Philosophy of Science, Paradigm, Epistemology, and Ontology

¶ … Philosophy of Science, Paradigm, Epistemology, and Ontology

Note that defining philosophy of science is different from asking you about your personal philosophy of your discipline, such as your philosophy of education, or your philosophy of management.

• The distinction between and among these terms

• An explanation of why these terms are important for researchers to know

Philosophy of science, paradigm, epistemology, and ontology

Philosophy as a discipline concerns itself with understanding the pursuit of knowledge: how we know things and what we can know. The branch of philosophy specifically known as the philosophy of science is concerned with how knowledge deemed to be 'scientific' is constructed. It concerns itself with questions about what constitutes science (versus art, commonsense knowledge, speculation, and superstition); how scientific knowledge is created; and the standards for establishing scientific principles (Definition of philosophy of science, 2013, Britannica Concise Encyclopedia).

Although scientific knowledge is often viewed as 'objective' or at least more 'objective' than subjective opinion, the ways in which scientific knowledge is created are not written in stone. The notion of a paradigm shift, which "refers either to a model or an example to be followed or to an established system or way of doing things," was developed by Thomas Kuhn to explain how science progresses and changes (Lewis-Beck, Bryman, & Futing 2004). Another way of defining a paradigm might be that of a 'lens' or the particular way in which a group of persons within a specific discipline sees the world, consciously and unconsciously filtering the stimuli around them. But Kuhn's concept of the scientific paradigm was a departure from previous ways of looking at science. "As a reaction against philosophies of science that prescribed the appropriate scientific method, such as Popper's falsificationism, Kuhn (1970) focused on the practices of communities of scientists" (Lewis-Beck, Bryman, & Futing 2004). Instead of science developing in a linear fashion in a quest for ' truth,' Kuhn saw scientific developments as a series of ideological changes, in which there was a radical break with the past when the scientific community as a whole was willing to change long-standing approaches to generating knowledge. Kuhn saw scientists as engaged in a constant negotiation "consisting of their views of the nature of the reality they study (their ontology), including the components that make it up and how they are related; the techniques that are appropriate for investigating this reality (their epistemology); and accepted examples of past scientific achievements (exemplars)" (Lewis-Beck, Bryman, & Futing 2004).