Is the "New Terrorism" That Much Different From the "Old Terrorism"?

New Terrorism -- Risk Management

In the aftermath of the carnage created by terrorists on September 11, 2001, in which 2,977 people were killed (in the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and in hijacked commercial jetliners), the United States government initiated a "war on terror." That war has yet to be won, and may never be won because terrorists have found new ways of launching attacks and where there once was just Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda to cope with, now there are numerous jihadist offshoots like ISIS and Boko Haram, among others. Some observers call this current era "new terrorism" and in general when a previously unknown terror group makes its bloody mark on innocent people, those actions could also be called new terrorism. However, this paper looks at the concept of what is known as new terrorism, at the realities created by the terrorism witnessed in the news reports today, and the urgent problems terrorists create vis-a-vis risk management.

New Terrorism

Author Peter R. Neumann has written a book, Old and New Terrorism, in which he points to the differences between "old" and "new" terrorism. Neumann explains that during the late 1990s, when people talked about "new terrorism," they were often alluding to "a catch-all for everything that seemed novel or unusual" which only led to "widespread confusion" (Neumann 2009, p. 14). But what Neumann is talking about when he uses the phrase new terrorism is a group of terrorists that does not necessarily have a hierarchy, but rather is operational within networks. In other words, often in new terrorism, "There is no single central leader or commander; the network as a whole…has little or no hierarchy" (Neumann 2009, p. 16).

Moreover, Neumann mentions that often there are no "firm rules on operations are initiated and authorized" because decisions to carry out attacks can be made by members of the network (Neumann 2009, p. 16). Meanwhile in an article published in the website Social Europe, Neumann mentions that the "pre-eminent historian of terrorism," Walter Laqueur, had predicted a dramatic change in the structure of terrorist organizations two years prior to the September 11 attacks (Neumann 2009, p. 1). Laqueur made some outrageous predictions about new terrorism -- that terrorists wanted to build "earthquake machines" and launch "artificial meteors with which to bombard the earth" -- but in general Neumann believes that Laqueur was one of the first to get a handle on new terrorism (Neumann 2009, p. 1).

Martha Crenshaw, with the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University in California, writes that many of those who argue that there is a "new" terrorism believe the "old paradigms should be discarded entirely and replaced with a new understanding" (Crenshaw 2007, p. 2). She is careful to explain that there has been great amounts of confusion over just what the new terrorism means, and how it compares with the old terrorism.

First of all, Crenshaw makes the point that new terrorism got its momentum with the sarin gas attacks on the Tokyo subway in 1995, and Timothy McVeigh's bombing of the federal building in Oklahoma City. The two individuals who perpetrated those attacks were not linked to any terror group, hence the belief that this was a new paradigm, Crenshaw explains (p. 4). Fears about the use of unconventional weapons also added to the momentum to believe in a new terrorism (i.e., after the September 11 attacks anthrax letters were mailed in the U.S. causing great fear and paranoia).

The bottom line for Crenshaw is that the "…departure from the past" terrorism is just not as pronounced as new terrorism proponents think" (p. 5). The violence seen today that is perpetrated by terrorists is not "a fundamentally or qualitatively 'new' phenomenon," Crenshaw asserts on page 5. In fact contemporary terrorism shared many of the characteristics of terrorism dating back to the 19th century; including the use of terrorism by "groups of Russian revolutionaries, European and American anarchists, and Irish nationalists" (Crenshaw 2007, p. 5).

Moreover, Crenshaw notes that Laqueur (referenced earlier in this paper) believes that the "new" and the "old" coexist; Laqueur says that "new" terrorists are religious fanatics who suffer from "delusion and persecution mania" (Crenshaw 2007, p. 9). What the writer wants readers to understand is that misunderstanding what is "new" in terrorism could actually lead to "mistakes of prediction and of policy," and those mistakes could send security professionals off on wild goose chases (Crenshaw 2007, p. 31).

An example Crenshaw uses very effectively is the September 11 terrorist acts. Many observers believed that hijackings were a thing of the past, and that they were an "outmoded tactic" at best. Because governments had installed screening technologies at airports, many government security experts figured that al Qaeda's next move wouldn't involve hijackings. Those experts were so wrong, as we now know. Hence, Crenshaw's point is that society can expect old methods of terror to be combined with new methods, and moreover, "a strictly 'new terrorism' viewpoint is bound to overestimate the effect of religious beliefs as a cause of terrorism and as a cause of lethality" (Crenshaw 2007, p. 32).

At the end of the day, Crenshaw insists that it cannot be honestly asserted that there are two types of terrorism because much of the carnage from terrorists involves more similarities than differences in terms of lethal tactics.

David Tucker writes in the Naval Postgraduate School publication that the new terrorism as functioning with "…autonomous, dispersed entities," only linked by communications from leadership but in fact sharing a "common purpose" (Tucker 2001, p. 1). Tucker notes that because new terrorism allows network-style groups within a larger organization to act without a "pyramid of authority," those "cells" are motivated by the "flexible, adaptive and resilient" nature of their authority to strike and kill (Tucker 2001, p. 1). Tucker explains that the "communication revolution" has provided opportunities for new terrorism jihadists to "get their message to a worldwide audience" and act as an ad hoc group while recruiting new followers to their cause (Tucker 2001, p. 2).

