Dombrowsky \"Disaster\" as a Trigger Joseph Scanlon,

Dombrowsky

"Disaster" as a Trigger

Joseph Scanlon, Director of the Emergency Communications Research Unit at Carleton University, states that the term "disaster" has undergone a transformation in the wake of 9/11. Its transformation is the center of debate for researchers whose work relies on an adequate definition and understanding of "disaster" -- yet Scanlon makes clear that he has been particularly struck "by how much of the debate [is]...influenced by awareness of various events and how much of that awareness [is] media related" (Scanlon 2005:13). In the field of emergency communications, that awareness has led to a new culture of "disaster" maintenance, and it has been largely influenced by media representation. According to Wolf Dombrowsky, "the term 'disaster' has only ephemeral significance. It is a trigger, a flag to signal a meaning, a stimulus to produce a specific reaction" (Dombrowsky 1998:15). Dombrowsky's assertion has been challenged by several researches, but his premise, essentially, is confirmed by Scanlon, who sees the media as the flag-bearer, "forcing us into definitions that are adjusted to those events we know or think we know" (Scanlon 2005: 16). This paper will discuss Dombrowsky's definition of "disaster" within the context of a post-9/11 world climate, examining the conceptual dimensions of the term, its ontological significance, and the way it is applied in the field of crisis management. It will also expand on the idea of "disaster" being a term that has "ephemeral significance."

Ron Perry signifies the importance of such a discussion by stating, "The extent to which we are able to identify and manage disasters of the future is contingent upon our collective understanding of the meaning and dimensions of the concept" (Scanlon 2005:16). Likewise, Perry notes that "as we sharpen our conception of disaster, we identify the disciplinary niches and their value in a field that is almost inherently interdisciplinary" (Perry 2005:20). The discussion also has a practical element to it -- not merely a theoretical:

With the investment of resources, governments expect more from the community of disaster researchers. To answer such questions regarding the need for and implementation of warning systems, appropriate mitigation measures, tactics for response and recovery, researchers need to have a firm grasp on what a disaster is and what it is not. This is especially relevant to the issue of comprehensive emergency management and integrated emergency management systems. (Perry

2005:20)

Dombrowsky, accordingly, takes a "sociological approach" to the term "disaster": "Epistemologically, the definitions used in science and practice are classified and redefined as programmatic declarations" (Dombrowsky 1998:13). Because, Dombrowsky argues, definers of the term are dictating policy in response to the what the term signifies, both "problem and perception" and "solution and exigency" may be mismatched, since terminological conceptions are likely to differ according to one's "prestructure" of "reality" (Dombrowsky 1998:13).

The importance of making sure problem matches perception and solution matches exigency cannot be understated, since, as David Alexander points out, "On average about 220 natural catastrophes, 70 technological disasters and three new armed conflicts occur each year" (Alexander 2005:25). Alexander iterates the importance of discussions of "disaster" in three ways: 1) "Any failure to mitigate hazards is shown up in their impacts;" 2) "Corruption is exposed by bringing its consequences to light;" 3) "Human relations are made more explicit and conspicuous by the increased levels of socialization that commonly occur in the immediate aftermath of disaster" (Alexander 2005:26).

However, Dombrowsky's contention with Alexander stems from the fact that Alexander provides only interpretation: "Alexander does not advance a notion of what 'disaster' could be in reality nor in scientific terms, because to him 'the definition depends on shifting portrayals and perceptions of what is significant about the phenomenon'" (Dombrowsky 2005:82) That is exactly what, Dombrowsky argues, organizations all over the world do:

The German Red Cross, for example, defines disaster as an 'extraordinary situation in which the everyday lives of people are suddenly interrupted and thus protection, nutrition, clothing, housing, medical and social aid or other vital necessities are requested...The German law that states the laws of disaster protection itemizes phenomena (such as storm, flood, blizzard, explosion, etc.)

which are seen as typical in releasing disasters...German insurance companies define disaster as a situation involving damage and/or loss of lives beyond one million German marks and/or 1,000 persons killed. (Dombrowsky 1998:14).

