Douglas Macarthur and the Inchon

Douglas MacArthur and the Inchon Decision

Most historians today would agree that Douglas MacArthur (1880-1964) has not "faded away," but remains a source of ongoing research and scholarly investigation concerning his career and the decisions that ultimately contributed to his downfall. A brilliant tactician, military leader and communicator by most accounts, General MacArthur also possessed an oversized ego and some potentially paranoid delusions about those around him that likely contributed to this ignominious fate. This paper examines MacArthur's career and the decisions that resulted in his victory at Inchon during the Korean War in 1950 and the subsequent setbacks that marred this final victory in the general's life. A discussion concerning MacArthur's role as a communicator and his likely rationale for approaching the planning and prosecution of his battle strategy at Inchon is followed by an assessment of the positive and negative lessons that can be learned from MacArthur's lengthy military career in the concluding section.

Review and Discussion

1. What were the mission, goal(s), and objectives of the U.S. vis-a-vis the Korean Situation in August, 1950?

The fundamental mission of the U.S. In August 1950 was to stop and reverse the relentless drive of tens of thousands of elite North Korean forces invading their South Korean ally. Without U.S. intervention, it was feared that the entire southern peninsula would soon be overrun by the invading North Koreans, and there was sufficient justification for such concern. For example, in his recent book, the Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War, Halberstam (2007) reports that, "On June 25, 1950, nearly seven divisions of elite North Korean troops, many of whom had fought for the Communist side in the Chinese civil war, crossed the border into South Korea, with the intention of conquering the entire South in three weeks" (p. 1). Just as there were two very different sides to the man himself, his legacy is likewise perceived in vastly different ways by different schools of thought concerning MacArthur's actions at Inchon in 1950 (see map at Appendix a for location of Inchon). For instance, Demick (2007) points out that there is a 16-foot-tall bronze statue of General Douglas a. MacArthur on a bluff in Inchon, South Korea that overlooks the.".. very spot where thousands of U.S. troops, under MacArthur's command, landed in 1950 to drive back the North Korean forces. Devotees regularly pay homage to the Korean War general with bouquets of chrysanthemums accompanied by admiring notes -- 'Long Live MacArthur, the savior of freedom'" (p. 47).

By sharp contrast, a growing number of modern South Koreans are of a diametrically opposite view about MacArthur and his actions at Inchon: "Much larger numbers of South Korean students and trade unionists have chosen this same place for a different purpose: to stage unruly protests in which they unfurl their cri de guerre: 'Tear it down,' they chant. 'Tear it down'" (Demick, p. 47). In fact, the critics of MacArthur's decision at Inchon go as far as to characterize him as a war criminal for his actions and maintain that "his lies and blunders unnecessarily prolonged the war in Korea, causing tens of thousands of deaths and leaving the country as the last front line of the cold war. This view of the American legacy in Korea has prevailed among younger generations of South Koreans for at least a decade" (Demick, p. 48). This dichotomy of opinions about MacArthur is a recurrent them throughout the literature, and there appears to be adequate justification for both sides.

In chapter 6, "Decision Making," the authors report, "When the Korean War began in 1950, Douglas MacArthur - the most brilliant and among the most flamboyant American generals of the twentieth century - was soon selected to command United Nations forces in Korea. Only five days after North Korea began the war by invading South Korea, MacArthur seized on a concept for winning the war" (p. 295). The concept MacArthur formulated so quickly was as bold and daring as the general himself: "A turning movement deep into the flank and rear of the enemy that would sever his supply lines and encircle all his forces south of Seoul" (quoted in Decision Making at p. 295). While destroying the enemy's capability to wage war represents a fundamental goal of virtually any military endeavor, this bold plan for winning the war was not viable for a number of reasons, including a lack of manpower and a lack of time for preparation and the general was compelled to abandon this approach for the time being, but he did not simply forget about the concept but rather incorporated it into his mindset for future reference as the war progressed (Decision Making).