Terrorists Using the Communication Revolution

"ISIS has utilized a brilliant social media strategy to recruit fighters and increase their international recognition" (Pape 2015).

On the subject of terrorists using the digital revolution to recruit new followers and to communicate within their group, a prime example is ISIS. The terrifying violence that the jihadist group has launched in Iraq and Syria clearly puts it at the top of list of terror groups that the Western world has to contend with, but at the same time its videos placed online attracts new fighters. In many instances ISIS comes into a town and separates the men from the women; the men are marched off to be slaughtered (by beheadings or at the muzzle of a rifle) and the women are kept as sexual slaves.

ISIS shows very impressive sophistication with digital media; it takes video of its horrific acts of cruelty and its "unfathomable brutality," according to Terrance McCoy writing in the Washington Post (McCoy 2014, p. 1). Those videos are shown on computers worldwide, and ISIS has become the most feared group in the Middle East. Their acts of terror, from "beheadings to summary executions to amputations to crucifixions," ironically help them recruit fighters from around the world, McCoy explains. And on the subject of recruitment, ISIS has shown that it is very sophisticated in the way it recruits would-be killers and terrorists.

More than just showing video online of its brutal, unthinkably cruel slaughter of innocent people, ISIS has perfected the use of social media like Twitter and used "end-to-end encryption" (Ackerman 2015, p. 1). That kind of encryption is described by Ackerman; the "messaging service" (Twitter) is being used to send information, and Twitter does not have access to the decryption keys "of those who receive it" (Ackerman 2015, p. 1). In other words, the person on a computer or a smart phone who receives a message (through Twitter) from ISIS can read the message (which sometimes urges the reader to "kill, kill, kill, kill" (Ackerman 2015, p. 1).

The FBI Chief, James Comey, testifying before the U.S. Congress, said he wants a debate about how U.S. technology could insert "back doors" or "front doors" into encryption software so that U.S. intelligence could thwart ISIS in this rogue yet sophisticated recruitment method (Ackerman 2015, p. 1). There are many reasons that security experts offer as to why "back door" software that can foil terrorists' encryption strategies are a bad idea. Such a technique would "leave the door ajar for…hackers, criminals, foreign intelligences services to gain access to enormous treasure troves of & #8230;data" (Ackerman 2015, p. 2).

Is ISIS an example of new terrorism? According to Tim Lister -- writing in CNN's web pages -- explains that military commanders are impressed with ISIS in terms of their military tactics and their flexibility. First of all ISIS -- clearly among the most deadly and fanatical jihadist groups; Boko Haram in Africa would also qualify in this category -- has experienced regional commanders that have fought in Chechnya and Afghanistan, and with Saddam Hussein's army.

Secondly, as Turkish analyst Metin Gurcan said, ISIS has a "fluid and decentralized command and control structure" -- which would place it in the category of "new terrorism"; also, ISIS is said to be "one of the most disciplined players on the battlefield (Lister 2015, p. 4). Meanwhile, notwithstanding "hundreds of airstrikes on its military infrastructure, ISIS continues to function as a rudimentary government" in cities it has captured in Iraq (Lister 2015, p. 5). This is clearly a formidable foe for the United States and its partners in the Middle East.

One of the potential downsides to the ISIS war strategy is its desire to attack, attack, attack, even when the situation is futile. This may be part of its strategy being part of the new terrorism because autonomous ISIS cells can decide to just continue a battle even when it is losing. Michael Knights, an expert on the Middle East, says that ISIS suffers from "chronic tactical restlessness…an almost pathological need to take the initiative and attack the enemy, even when…success was highly unlikely" (Lister 2015, p. 6).

Is Boko Haram Joining with ISIS?

An article in Business Insider says that the leader of the violent African jihadist group Boko Haram has pledged allegiance to ISIS. According to journalist Armin Rosen, when Boko Haram made that announcement it spread "widespread alarm and raised concerns" that his coalition could strengthen Boko Haram's ability to "cause death and destruction" throughout Africa (Rosen 2015, p. 1). Whether or not Boko Haram aligns itself with ISIS, this Nigerian terrorist group has killed an estimated 11,000 people since 2011, and 6,000 people in 2014 alone. This is the group that kidnapped over 200 school girls in Nigeria in 2014, and Boko Haram has declared "…its own Islamic state in August of 2014" (Rosen 2015, p. 2).

It is not clear whether or not Boko Haram would be considered a new terrorist group, because apparently they are undergoing a "huge change in methodology as well as production quality and capabilities" (Rosen 2015, p. 2). Nevertheless, Boko Haram is a feared, fanatical organization attempting to install its own Islamic state in Nigeria, and though it has come under pressure from various militaries, it appears to continue to be a vicious group of bloodthirsty killers claiming somehow to be Islamic in ideology.

What Problems Does New or Old Terrorism Prove for Risk Management?

