BRICS as an alternative to Western economic hegemony and democracy

¶ … BRICS countries, Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, provide a viable alternative to the World Bank and offer meaningful balance of global geo-political power in the waning years of American hegemony. However, BRICS can be considered fragmented. Two of its countries, China and Russia, lack democratic infrastructure and institutions and show no signs of shifting in the direction of democracy. These authoritarian regimes do not necessarily threaten the economic integrity or prowess of BRICS, but may impede the ability of the Democratic BRICS -- Brazil, India, and South Africa -- to achieve goals of social justice in the global south.

Brazil, Russia, India, and China have convened as BRIC since 2009, and a few years later South Africa joined their forces to create BRICS. Original goals of BRIC and BRICS included improving the economic and political power of member nations and reforming global financial institutions to become more favorable to emerging economies. However promising BRICS may be for facilitating the global south and offering opportunities for economic and political reform, the ability of BRICS to expand opportunities for democracy remains relatively weak due in part to the strength and clout of non-democratic state members like China and Russia. BRICS is a relatively diverse group, economically, politically, and culturally, which could prove an asset but has yet to become a tangible one. Moreover, corruption is a major problem for all BRICS nations. Still, BRICS are becoming increasingly relevant as \"American hegemony has reached its peak,\" (Armijo, 2007, p. 7). Developing a global economic coalition to rival the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank ideally leads to the emergence of a more equitable world order in which the failures of neoliberalism can be set aside for the promise of genuine equity and social justice.

Although the BRICS have a lot of catching up to do in order to reach the power of the global economic giants like the United States, Japan, Germany, France, Great Britain, and Italy, it is feasible that BRICS will eventually be able to compete legitimately and even rival their traditional economic power. BRICS nations are growing economically, especially compared with the slower and even stagnant growth in advanced economies (Armijo, 2007, p. 8). The potential of BRICS to eventually outpace their wealthier counterparts depends largely on their ability to stimulate the instruments of economic growth and development and not just in terms of GDP but in terms of the financial and political institutions that ensure long-term economic and political stability. Theoretically, BRICS \"operates on a logic of policy transfer and networking, which -- in theory -- suggests contagion\" of democratic principles and institutions (Carducci & Bruno, 2015, p. 46). Currently, Brazil, India, and South Africa are the only BRICS nations that have democratic institutions and those institutions are either young, corrupt, or both. An optimistic perspective views democracy as the inevitable midwife of economic empowerment, whereas a pessimistic point-of-view points to problems like endemic corruption not only within BRICS states but also their neighbors and allies in the global south. Other problems that might prevent the emergence of democracy or long-term growth in the global south include heterogeneity and irreconcilable differences in attitude, culture and political philosophy.

Diversity Among BRICS

The diversity of the BRICS political structures, cultures, and economies could prove their greatest strength or their greatest weakness. As a strength, heterogeneity allows the BRICS nations to offer other emerging economies like, say, Indonesia to craft their own economic policies within a political framework that currently works for that nation. Other Marxist-style nations like Vietnam could be helped by China\'s example, whereas authoritarian regimes throughout the global south can enjoy being mentored by Russia.

On the other hand, diversity could prove detrimental to BRICS due to the need for BRICS to wield power collectively. \"Many observers do not think the BRICS nations have hope of acting together as either an economic bloc or a coherent political power in world affairs,\" (Peng Lu, 2014, p. 437). The whole point of BRICS is to provide a coalition that can be used to rival and compete with G7, or what Fotopoulos (2014) calls the \"transnational elite,\" (p. 1). To be effective, that coalition needs to agree upon rules and principles that govern its activities and policies. As BRICS is still in its infancy, the problems of working together have yet to surface in any meaningful way. BRICS will be far more effective if it can develop a set of working principles that allow it to operate like a cohesive organization rather than its current fragmented one.