Just as MacArthur's decision-making during the early days of the war was marked by haste, the North's decision to precipitate the war was based on some erroneous assumptions about the wherewithal of the United States regarding its erstwhile South Korean ally, but these assumptions were not entirely without sound basis in fact. According to one historian, "Although the United States had itself partitioned the Korean peninsula after the defeat of the Japanese -- and installed its own man, Syngman Rhee, in Seoul -- Korea was still viewed as an irrelevant backwater. In January 1950, Secretary of State Dean Acheson described Korea as being 'outside the U.S. security perimeter'" (Demick, p. 58).

Despite these misplaced assumptions about what the U.S. And its allies would do in response to an invasion by the North, but these misperceptions where shared by North Korea's allies of China and the Soviet Union as well. In this regard, Kaufman (1999) reports that, "It now seems clear that the Soviet Union and the PRC played a reluctant but, nevertheless, significant role in Kim Il Sung's decision to invade South Korea in the early summer of 1950. Simply put, without their acquiescence, North Korea would almost certainly not have attacked" (p. 37). After the speech by Secretary of State Dean Acheson that declared Korea was not within the U.S. defense perimeter, the North Korean Leader, Kim Il Sung was confident that he could prosecute his plans for invading South Korea and get away with it - and quickly. According to Kaufman, in early 1950, Sung visited Soviet leader Joseph Stalin and Chinese leader Mao Zedong to discuss his plans for invading South Korea. At the time, Kaufman advises that, "Although Stalin approved the plan to reunite Korea and even promised to supply North Korea with arms and other military equipment, he did so reluctantly and only after Kim II Sung promised that he could defeat South Korea within three days" (p. 38). Likewise, General MacArthur believed that he could defeat the North Koreans in just three weeks, but both of these leaders were far off base in their estimations. As Halberstam (2007) emphasizes, "The Korean War would last three years, not three weeks, and it would be the most bitter kind of war, in which relatively small American and United Nations forces worked to neutralize the superior numbers of their adversaries by the use of vastly superior hardware and technology" (p. 1).

Despite Sung's assurances, Stalin remained highly concerned that the war in Korea could result in another world war involving the United States and the Soviet Union (Kaufman). According to this author, "Stalin waited until the Chinese agreed to support the invasion before he gave it his unequivocal backing. Should the United States intervene in the war, he anticipated that the Chinese would enter the conflict, thereby diminishing the need for Soviet intervention while forcing Beijing to be more dependent on Moscow, something he preferred" (Kaufman, p. 38). As a concomitant to his decision, Stalin believed that a war in Korea might compel the United States to redefine its interests and its resources from its bases in Europe and counter the U.S.'s efforts to reestablish Germany and Japan as major economic and political powers (Kaufman, p. 38).

In their analysis, "Operation Chromite: The Concept and the Plan," the historians at the U.S. Army Center of Military History (2007) report that, "Although the exact date of D-day is partially dependent upon enemy reaction during the month of August," at the time, MacArthur communicated the following message to Washington: "I am firmly convinced that an early and strong effort behind his front will sever his main line of communication and enable us to deliver a decisive and crushing blow" (quoted in Operation Chromite at p. 3). The general insisted as well that time was of the essence for the success of his operations: "Any material delay in such an operation may lose this opportunity. The alternative is a frontal attack which can only result in a protracted and expensive campaign to slowly drive the enemy north of the 38th Parallel" (p. 5). As prophetic as this missive turned out to be, some observers suggest that MacArthur's deceit and outright fabrications contributed to the eventual drawn out and extremely bloody nature of the conflict.