The point to which Dombrowsky aims this exchange is this: the term "disaster" is a trigger that, when pulled (or used), produces an effect: that effect depends largely on how the term is applied -- in what manner it is construed, and towards what disposition it inclines: "Sometimes the wrong trigger produces a lack of vital necessities, which is the case when charity is hampered by repulsive pictures...instead of being spurred by pitiful pictures" (Dombrowsky 1998:15).

Dombrowsky breaks down his argument into three lines of demarcation: 1) "the question of how language is structuring our perception of the world"; 2) "how reality is transformed into the mechanics of problem-solving"; 3) "how disaster sociologists and their ways of conceptualizing disaster will be affected by all this" (Dombrowsky 1998:15). Dombrowsky instantly takes issue with lingual expressions that carry connotations of irrelevant or misleading sense: for example, the phrase, often heard in media, "disaster strikes" is a hyperbolic absurdity. Lightning may strike, but not disaster: "Disasters do not cause effects. The effects are what we call a disaster" (Dombrowsky 1998:15). By personifying "disaster," the term is given a larger-than-life significance that can have unpremeditated ramifications on a listening public. Not only this, but "disaster" is reduced to a level of subjectivity that requires continuous redefinition. Dombrowsky accuses Alexander of concluding that such subjectivity is inevitable; Dombrowsky says no: such an idea "challenges the traditional principles and practice of scientific craft" (Dombrowsky 2005:84).

Rather, Dombrowsky insists that words be defined and used cautiously, not haphazardly or without due respect -- for every word carries weight and meaning, and to rely on successive interpretations to relay or convey a fixed idea is like relying on the wind to scatter debris into an ordered stack. The origin of this subjectivity with regard to "disaster" research has its roots in the 9/11 attack:

The 11th September attack has focused the theorizing of Cutter and Alexander upon catastrophic terrorism and motivated them to do something about the shocking brutality of international terrorism. As their first step, they combine the incompatible together: vulnerability, disaster, danger, failure, hazards, threat, risk, emergency, terrorism, and war. Because they do not appreciate the origins and advances in science, 'new understandings', cannot take place." (Dombrowsky

2005:86)

Susan Cutter, however, argues that she is "skeptical of the continuing definitional debates and arguments regarding the terminology that is used in our discourse involving hazards, risks, disasters, and vulnerability" (Cutter 2005:105). Cutter sees no point in debating the definition of terms -- she embraces their utility, defines them, and applies them to research. In fact, she sees Dombrowsky's "line of scholarly inquiry into semantics (or ontological debates) is counter-productive at this point in the intellectual development of the field...Disaster research is a relevant and pragmatic endeavor; one that uncovers new knowledge and then applies it to reduce the impacts of disasters on society" (Cutter 2005:105).

Cutter also places emphasis on the integration of research studies concerning "specific hazard etiologies," which to some extent finds favor with Dombrowsky. As Dombrowsky articulates, "Most definers of 'disasters' act in the way that Prometheus used his bed. In the first place, their definitions of disaster do not focus on the vital problems of the victims, but on the solutions they have at hand or can provide" (Dombrowsky 1998:16). The problem with such an assessment is that it often tends to ignore or marginalize reality. Reality is assessed according to what solutions are available to meet that reality -- not vice versa, in which case solutions would be drawn up to meet the needs of the reality. In such a sense, Cutter's belief that integration of "hazard etiologies" would help establish a greater awareness of the reality of "disaster" falls in line with Dombrowsky's perspective. However, Dombrowsky insists that integration does not necessarily imply reality-based solutions: it only establishes a wider breadth for research-based solutions. Reality oftentimes does not correspond to research-based or textbook definitions of problems and solutions: "The cases where warm clothing was sent to African famines, or thousands of tons of contraceptives or cough mixtures were sent to mass casualty situations are not only mistakes, but the logical outcome of the internal dynamics of self-preserving organizations" (Dombrowsky 1998:16).

For this reason, Dombrowsky uses the idea of "disaster" as a "flag" or "trigger." For example, to remain within the confines of legality, each country and/or state must implement a code of disaster regulation. These regulations are fundamental to developing an emergency framework. The risks and hazards associated with that framework can differ according to levels and the department for which each risk or hazard is responsible. The law establishes the regulations based on "flags" or "triggers" given off by the use of the term "disaster," which Dombrowsky describes as only faintly reflecting reality. Therefore, the law is being guided by a mirage of situations that do not necessarily meet the requirement of an actual disaster. The term is used merely to set up a process of works which will then interpret future "disasters."

