Adult Learning Fodor (1987) Offers

Adult Learning

Fodor (1987) offers a theory of psychology that avoids the problems of physical reductionism, implied by many psychological theories, and suggests that language can be approach as a far more intuitive and natural process -- he calls this folk psychology. Fodor's form of folk psychology takes into account the realization that people in general cannot have a conscious grasp of exactly the kind of psychology they are engaging in. In other words, people are capable of understanding each other's behavior without being explicitly familiar with the mechanisms they employ to reach that understanding. This anomaly has its analogy in language: most speakers of the English language are able to speak it fluently and grammatically correct without having any formal understanding of its grammatical laws: "Chomsky has famously argued that the best explanation of such capacities is that speakers of natural languages have a form of unconscious knowledge of the grammar of the language that they speak. Such unconscious knowledge is known as tacit knowledge and is held to be encoded in the brain," (Cain 8). Recognizing this idea suggests that humans perform a similar sort of computation when making psychological inferences: we understand the causal laws that bind people's intentional states together, and we apply this knowledge without consciously knowing what we are doing.

Historically, one of the most important theories attempting to overcome this hurdle -- namely, that the psychological phenomenon of language cannot be physically observed -- has been behaviorism. Although, in many ways this is an antiquated way of conceiving of the human mind, it nonetheless provides vital insights into the teaching of ESL. Behaviorism is an increasingly broad area of study, which has its roots in the very beginnings of modern psychology. The driving notion behind the theory is that we, as ordinary human beings, possess no direct way to look into the human mind and observe precisely what it is comprised of or how it operates. Consequently, the only workable approach towards psychology, according to behaviorists, is to conceive of the mind as the relay between external, physical inputs and their resulting outputs. In other words, the mind is simply a mechanism that performs certain functions when specific inputs are given to it, and the result is an output -- this output is human behavior. In other words, although the ideal way to analyze human behavior and thought would be to observe the mechanisms of the mind first hand, psychologists must be content to observe behavior and make inferences about the mind. Doubtlessly, even though significant advances have been made in our understanding of the physical mind, the mental and subjective machinery within will forever remain a black box to our probing. Accordingly, philosophical reasoning will always remain a means towards advancing psychological theory, regardless of how deep our empirical knowledge of the brain might go.

Freud writes, "We possess no criterion which enables us to distinguish exactly between a psychical process and a physiological one, between an act occurring in the cerebral cortex and one occurring in the sub-cortical substance; for 'consciousness,' whatever that may be, is not attached to every activity of the cerebral cortex, nor is it always attached in an equal degree to any particular one of its activities; it is not a thing which is bound up with any locality in the nervous system," (Freud 84). In this way, Freud argued that the task of the psychoanalyst was not to attempt to understand consciousness from a strictly physical standpoint, but to insert workable models into the input-output mechanism that is the human mind. Freud approached the mind as if it were a "black box"; we cannot ever fully know the electric and physical activities that may be responsible for the workings of the human mind; instead, we must treat consciousness without concern for the particular physical phenomena which may play a role. Accordingly, if a model can be developed of human consciousness and unconsciousness that can accurately predict and diagnose, then we must accept that this model is correct in the absence of physical observations of the brain. This is the basic premise that later psychologists, philosophers and researchers adopted to develop the theory of behaviorism.

From this foundational understanding of behaviorism, a central doctrine of behaviorism emerged. It is comprised of three rigid premises:

Psychology can only be understood in terms of behavior -- it should not be expected to make claims about the internal workings of the mind.

The causes of all human behavior originate from the external environment, so all behavior can be understood by characterizing the environment.

Consequently, all psychological theories that rely upon mental states and their interactions with one another should be completely eliminated in favor of the behaviorist model.

B.F. Skinner was perhaps the most famous and most forceful advocate of behaviorism in the twentieth century. He explained that although there is a sort of intuitive appeal towards looking for internal causes to human behavior, this is inconsistent with the observable world: "There is nothing wrong with an inner explanation as such, but events which are located inside a system are likely to be difficult to observe. For this reason we are encouraged to assign properties to them without justification," (Skinner 1). Skinner claimed that all human behavior -- including emotions and language -- could have their occurrence traced back, causally, to physical stimulus. Language, to Skinner, is nothing more than a behavior; granted, it is a more complex behavior than most, but it still must be situated within the overall framework of input and output. The complexity of language results in the fact that we, as observers, are rarely able to accurately predict what any particular individual will say at a given time; nevertheless, if it were possible for us to enumerate all of the numerous forces making themselves felt upon a person by his or her environment, it would be possible, according to Skinner, for us to accurately predict what he or she would say.