2. MacArthur was an expert communicator. How did he use communication to accomplish Inchon? How did he vary communication tactics depending on the audience and objective? Like many charismatic leaders, MacArthur seemed to possess an innate knack for knowing what to say depending on his audience and his own personal goals. His flexibility in this regard as an expert communicator is amply demonstrated by the wide range of high-level leadership positions over the course of his lengthy military career. According to Grandstaff (2007), "Army General Douglas MacArthur is a prime candidate for the study of leadership. The son of Army General Arthur MacArthur, he spent more than 70 years serving in a variety of leadership positions, including Superintendent of West Point, Chief of Staff of the Army, Field Marshall of the Philippines, Supreme Allied Commander of the Pacific during World War II, Military Governor of Japan during its occupation, and as a presidential hopeful as well as public administrator and businessman" (p. 128). While MacArthur has been criticized for his lack of communication with the Joint Chiefs of Staff prior to and during his prosecution of the Inchon landing and thereafter, the man's prestige and ego went a long way in ensuring that whatever the general said, people would listen. In this regard, Grandstaff emphasizes that, "His famous victory following the Inchon landing during the Korean War is a classic in the annals of military strategy. President Harry S. Truman's later dismissal of MacArthur also provides an important lesson in civilian control over the military. The general's famous speech to the Congress in 1951 belies his main point -- far from fading away, MacArthur's star continues to rise in the pantheon of 'great leaders and generals'" (Grandstaff, p. 128).

3. Why was Inchon the "right" decision?

Like many decisions that require a "right or wrong" determination, whether the decision to land at Inchon was the "right" one or not depends on who is asking and who is being asked. As Dorschner (2003) points out, "Douglas MacArthur's admirers and detractors alike admitted to his uncanny predilection for victory, never so evident than at his landing at Inchon in the Korean War, code named 'Operation Chromite.' The Inchon landing offered the promise of relieving battered United Nations defenders on the Pusan Perimeter, soundly defeating the North Korean People's Army and rapidly ending the Korea War" (p. 37). While this promise provide to be elusive for MacArthur after the Inchon landing and while historians continue to debate the correctness of MacArthur's Inchon decision, the reality of the situation was that the U.S. was woefully unprepared for the virulence of the North Korean response to the various border incidents and imposition of a U.S.-sponsored leader in South Korea that had been taking place for several months prior to August 1950. According to one historian, "The Communist invasion of South Korea on June 25, 1950, caught America by surprise. 'Where is Korea?' asked one officer stationed in Japan upon hearing that North Korean forces had crossed the thirty-eighth parallel, the line separating the country into two parts" (Demick, p. 58). In reality, though, this response should not have come as such as surprise to the American leadership. According to Kim (2007), "The official American history is that the Korean War started on June 25, 1950 when the North Korean forces suddenly attacked the South under Stalin's order. This is a gross misrepresentation of the origin of the War.... The truth is that the Korean War really started in 1945 when the U.S. suppressed the KPR government and imposed its military rule in the southern part of Korea" (p. 2). Likewise, there had been a number of hostile encounters between South and North Korean forces prior to the invasion of South Korea by North Korean forces. For instance, Kim reports:

In addition to the widespread guerrilla warfare in the South, major battles also broke out between the North Korean (DPRK) and South Korean (ROK) armies along the 38th parallel line in 1949. The first major battle, initiated by the ROK troops near the border city of Kaesong, took place on May 4, 1949, lasting four days with hundreds of dead soldiers. The fighting also occurred in June 1949 in the Ongjin peninsula, the same area where the official Korean War would 'begin' one year later. Then another major battle also broke out in August 1949. Thus, when the armed clash broke out in June 1950, it was more or less a continuation of the past conflicts. It was certainly not a surprise attack (emphasis added) (pp. 3-4).