Since there exist many specific risks and hazards (many of them self-made, for example, by chemical and/or oil companies, or airports with aircraft risk), the State cannot possibly devise a plan of action to cover all of them in one fell swoop. Therefore, the State requires each company to establish a specific plan for any disaster that might be foreseeable. The preparation for disaster must be fully realized before any company whose risks and hazards qualify for "disaster" status can operate legally.

Frankfurt airport, for example, can only operate if all State safety requirements for airport safety concerning risks and hazards have been fulfilled. The Airport Emergency Plan (AEP), which indicates a course of action for each color of raised flag. The AEP would be the triggered response to a specific emergency situation. While Dombrowsky takes issue with researchers' use of the term "disaster," he acknowledges that any specific meaning or definition is subjective, but that its effectiveness is in creating a response meant to get a specific "disaster" or event under control.

To reinforce this sense, Dombrowsky identifies a number of definitions of "disaster," ranging from those applied to disaster medicine to emergency planning for nuclear accidents, and raises the issue of their typology.

At first glance, all examples cited seem to use real definitions, i.e. The definiendum is explicated with a specific definiens. For example, a disaster

(definiendum) is an event (genus proximum) concentrated in time and space

(differentia specifica). In terms of logic, the method is correct, although inappropriate in terms of being sociological. The question is how the genus proximum and the differentia specifica should look if it is a definite sociological definiens? (Dombrowsky 1998:17).

Here is where Dombrowsky derives the central point of his argument: there exists little to no sociological emphasis on the approach to defining "disaster." Rohit Jigyasu answers that "the question of definitions with respect to important terms such as disaster...is paramount but the strive towards defining commonly acceptable definitions should be open and flexible" (Jigyasu 2005:108). Jigyasu asks for a flexibility regarding the terminology that Dombrowsky so adamantly (and rigidly) demands be more precise and attenuated to sociological principles.

Since 9/11 the ways in which the term "disaster" raises flags have shown to be more diverse and amplified than previously. Jigyasu, therefore, states his agreement with Dombrowsky's "view that disaster is not and never was a reality and that it is a word that describes something we perceive within the space and time we observe" (Jigyasu 2005:111).

Neil Britton rephrases Dombrowsky's argument in an interesting way by asking, "Is disaster a dog because when one occurs it is 'obvious', or is it a demon because, up to now at least, no-one really knows what it is?" (Britton 2005:113). Demonizing "disaster" is something that both Dombrowsky and Britton believe needs to be avoided: "Some influential segments of society have...the need to conjure up demons or insist on demon definitions, and here I am thinking particularly of the current U.S. Administration and its bizarre rhetoric in its so-called war against terrorism" but such demonizing does not appear to be popular (Britton 2005:114).

Where Britton disagrees with Dombrowsky is precisely over the matter of whether disaster managers will be able to readily focus on the reality of the disaster, or the "nuances," as Britton calls them. This refers to the subtle differences that each emergency situation will present, requiring an extra dimension of care or an alternate course of action other than the one prescribed. As an air pilot once said, relating an incident in which the aircraft refused to gain altitude -- follow the procedure step-by-step and he would have crashed: but he saw and was able to address the need that his situation especially demanded. He made the correct (and spontaneous) decision, and the aircraft gained altitude. Britton suggest that disaster managers "are more likely to be attuned to many of the relevant nuances," but Dombrowsky finds such a view "alarming"; says Britton: "I am not quite sure why he thinks that the group that does the managing, and who know the most empirically...would not be attuned to the nuances" (Britton 2005:118). Yet one thing they will both agree upon is that "disaster research cannot afford to have a situation where, for all practical purposes, researchers and practitioners belong to two different cultures, or think they do" (Britton 2005:119).

Essentially, the exchange between Dombrowsky and Britton comes down to the role of sociology in disaster research. Allen H. Barton discusses the origins of contemporary disaster research in an effort to explain how modern disaster research is conducted and to what end:

The Disaster Research Group had been established in 1952 as the result of a request from the Surgeons General of the Army, Navy and Air Force that the NAS-NRC conduct a survey and study in the fields of scientific research and development applicable to problems which might result from disasters by enemy action -- other words to examine how research on disasters could be applied to civil defense in a nuclear war. (Barton 2005:125).