At the moment, the BRICS countries are not near to challenging the supremacy of the transnational elite: their combined nominal GDP \"represents only 20% of global GDP and their total capital investment was estimated to be between 11% and 20%,\" even though the five BRICS account for 42% of the entire world population (Fotopoulos, 2014). The population power of BRICS, and their shared interest in economic development and shifting global balances of power may override the problems evident in their heterogeneity. As population hubs, BRICS also offers the opportunity to shift purchasing power to the global south and significantly challenge the transnational elite.

Why is Democracy Important?

Democracy is not a necessary factor for economic power; one only need glance at Saudi Arabia to realize that authoritarian regimes and other non-democratic models can coexist with wealth. The wealthiest BRICS nation, China, remains staunchly committed to its entrenched communist-authoritarian system. Democracy might not stimulate growth as much as the reverse; \"improvements in the standard of living -- measured by GDP, health status, and education -- substantially raise the probability that political freedoms will grow,\" (Reisen, 2016). Simply by prospering each other mutually, all of the BRICS nations and not just the democratic BRICS will promote democracy and growth in the global south.

In fact, wealth generation is not the ultimate goal of empowering the global south. The global south needs far more than padded financial statements; it needs the long-term institutions that allow economic and political power to emerge. Not only will democratic institutions allow for the bottom-up empowerment of people through small business development and the emergence of social support and welfare systems, but also will permit BRICS and their allies to become part of the international community in ways that allow for long-term relationship building. The BRICS coalition has already been convening with serious and significant demands for pooling resources for infrastructure development, asking for \"reforms of global governance institutions,\" and even the possibility of a BRICS development bank (Armijo & Roberts, 2014, p. 2). Making such drastic requests requires relationship building with the transnational elite.

Although Brazil, India, and South Africa all have the technical infrastructure of democracy, none of these are shining examples of political culture. Of these three nations, India has the longest standing democratic institutions and those institutions were influenced by one of the premier democratic emblems: the United Kingdom. India has, however, suffered from a lack of social justice and equality due to entrenchment of patriarchal codes and hierarchical social systems. There has been an \"incongruence between political democracy,\" on the one hand, and \"economic equality and social justice\" on the other (Sharma, 2015, p. 42). The same can roughly be said of Brazil and South Africa. However, even by the most \"objective metrics,\" Brazil can be considered the \"least imposing of the BRICs countries,\" because it presents the fewest risks and obstacles for potential investors (Armijo & Burges, 2010, p. 14). Brazil boasts material capacities, a relatively stable government in spite of some domestic problems, and its focus on being \"an effective political entrepreneur at the global level, initiating and participating in multilateral fora as diverse as the trade G20, the financial G20, and now the BRICs club,\" (Armijo & Burges, 2010, p. 14). Brazil\'s participation in numerous coalitions allows it to become one of the most potent examples of democracy for the global south, particularly in its immediate sphere of influence in South America and the Caribbean. Brazil\'s economy is market-driven, with decreased state control in ways that are mirroring the global north as well as showing demonstrable commitments to environmental sustainability: which is widely viewed as being critical to being considered a \"western\" society (Viola, 2015, p. 387). As in India, Brazil\'s institutions reflect the core tenets of democracy that ensure political stability on paper -- but long-term economic development and stability require broader policies of social justice. Still, Brazil is \"the largest, most promising, and fastest-growing developing country in the Western Hemisphere,\" and \"increasingly demands to be taken seriously on its own terms,\" (Meacham, Cooke, Rossow & Studdart, 2015). Whereas the United States will dominate throughout the Americas in the decades to come, Brazil has much more cultural capital as a role model for South American and Caribbean nations.

Democracy is important to the global south for several reasons that include but go beyond economic growth. All of the BRICS nations suffer from inequality as well as corruption: two factors that are contrary to democracy. Income disparity, economic diversity, public health, and access to education are factors that need to be considered when revising the global balance of power. Brazil and India have been described as \"well-institutionalized\" democracies, but both have problems with corruption and inequality (Armijo, 2007, p. 8). China\'s problems include geopolitical rivalries, high levels of pollution, and high levels of corruption. The greater degree of political similarities between the three countries known as the \"democratic BRICS\" render them as being potentially more influential in general throughout the global south than either China or Russia, despite the relatively strong political and economic power wielded by those latter two. Long-term stability requires public confidence in governmental institutions, and \"sustainable development of emerging economies cannot be achieved without political stability, and popular confidence in political institutions is vital to the stability of a regime,\" (Peng Lu, 2014, p. 437). Therefore, the democratic BRICS can become viable models of democracy if they conscientiously shift their domestic policies and politics towards promoting gender, social, and economic equality.

