2001). At the outset, the proponents of this theory are in agreement with the Piagetian belief that the "A not B" error doesn't pertain to an object concept per se. The evidence lies in the method they used, a variation of the canonical "A not B" task: there was no hidden object and the infant was cued simply with the lid to a hiding well (Smith 1996b in Thelen, 2001). As it turned out, the infants still made the "A not B" error. Hence, like Piaget, the Dynamic Model Theory contends that the phenomenon is about moving to a location in space and remembering a cued location (Thelen 2001). However, the Dynamic Model Theory disagrees with the Piagetian proposal that perseverative reaching (i.e. The "A not B. error") is unique to a particular stage in infancy and disappears henceforth. Rather, an infant's response to the task can be understood simply and completely in terms of the interaction of the processes of perceiving, moving, and remembering as they evolve over time (Thelen, 2001).

Essentially, the Dynamic Model Theory proposes that an infant's response to the "A not B" task can be predicted by a motor planning field integrating three relevant inputs and operating continuously as the different events in the trial unfolds (Thelen, 2001). These three inputs are the task input (e.g. The lids marking the hiding location), specific input (e.g. The experimenter hiding the toy in point A or B), and memory input (e.g. memory of where the infant has reached in the previous trials). As the trial progresses, these inputs are "recorded" in the motor planning field as activation sites. Whichever input represents the most highly activated site at a particular point in time, that more likely becomes the basis of where the infant will reach.

The implication of the Dynamic Model Theory is that the "A not B. error" is context-specific in nature. Hence, it is able to explain the disruptions in the error when slight variations to the trial are introduced and also observations of the "A not B" error in older children and even adults (Spencer & Hund, submitted and Schutte & Spencer, submitted, in Thelen, 2001). The Theory, however, fails to specify what leads to the change in the "cooperativity" of motor planning field neurons from weak to strong in older children, which differentiates their performance from younger children in the "A not B" task. Could the "cooperativity" change be related to specific cognitive gains that occur between 12 and 18 months of age?

Contrary to Piaget's position that the ability to trace individual objects through time and occlusion develop slowly over the first two years of life, some studies suggest that these processes are in place earlier -- between four to five months (Wynn, 1992 and Spelke et al., 1995 in Carey and Xu, 2001). Often, but not always, this hypothesis is tested using events unfolding behind screens and the outcome of the trial -- expected or otherwise -- is revealed when the screen is lowered or removed (Carey and Xu, 2001). In this method, the finding is interpreted by monitoring the looking times as the infant watches the outcome of the trial -- unexpected outcomes elicit longer looking times than expected outcomes. This method has been used to yield interpretable findings even among very young infants (Slater et al., 1996 in Carey and Xu, 2001).

The screen experiments are able to affirm Piaget's theory that in fairly young infants (less than 10 months old), object differentiation is based on spatiotemporal discontinuity or spatial location (Carey and Xu, 2001). However, at around 12 months of age, a secondary kind-based system emerges that allows infants to differentiate objects based on their features in the absence of spatiotemporal information. This capacity is said to be linked to linguistic competence such as the understanding of object labels (Carey and Xu, 1996 in Carey and Xu, 2001). The implication of this is that at some point, object representation in infants may not only be perceptual but pre-conceptual as well (mid-level representation).

In summary, this paper has presented two alternatives to the Piagetian theory on the object concept. The Dynamic Model Theory provides a mathematical model to explain the context specific nature of the "A not B" error in Piaget's theory. Carey and Xu's review of recent arguments on infant object differentiation suggest that the object concept may be established much earlier in infants than Piaget proposes and operate through an object-based phenomenon.

Q2.

Like any other developmental index, the development of self-concept is a product of many inter-relational factors that are both inherent and environmental in nature. Specifically, children come to know who they are as they see their inherent qualities manifested in life situations and shaped by their socialization experiences, cultural background, and cognitive performance. This paper attempts to examine these factors using current empirical evidence.

First at hand -- how old are children when they can give stable and coherent descriptions of themselves? There is some evidence to suggest that it is earlier than what the general public might expect. At around 5-7 years of age, children can give self-reports of extraversion, agreeableness, and conscientiousness that substantially converge with ratings on relevant behavior as reported by their parents and teachers (Measelle et al., 2005). This is fairly consistent with cognitive development views since this period (transition from early to middle school) coincides with the beginnings of processing and organizing complex information in a more coherent manner (Cowan, 1978 in Measelle et al., 2005). These cognitive milestones allow children to participate less in all or none thinking and see the good and bad in themselves (Measelle et al., 2005).

The association between cognitive skills and the development of self-concept is significant. In light of Piaget's theory, it would appear that the precursors of self-concept would not appear until at least object permanence is established (Piaget, 1954). That is, until an infant realizes that she is looking at herself in the mirror rather than another baby, the concept of self cannot begin to form (Johnston, 1996). As children mature, the link between cognition and self-concept becomes more illuminated. In older children, part of the maturation process is the ability to solve problems and process information (Siegler and Alibali, 2004). The fact that children use a variety of strategies and behave differently when overcoming obstacles to reach a common goal reflects differences not only in their cognitive abilities but also how they see themselves -- "I don't give up easily; I always try my best; I learn well; I don't like myself," etc. (Measelle et al., 2005).

If, as earlier suggested, by five to seven years of age, children are able to give accurate self-descriptions of themselves, then the precursors of self-concept clearly evolve around the toddler and pre-school years. If this is so, then the child's immediate environment and primary caregivers have an important role in the development of self. While it is generally accepted that a child's temperament -- presumably the baseline where self-concept builds upon -- is largely inherent, there are some empirical evidence to suggest that temperament and toddler self-control can be moderated by mother-child relationship quality.

In particular, it is hypothesized that "mother-infant synchrony is an antecedent of the emergence of self-control" (Feldman, Greenbaum, and Yirmiya, 1999). Longitudinal studies show that the experience of mutual synchrony during the first year is important in helping infants with difficult temperaments achieve self-control at two years (Feldman, Greenbaum, and Yirmiya, 1999). The experience of mutual synchrony is characterized by the ability of a mother to match a response to her child's mood change; share control over interaction with her child; and maintain visual contact during face-to-face interactions (Feldman, Greenbaum, and Yirmiya, 1999). Self-control marks the first expression of internalised socialization and is manifested by a child's obedience to parents' instructions and ability to wait when asked (Emde et al., 1991 in Feldman, Greenbaum, and Yirmiya, 1999). As such, it can be said that parents, especially mothers, are important agents of socialization.

Social behavior is but one of many dimensions that can be used to evaluate self-view among children. Dimensions may be positive like achievement and well-being or negative like aggression and alienation (Bird and Reese, 2006). When a child says about herself, "I am happiest when I am close to people," it indicates social closeness, while if she says, "People always say mean things to me," it may suggest alienation (Bird and Reese, 2006). For children to be able to view themselves as such, they must have connected that self-view to a concrete past event/events in their lives (Bird and Reese, 2006). In other words, a personal life history is believed to form the basis of a subjective self (Bird and Reese, 2006).