At that point in time, sociology was not considered a relevant field of study complementary to disaster research. However, sociological studies of the 60s and 70s revealed that not all research accounted for what Barton terms "collective stress" -- a collective stress situation being one "in which many members of a social system fail to receive expected conditions of life from the system" (Barton 2005:126). Suddenly, the range of disaster research broadened from "acts of God" and nuclear warfare to include "bombing, genocide, crop failures and famines, depressions, epidemics, and environmental decay, as well as chronic conditions like poverty, slums, racial oppression, and endemic disease" (Barton 2005:127).

For Barton, "the problems of preparing for or avoiding physical disaster form a subset of the problems of collective stress and of social problems generally" (Barton 2005:151) What Barton sees as necessary to the disaster research are "systematic comparative studies of how different societies deal with the 'vulnerability' problem" (Barton 2005:151).

Meanwhile, Alexander reflects upon Dombrowsky's concerns and suggests in response that the wider issue is "the role of science and academic disciplines in conditioning the theoretical study and practical management of disaster" (Alexander 2005b:97). Alexander's response to Dombrowsky is similar to Cutter's. He emphasizes pragmatism and accentuates relevant discussion as opposed to what he considers to be an ontological debate. Dombrowsky seems to tackle various concerns all at once, highlighting needs and questioning phrases and intentions, all the while skirting the aim of disaster research, which, as Alexander states, should be focused thus: "Let there be no doctrine or dogma in studies of catastrophe: I believe such works should be adisciplinary, based on the demands of the problem, not the strictures of academic disciplines" (Alexander 2005b:98). Alexander appears to be slighting, in fact, Dombrowsky's contribution to the exchange -- but lest appearance be construed for reality, he quickly allows that "the expertise of sociologists is obviously fundamental to such endeavours."

Alexander's main argument is that "disaster does involve imbalance between supply and demand" (Alexander 2005b:98). What Alexander attempts to convey with such a statement is that the demand for disaster research is greater than the supply -- and that will, essentially, likely always be the case, as disaster scenarios continue to unfold in all shapes and sizes. The likelihood of researchers ever developing a full proof model or framework that will allow citizens to prepare for and deal with disasters is very low. The emphasis of study should be on correctly responding to and/or preparing for various situations, and recognizing what and how to address in emergency situations that are unforeseen. Although AEPs are formulated to deal with any foreseeable situation that may arise twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week; it is impossible to foresee all possibilities. Dombrowsky's concern lies in the fact that researchers like Alexander attempt to account for the discrepancy between plan and action without due reference to proper sociological science. Instead, they use the term "disaster" as a flag or trigger to call into action a plan previously devised to meet a specific and idealistic "disaster," but not reality.

Dombrowsky clarifies his case by asserting the essentiality of sociology to any proper disaster research discipline:

Similar to the beginning of sociology as a science, the subdiscipline of disaster sociology faces the problem of defining its object of study. To myself, already, the distinction between two different classes of objects, natural and manmade disaster, seems fairly unsociological. Moreover, the definition of disaster as an event raises more questions than any sociological elucidation. In contrast to other scholars in the field, I suspect more dissent than consensus in the ways of conceptualizing the domain of our object of study. (Dombrowsky 1998:13).

Dombrowsky further laments that the sociology of disaster lacks a precise epistemology and that very little work has gone into providing a "sociological definition of disaster." Despite numerous definitions and/or plans for action concerning disaster situations, such definitions and plans "serve for nothing else than to claim that the definers approach reality under specific conditions" -- meaning that such definitions and plans demand that reality meet and comply with their terms, not their terms with reality. Here is where Dombrowsky contends a significant amount of work should be applied to disaster research from a sociological perspective: one that does not place an infrastructure of procedure on reality, but that observes reality and formulates an understanding of disaster based thereupon. What Dombrowsky implies disaster research does not need is another flag or trigger. His plea is for researchers to focus more on the real and less on the theoretical -- but to do such, their research must be grounded in proper traditional scientology.