The Role of Foreign Policy

Brazil, like many other Latin American nations, remains noninterventionist in its foreign policy. India, on the other hand, possesses nuclear weapons and has border disputes with Pakistan, another nuclear-armed nation. The current Modi government is somewhat friendly to BRICS, and yet continues to view China as more a roval and competitor than as a collaborator in competing against the G7 (Meacham, Cooke, Rossow & Studdart, 2015). South Africa, the newest member of BRICS, and one of its democratic entities, has been called an odd choice for several reasons, one of which is its relatively small GDP and population size. As Meacham, Cooke, Rossow & Studdart (2015) point out, South Africa is \"not exactly poised to become a driver of global economic growth,\" and Nigeria should have been the African selection. Nevertheless, South Africa is a part of BRICS, perhaps due to its promising infrastructure and financial services sector, which are deemed mature and \"relatively sophisticated,\" (Meacham, Cooke, Rossow & Studdart, 2015, p. 88). The democratic BRICS are not as powerful economically without China, but each of the democratic BRICS demonstrates different attitudes and relationships with China as well as toward Russia. None of the democratic BRICS have evolved any sort of voting bloc that allows them to utilize their emerging political power, even regionally. Their future role as leader in the global south depends on their willingness to come up with mutual solutions that can at once undermine the hegemony of the transnational elite and the hegemony of Russia and China, both of which abuse their relative power by intervening in ways that inhibit, not promote, democracy and social justice. Syria is the prime example, but China\'s tacit enabling of North Korea and its incursions in the South China sea are comparable.

China and India remain the most robust economies in the BRICS conglomerate. All of the BRICS countries have strong industrial sectors, which is one of the reasons why their coalition is both feasible and formidable. Moreover, all of the BRICS nations participate to varying degrees in the neoliberal global economy but all BRICS also have \"large areas of the economy that operate informally and outside the reach of regulators and tax collectors,\" (Armijo, 2007, p. 8). The latter may need to be corrected if BRICS is to compete with the G7. China is instrumental for the success of BRICS, regardless of its form of government. It is by far the most powerful nation of BRICS in terms of wealth; \"China alone accounts for more than 70% of the combined GDP growth generated by the BRIC countries from 1999 to 2010,\" (Peng Lu, 2014, p. 437). China is both supplier and market for other BRICS nations in addition to the role it plays in the G20. In fact, China is Brazil\'s largest trading partner and \"is among China\'s largest destinations for foreign direct investment,\" (Meacham, Cooke, Rossow & Studdart, 2015, p. 88). Brazil barely trades at all with Russia or India. South Africa, while not unfriendly towards China, has reservations about selling out its economic viability to what could be considered a bully state. China\'s provision of low-cost goods to a nation that has been isolated from access to global marketplaces due to apartheid has shifted attitudes toward China in South Africa.

The current BRICS format is relatively loose and offers non-binding options for member states. This means not only that their respective domestic policies can remain in accordance with the political culture and goals of their nations, but also that each nation is free to pursue whatever agreements it wants with other parties as well. BRICS meetings are summit style, aimed at locating points of cooperation and convergence rather than on hashing out differences. Still, domestic pressure on their governments for social justice, access to healthcare and education, income parity, or pollution reduction is bound to become more of an issue for all of the BRICS nations, and their form of government will determine their responses to public pressures and grassroots movements. China and Russia are poorly positioned to handle major domestic upheavals and domestic upheavals are unlikely to occur in any of the democratic BRICS. The reason the democratic BRICS need to become role models for the global south is that they offer a more long-term plan for growth and development, rooted not just in economic power as per China\'s model, or in geopolitical power as per Russia\'s model. The democratic BRICS ideally function as role models for stimulating social justice.