To many critics, including Noam Chomsky, this was an absolutely ridiculous claim. However, the lasting appeal of this conception of language is that it is explicitly scientific in its terminology and approach. From Skinner's point-of-view, the words that we typically use to describe the process of thought -- such as "idea" and "concept" -- lack any real meaning; they do not exist, except as ways for us to speciously map the characteristics of thought. Accordingly, we must embrace the premise that the mind acts only as a biological tool that shapes the various inputs we receive from the external world into behavior -- this behavior is very often verbal language. Nevertheless, "This point-of-view is emphatically rejected by scientists calling themselves cognitive ethologists. Cognitive ethologists, stimulated by the writings of distinguished biologist Donald Griffin (1976), claim that behaviorism has unduly inhibited the investigation of the nature of consciousness in animals," (Shettleworth 7). In other words, Skinner's version of behaviorism, according to some, goes too far in asserting that consciousness is merely a mirage; as a result, other behaviorists have modified his understanding of the theory to allow for inferring the existence of something akin to what we believe consciousness to be.

Still, not all behaviorists have gone as far as Skinner in contending that there is no justification within the context of behaviorism for the existence of consciousness. In a more forgiving understanding of the term, the theory does not claim that we can truly know what the manifestations of thought are, only that we can infer, from the observable and from our common sense grasp of how mental systems may operate, and exactly when they are operating. Put differently, behaviorism tells us that if certain systems satisfy the requirements for thought, then we have no justifiable reason to doubt the presence of consciousness; similarly, we should infer that thought itself is a complex ordering of inputs. Philosopher Daniel C. Dennett uses this concept of causality and intention to illustrate that there is a spectrum of ever-increasing mental processes that can go from those used by a thermostat to a human being. The important point being that the thermostat is centrally limited by the information it needs to know to properly carry out its function; this is what makes it such a simple entity. A human being, by contrast, receives millions of inputs and is required to carry out far more complicated processes to carry outs its functions. Importantly, "There is no magic moment in the transition from a simple thermostat to a system that really has internal representation," (Dennett 32). The only answer, therefore, is to assume that internal representation is present where it can be inferred, to a high level of success: this is the behaviorist stance.

Within the context of teaching English as a second language, the behaviorist stance suggests a number of things. First, it suggests that the learning environment is perhaps the single most important feature of teaching. After all, if language is nothing more than the output of a finite number of physical inputs, then it is exceptionally important to organize a class such that the proper inputs are provided and reach the students appropriately. Second, it suggests that once an appropriate curriculum has been compiled -- one that produces the appropriate results -- then this very same curriculum should produce the same results every time it is employed properly. And third, it suggests that language itself cannot be conceived of as anything other than a response to an external stimulus; therefore, we, as teachers, should not be concerned with the internal, conceptual aspects of learning a language, and only with the observable, verbal responses that our teaching techniques produce. Of course, these stand as direct consequences of accepting the theory of behaviorism within the context of teaching ESL; however, my experience has shown that, if anything, the version of behaviorism that allows for consciousness is the most beneficial for developing an efficient and successful approach towards teaching.

Unfortunately for the theory of behaviorism, this phenomenon is not easily explained without the existence of internal thought mechanisms or the students' ability to freely choose to not resist learning. Without the existence of this free choice, we would expect that any approach towards teaching would have produced the desired output. In other words, if human behavior is deterministic, then there is little to suggest that my students would choose to resist attempts to teach them English. Yet, Skinner explicitly embraces these apparent consequences of hard determinism: "Unlike the soft determinists, however, Skinner agrees with his critics. His kind of determinism permits no freedom or dignity, but that is a small price to pay, he says, since freedom and dignity, as they are usually understood, are overrated goods," (Feinberg 414). Skinner, and others, is willing to break the commonplace perceptions of reality to extend the notion of direct cause and effect to everything in the universe, and thus eliminating the possibility of free will. So overall, it may not be the case that this experience in the classroom can simply be characterized as a very complex interplay of input and output, but may in fact have possessed an aspect of conscious decision-making.