What is risk management? Marquette University (MU) in Wisconsin defines risk management as the ongoing process to "identify, analyze, evaluate, and treat loss exposures and monitor risk control and financial resources to mitigate the adverse effects of loss" (MU). There are methods that can make events more predictable, and when an event is somewhat predictable, then there is "less risk" because perhaps the negative event can be prevented or at least mitigated (MU). The best approach to risk management (according to MU) is an "avoidance of activities which cause loss," or at least a reduction of the possibilities that there will be losses. However, when it comes to terrorism (new or old), avoiding attacks in order to lessen the risk is rarely possible.

Years After September 11 -- Risk Management

Author Etti Baranoff writes in the Journal of Insurance Regulation that of course risk management has always been an "underlying concern" for businesses and corporations, for government and even in private life (Baranoff 2004, p. 71). But after September 11, and the "insurance cataclysm" that was caused by the terrorist attacks, the old debate concerning the "ideal focus" of regulation in the insurance industry has been rekindled.

Given the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, and the anthrax scare that followed, new fears came into focus (including chemical, radiological and biological warfare) and executives were looking towards an enterprise risk management (ERM) solution (Baranoff 2004, p. 75). In other words, how do businesses mitigate risks that are unknown but are altogether possible in the U.S.

Americans have plenty of risks to worry about, especially after September 11, Baranoff writes on page 77. A survey by National Underwriter ranked Americans' concerns like this: a) long-term financial security; b) saying employed; and c) physical safety and security (Baranoff 2004, p. 77). Also in the survey it showed that Americans worried about living too long or dying too young, the loss of health insurance, and the risk of being hurt by terrorism. The previous catastrophic models that insurance companies had used were focused on property and industry losses -- not life and health issues. But that changed after 9/11.

Hence, there is now a focus on insurance (the application of risk management) that deals with people and companies. That's why the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA) was signed into law in 2002, which in a way, according to Baranoff, leads us all into a more "holistic" way of regulating how insurance (risk management) can be beneficial to everyone.

Who Should Pay for Damages Produced by Terrorism?

A peer-reviewed article in The Geneva Papers points to the issue of risk management post-9/11, and who should pay for losses due to terrorism. The authors note that the September 11, 2001 attacks raised many questions, including foreign policy decisions, how counter-terrorism will impact the threats, national security and more.

But the looming questions as far as risk management is concerned is: "who should pay for losses due to terrorism?" (Michel-Kerjan, et al., 2005, p. 145). This is a very pertinent question because after the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States, it was determined that those attacks constituted "…the costliest even ever in the history of insurance" (Michel-Kerjan 2005, p. 145).

Indeed, the direct damage caused by bin Laden's terrorist organization was estimated to be nearly $80 billion; of that total, about $32.5 billion was covered by insurance, Michel-Kerjan explains on page 145. Reinsurers from Europe have reportedly covered nearly two-thirds of the losses that were insured, and after 9-11, most of those companies opted out of any further coverage for the terrorism risks.

Michel-Kerjan points to risks at two levels that are "highly correlated risks." The first insurance level discussed is that there were "multiple lines affected instantaneously" -- including: a) commercial property; b) business interruption; c) worker's compensation; d) life, health and disability coverage; e) aircraft hell and "general liability lines each suffered catastrophic losses" (Michel-Kerjan 2005, p. 145).

The second level of risks referenced by the authors entails the possibility of catastrophic terrorist attacks happening simultaneously "…in different densely populated and industrialized locations," which would require a stunningly huge payout from insurance companies (Michel-Kerjan 2005, p. 145). And clearly smart companies are paying high prices for insurance in order to address risk management issues.

In France the problem for insurance companies is compounded by the fact that the law does not allow insurance companies that provide coverage for commercial properties "…to dissociate terrorism coverage from commercial property"; in fact, the law passed in France on September 9, 1986, obligates insurers to provide terrorism coverage "up to the overall limits of any property policy" (Michel-Kerjan 2005, p. 146).

But because of the enormous burden this problem placed on French insurance companies, the French government and private insurers got together and signed a public-private partnership deal that "…created a specific national terrorism pool of co-reinsurance" (Michel-Kerjan 2005, p. 147). This deal (in which federal monies would back up private insurance money when terrorism causes great damage) was the very first post-9/11 state-backed terrorism pool.

Risk Management Concerns Depend on Where you Live

In Canada, the perception of terrorism threats is very different from the perceptions in the United States. An article in the Journal of Risk Research points out that "terrorism has some unique features as a risk management issue, and due to the uncertainty, juxtaposed with the likelihood of terrorism, risk management and risk assessment have become an "increasingly complex" problem (Lemyre, et al., 2006, p. 756). Management (government) must make decisions on the potential health risk to the population based not just on intelligence that government obtains regarding the possibility of attacks, but leaders in government must also make risk management decisions based on the public perceptions of what might happen.

After 9/11, there was "substantial psychological stress among the U.S. public," in particular among women, among "visible minorities," and among residents that live fairly close to the attacks (Lemyre 2006, p. 756). In fact, a survey taken in the U.S. In November, 2001, showed that "…almost half of respondents perceived the average American as likely to be hurt in a terrorist attack within the coming year" (Lemyre 2006, p. 756).