Brazil and South Africa, more than India, \"have strong domestic political opposition standing for the defense of international human rights,\" (Viola, 2015, p. 389). Their tacit or even explicit support of human rights might eventually prove to be a source of conflict between them and China and could also endear Brazil and South Africa to the United States and the EU. Democratic forms of government are obviously the starting point for engaging in critical discourse internationally related to human rights promotion around the world. Unfortunately, the democratic BRICS lack the position or status to become leaders with the possible exception of Brazil. India\'s human rights problems are rampant, related to gender and income disparity, and South Africa still reels from apartheid. Thankfully, the latter\'s inclusion in BRICS holds South Africa to a higher standard and draws attention to the tremendous progress than has been made in achieving racial parity through emerging black entrepreneurship and the black middle class. Yet South Africa, like Brazil, is not a military power and therefore lacks the potential for developing a broader sphere of influence in the global south (Carducci & Bruno, 2015). The process of democratic contagion throughout the global south does not necessarily depend on there being a military or \"hard power\" model like the United States, yet as it stands now BRICS is too loose a coalition to develop the kind of cultural capital needed to create the bleed-through needed to do more than just build wealth.

Their cultural spheres of influence remain local, which could prove efficacious to the democratic BRICS. For example, there is no real need for Brazil to become an influencer of Angola but there is a need for South Africa and perhaps also Nigeria to become a role model for democratic reform in sub-Saharan Africa. India can become a role model for Bangladesh and Pakistan, Russia to Uzbekistan. The BRICS trading partners can still be halfway around the world, but their sphere of political influence may be more effective when localized. Democratic institutions need to be culturally relevant as well as feasible within the existing framework. Because of their heterogeneity, the democratic BRICS can offer the global south the cornerstones for universality in human rights: exhibiting the tenets of social justice that transcend differences in culture and politics. If development as a concept is broadened beyond its purely economic model, represented in part by the outmoded, neoliberal, and hegemonic institutions like the World Bank, then development must also include a commitment to social justice. State sponsorship of economic development needs to be stable but not necessarily democratic; democracy is, however, critical for the emergence of genuine development of ethics and social justice.

Poverty, unemployment, lack of access to education and healthcare, and gender inequity are core development goals. Sharma (2015) adds that the abolition of feudal or colonial land tenure programs, access to loans, access to information in a free media, and assurance of clean air and drinking water should also be goals for the global south that have not yet been fully realized by the democratic BRICS. In the future, the democratic BRICS need to focus as much if not more on these sociological and social justice goals as on economic goals. The neoliberal model continues to perpetuate inequality by focusing more on how governmental institutions and structures can facilitate trans-national trade. A new model for empowerment in the global south demands more from governmental institutions, requiring that governments are accountable to the people and distribute the spoils of foreign direct investment accordingly by improving access to education, healthcare, and upward social mobility. With the democratic BRICS, stimulating human rights and advocating for social justice can be credible goals because these goals may be used to attract foreign investors.

Interdependent Heterogeneity

The democratic BRICS may illuminate the road forward by showing how the style of government is less important than the end result of social justice and human rights. China\'s record on gender equity is better, and certainly no worse, than that of India. Therefore, form of government should be less of a concern than outcomes like environmental and social justice. The entire BRICS philosophy has been providing alternatives to hegemony, and alternative methods of inspiring organic democratic growth. The imposition of democracy using military power, in the way the United States and Britain have actively pursued, has yielded poor results. A new approach is needed, one that allows for sustainable development. Sustainable development implies environmental and social sustainability, both of which also depend on transparency in government, citizen trust in government, and freedom of the press as well as access to new media. China and Russia are hindering these types of fundamental freedoms. The democratic BRICS can at least show how citizens of the global south can empower themselves by using new media, accessing micro-lending programs, and put grassroots pressure on existing institutions and organizations to promote environmental justice. If the governments of Brazil, South Africa, and India can clean themselves up, they may provide citizens of their respective countries with the channels of personal empowerment that can then be used to undermine the neoliberal policies and programs that prevent social justice or environmental sustainability.