Due Process in Supreme Court

Supreme Court

In the case of Brady v. Maryland (1963) is a 14th Amendment case governing due process in the court of law. Brady was prosecuted for murder in a case where there were two accused, the other being a man named Boblit. There was a handwritten confession from Boblit stating that he was the killer. While Brady had admitted that he was there, he contended that he was not the killer. The prosecution had known about the handwritten confession, but had not disclosed this to the Brady defense. Brady was convicted. When the case went to the Appeals Court the conviction was upheld and the appeal only upheld for the sentencing.

The Supreme Court ruled that Brady had not received due process because the confession was important evidence to the defense. The prosecution withheld this evidence in order to bolster its case, and the court found this in contravention of the 14th Amendment rights of Brady. The ramifications of the case are that where evidence exists, the prosecution cannot withhold that evidence. There are implications for this in terms of testimony, in that those who are giving testimony cannot withhold elements of that testimony that might help with the defendant's case.

The key here is that all of the evidence needs to be presented. The prosecution cannot withhold any evidence, as that would represent a violation of the defendant's right to due process. In the Brady case, this evidence could have resulted in a different conviction -- it didn't but it could have -- and could also affect sentencing as well. The question of capital punishment is especially important in Brady because Brady could conceivably have faced the death penalty based on a trial were evidence was withheld. The Supreme Court's ruling effectively defends against this.

The case of Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) was an extension of the Brady decision. In the case, the defendant Giglio had forged a number of money orders in order to commit fraud. The accomplice was a bank teller named Taliento, who had supplied Giglio with signature cards in order to help commit the forgeries, and then was also the teller who cashed the checks.

In the prosecution of the case, Taliento testified in the grand jury against Giglio, which led to the latter's indictment. This testimony was in exchange for Taliento avoiding prosecution for his part in the fraud. At Giglio's trial, there was a new prosecutor, and this new prosecutor was unaware of the deal that had been made with Taliento at the time of the indictment. Conversely, the defense was not informed of this deal. There was confusion at the time over whether or not Taliento had been promised immunity from prosecution in exchange for his testimony -- Taliento believed that he could be prosecuted. Giglio was ultimately found guilty of the crime.

The key issue in the case is the deal that was made with Taliento. During the appeals process, evidence was found that the government had a deal with Taliento, contrary to some of the testimony from the trial. The Supreme Court ordered a new trial, based on Brady and the 14th Amendment, noting that during the first trial, there was insufficient disclosure that Taliento had received immunity from prosecution. As a result, the trial in which Giglio was convicted was a violation of due process -- it needed to be disclosed that the reason Taliento was giving testimony is because he had received a deal in exchange for that testimony. It is worth noting that, as an extenuating circumstance in this case, Taliento's testimony comprised the majority of the evidence presented at Giglio's trial. With Taliento, there was likely not have been an indictment much less a conviction of Giglio. Taliento's credibility, therefore, was an important issue in this case, and the jury needed to know everything in order to make its assessment about Taliento's credibility.

The third case, United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976), is a further clarification on key issues of witness credibility. In this case, Agurs had been convicted of second-degree murder. In the case, the Agurs defense would note that Sewell had a criminal record, and that this was material. In the first trial, this criminal record had not been noted, but the argument was that this criminal record was material to Agurs' claim of self-defense in Sewell's death by stabbing.