In this environment, formulating a rapid and effective response assumed enormous importance and MacArthur believed he knew what to do but was thwarted time and again by a lack of resources and - from his perspective - cooperation from his higher-ups. For instance, in his book, Macarthur as Military Commander, Gavin (1998) reports that, "MacArthur had been planning a decisive counter-stroke aimed at cutting the communications of the North Koreans ever since early July. But one by one the fresh formations that he hoped to employ in this venture had been drawn into the Pusan perimeter" (p. 27). Despite these setbacks, MacArthur believed he had sufficient forces, especially since he had succeeded in securing the promise of a Marine division already, to successfully prosecute his plans at Inchon. According to Long (1998), "Intelligence estimated the North Korean strength round Inchon and Seoul as about 6,500, perhaps about 2,500 being at Inchon itself. This proved fairly accurate. The X Corps was 70,000 strong off Inchon on the I5th" (p. 208). The North, though, was much better prepared and determined than the Americans believed and perhaps even more so because of the perceived support they enjoyed from their Communist allies in China and the Soviet Union. In this regard, Halberstam reports that, "In the North, Kim Il Sung had been installed with a good deal more foresight by his sponsors from the Soviet Union, who had had their eye on Korea for a much longer time.... By the spring of 1950, Kim had been in power for almost five years; and, for at least two of them, he had been pushing, with ever greater aggressiveness, for his right to invade the South" (p. 70).

By claiming a basic "right" to invade South Korea in order to reunify the two countries under his political leadership, Sung was also seeking to legitimize his regime in the North. Given these circumstances, it would be gracious to forgive the leaders in Washington and MacArthur's own missteps along the way in his prosecution of the war in Korea, had it not been so costly and taken so long and ended so miserably. In the final analysis, it is difficult to argue with the success of the Inchon landing decision and it was likely impossible to argue with MacArthur, at least according to some historians. For instance, in Part 2: Program Management, the editors report, "MacArthur's bold stroke paid off fully when Seoul was captured on September 22, and the demoralized remnants of the North Korean army fell backward after the Inchon landing forces linked up with the Eighth Army four days later" (p. 296). Likewise, the Inchon landing served at a very minimum in stopping the North Korea juggernaut for the time being, giving U.S. leaders and United Nations forces time to gather their collective wits. According to a prominent article in Life magazine from October 1950, "When General MacArthur's X Corps struck at Inchon behind the Red forces in South Korea, the course of the war was reversed. Now, from a series of scrambling retreats followed by the desperate, dangerously fluid defense of the Pusan perimeter, the pattern had suddenly shifted to a general U.N. offensive aimed at wiping out the North Korea army" (p. 23).

4. MacArthur did not keep the JCS well informed. What are the arguments for and against this? Was he right in not keeping them informed? Does this create an ethical dilemma?

Although it is easy to damn MacArthur for his failure to completely communicate his plans for the Korean conflict to the Joint Chiefs of Staff today, it remains unclear whether he would have been successful in acquiring and organizing the minimum resources he needed to do the job otherwise. The general appears to have possessed a keen sense of what it was going to take to do the job he had in mind in repelling the North Koreans, and what tactical methods he should use to accomplish his goals - both militarily and personally. According to Gavin, "On 29 July, after not only the 1st Cavalry Division but the 2nd Division and 1st Marine Brigade had been allotted to Pusan, he informed the Joint Chiefs that he proposed to use his only remaining force -- the 7th Division -- 'along a separate axis in mid-September'. His mind was now firmly set on a landing at Inchon which if successful would lead to the recapture of Seoul and the severing of the roads and railways leading south" (p. 207).

By the end of August 1950, MacArthur had created the X Corps for the purposes of the Inchon landing and believed that the counter-strike would provide the quick end to the war that he had promised (Gavin). Some historians also suggest that this war was intended to be the crown jewel in MacArthur's crown and by all appearances, they may be right. According to one historian, "Strategic bombing could win the war. MacArthur was the 'flawed genius' who hoped to end his military career with one final brilliant victory. He would achieve glory and eliminate Communism all at the same time. The issue of MacArthur's failure to anticipate and perceive the threat of Chinese intervention at the time of the Wake Island conference and subsequently represented monumental defeats for MacArthur" (Rasor, p. 70).

