Dualism versus materialism in philosophical perspective

MIND THEORY: NAGEL VS. DENNETT

Dualism vs. Materialism

The theory of mind is probably one of the most challenging areas of philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience we will ever have to face, because it involves, depending on the approach or view taken, thinking about or quantifying the process of thinking. Neither introspection nor neuroscience has provided definitive answers to what the mind is, although this remains an active area of debate and research.

Dennett's view of mind theory will probably have more in common with the future direction of neuroscience research and therefore be more relevant and testable.

Dualism vs. Materialism

Generally speaking, philosophers can be grouped into dualists and materialists. Dualists believe the mind is an entity separate from our physical nature and even though it is still currently impossible to measure the mind using scientific instruments, this limitation doesn't mean the mind doesn't exist (reviewed by Ramsey, 2007, Section 3). Materialists, or eliminativists, argue that what we experience as thinking or consciousness is nothing more than our nervous system providing a means for us to interpret and react to the world and the existence of a mind need not be invoked. Arguments for and against the views of both groups have relied heavily on comparative psychology and neuroscience research using animals, which involves asking such questions as whether the brains of a mice and worms produce the equivalent of what we call consciousness or are nothing more than a series of reflexive responses to sensory experiences.

Nagel and Dennett on Mind Theory

One of the more influential philosophers that tackled the theory of the mind, Thomas Nagel, proposed that non-human animals have conscious experiences and it is impossible for us to know "what it is like" to experience the world the way another creature does (reviewed by Colin, 2010). To argue this point Nagel discussed the ability of bats to navigate their environment through echo-location and since we can't echo-locate it would be impossible for us to fully understand the conscious experiences of a bat. In proposing this argument, Nagel makes the assumption that creatures are capable of subjective experiences. Although many scientists and philosophers may agree with this assumption it represents a leap from sensory experiences to the process of mentation without an explanation of how the connection is made. Human minds, according to Nagel's viewpoint, are unique only because our means for interacting with our environments are unique from other species.

Daniel Dennett, on the other hand, holds the view that our conscious experiences represent sets of genetically determined tools for surviving within our environment (reviewed by Clark, 2002). These 'tools' take inert sensory or explicit information and transforms it into useful information through a process of tacit (hard-wired) rules and internal representations (memory and thinking processes) encoded within our nervous systems. One of the more significant tools that are arguably unique to the human species is the ability to converse verbally with others. The ability to form language in turn creates derivative tools, like society, written languages, books, and the internet, all with the goal of lessening the burden of survival.

Dennett goes on to describe the concept of 'florid representing' as an important tacit tool that is arguably a unique aspect of human consciousness (Clark, 2002, p. 70-71). Florid representing is the use of symbols or things to represent other things. For example, a chimpanzee may push a red button to get a banana, or a child may utter a word to express hunger, but this doesn't imply that either is capable of thinking about the button or word as a representation of food. Florid representing can therefore be equated with self-consciousness, or thinking about thinking. According to Dennett, florid representing could not have emerged without the capacity to form and use language (symbols).