This is not to say, though, that the Joint Chiefs were entirely in the dark about the operation or that they were not in agreement with the approach in principle. According to Long (1998), "From the outset the Joint Chiefs had agreed to the principle of an amphibious landing. It had evident advantages to a commander possessing command of the sea and the air, and it was inevitable that MacArthur's mind should turn to the kind of operation that had carried him from Papua to Luzon. But the Joint Chiefs and their advisers, for a variety of reasons, were not enthusiastic about the choice of a landing place -- so far north and at a port with difficult tides" (p. 207). Based on their concerns, Army Chief of Staff Lawton Collins, and Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Forrest P. Sherman were dispatched to Japan to collaborate on the issue (Long).

At a heavily populated staff conference on 23 July the naval objections were stated, concluding with the opinion that the operation was not impossible but not recommended. Collins and Sherman favoured a more cautious landing 100 miles south at Kunsan. Then MacArthur went into action, speaking with his customary eloquence and conviction. A landing at Kunsan was not likely to lead to the cutting of the North Koreans' communications. But seizure of Inchon and Seoul would win great military and political results" (Long, p. 207).

It was MacArthur's position that the majority of North Korean forces were concentrated around the Pusan perimeter; moreover, at that point in time, the general argued that Inchon was not sufficiently prepared to mount a solid defense. According to Long, "An attack at Inchon would achieve the same kind of surprise as Wolfe's at Quebec. The proposed landing at Kunsan would amount merely to extending Walker's perimeter. He concluded with a characteristic peroration" (p. 208). The mandate, in MacArthur's mind at least, was much more clear than for his Washington-based counterparts: "It was apparent that it was in Asia that 'the Communist conspirators' had chosen 'to make their play for global conquest'; if the war was lost to communism in Asia, the fate of Europe would be in danger" (Long, p. 208). In response to this self-imposed mandate, MacArthur suggested that he could.".. almost hear the ticking of the second hand of destiny" (quoted in Long at p. 207).

Clearly, by manipulating the facts to suit his military and personal purposes in Korea, MacArthur succeeded in convincing the military leadership in Washington of the viability of his plans, even though the marine commander remained skeptical (but still promised an entire marine division). For instance, Long advises, "The notion that the outcome of the world-wide hostilities between America and her allies on the one hand and Russia and her allies on the other would be decided in a Korean war in which so far neither Russia nor China had shown an active interest was far-fetched, yet acceptable no doubt to MacArthur's audience. Sherman agreed to the Inchon plan but Lawton Collins remained doubtful" (p. 207). Notwithstanding MacArthur's reassurances about his abilities and the quick outcome of the operations, the navy and marine commanders had good reason to be concerned because they knew the facts surrounding the mission. In this regard, Long points out that, "The misgivings of the naval and marine leaders were understandable. The tides in the channels leading to Inchon had a range of over 30 feet. At low tide inner harbour was a mud flat with a twisting narrow channel about 12 feet deep. On 15 September the morning high tide would be at 6.59, the evening tide at 7.19. A tide of 23 feet was needed to enable the LSTs to navigate the flats. There would be no room for error or delay" (p. 208).

Nevertheless, the operation proceeded and MacArthur's plans moved ahead but without providing the Joint Chiefs all of the details. According to Starling (1998), "In fact, the JCS were kept in the dark regarding the details until the last minute. Two days after the cable from Washington, MacArthur's staff had issued bulk operation plans; none were sent, however, to the JCS" (quoted in Part 2: Program Management at p. 296). In his book, the Coldest Winter, Halberstam makes the point that MacArthur and his intelligence staff members (headed by a cryptofascist named Charles Willoughby, later to serve as an aide to Spanish dictator Francisco Franco) "doctored the intelligence in order to permit MacArthur's forces to go where they wanted to go militarily" and in the process "were setting the most dangerous of precedents for those who would follow them in office" (quoted in Demick at p. 48).

5. Less than three months after the sweeping victory at Inchon, the U.S. military suffered its longest retreat. How did this rapid reversal take place? What characteristics within the man MacArthur) contributed to produce these two radically opposed outcomes?