My experience has provided an objection to behaviorism as a comprehensive theory of language: even if there is a direct correlation between an input and an output, this does not automatically imply that a language has been learned. Searle provided a similar objection based upon what he called the "Chinese room" thought experiment. Essentially, "The argument centers on a thought experiment in which someone who knows only English sits alone in a room following English instructions for manipulating strings of Chinese characters, such that to those outside the room it appears as if someone in the room understands Chinese," (Cole). We are to imagine that Searle is sitting in a room that represents a computer, and a series of instructions for manipulating Chinese characters, given a certain input, are provided for him. So, when he sees one specific character located in one place, he is supposed to supply another specific character located in another. In the thought experiment we are to believe that the algorithm for Searle in his room is detailed enough that Chinese speaking people outside the room can slip any phrase under the door, and Searle is capable of generating a coherent response -- it appears as if he understands Chinese.

This is a direct challenge of the behaviorists' claim that anything that performs a certain function must be assumed to understand that function in a way analogous to how human being do -- known as functionalism. After all, Searle understands not a word of Chinese, but behaviorists would be forced to conclude that he was fluent in the language. Accordingly, I have also been led to believe that simply eliciting the proper responses from my students is not at all the same as teaching them the English language; in this respect, behaviorism is a severely insufficient tool towards teaching.

So, while the fundamental concepts underlying behaviorism are doubtlessly beneficial in teaching ESL, it should, under no conditions, be interpreted to be the definitive and decisive approach towards teaching. Its most direct application must be the concern for the learning environment, and in paying close attention to the physical inputs that are required for any particular class of students. Although this is a key aspect of teaching, a teacher must be concerned with more comprehensive and internal theories of learning.

So, within the context of language awareness, we should be inclined to accept the notion that the human being cannot simply be characterized as an input-output mechanism, though in many isolated cases this may be beneficial. One of the main observational considerations that needs to be taken into account is the aforementioned progression of language awareness from intuition to mastery. Piaget is the researcher credited with devising cognitive theories about child development. Based in part upon his observations of his own children, he determined that all development follows a four-stage process: sensorimotor (birth - 2 yrs), preoperational (2-7 yrs), concrete operational (7-11 years) and formal operational (adolescent and adults). According to Piaget, language development first starts in the sensorimotor stage, and it becomes more fully developed in the preoperational stage. By the age of seven, it is assumed that all children (barring those with language disabilities) will be fully developed in terms of language usage and language awareness (Driscol 2000). What is interesting in the context of this paper is that although Piaget does believe that intelligence development is a lifelong process, his theories presupposes the idea that in terms of learning a second language as an adult is the result of intelligence development rather than language awareness and/or development -- something that Piaget believes occurs during childhood alone. Likewise Piaget did not believe that language development was crucial to children in relation to the development of their intellect, and indeed he believed that language development was simply the means a child would use to express himself and not a crucial element of cognitive development overall (Duncan 1995).

Researchers Huitt and Hummel (1998) determined that only about one third of high school graduates in developed countries have reached the formal operational stage of development that is based on the ideas of abstract concepts and symbolism. In other words, even at the age of about eighteen, most individuals have not fully developed their abstract linguistic skills, according to their study. This point is useful in terms of this paper in that it suggests, first, that it is possible to further increase cognitive development as an adult, and second, that through the use of different tools a teacher can instruct adult learners in new skills, such as learning a second language. Huitt and Hummel (1998) suggest using items such as visual aids and models, informal discussions and the teaching of broad rather than focused concepts as the keys to successfully teaching an adult student, which has not achieved formal operational development as described by Piaget.

Chomsky was the theorist attributed with considering linguistics as a cognitive science and a part of cognitive psychology. Chomsky drew on the theories formed by Rene Descartes; specifically those dealing with the nature of knowledge and language acquisition. Chomsky believed in what is known as "universal grammar." This concept is defined as, "the system of principles conditions and rules that are elements or properties of all human languages not merely by accident but by...biological...necessity" (Chomsky 29). Like Piaget, Chomsky believed that language development was the key to expressing thought rather than an integral part of the thought process, but he also held that language development and expression was an individual process rather than a part of the culture or expression of a group of people. Furthermore, Chomksy's ideals were in direct conflict with many prominent behavioral scientists, Skinner most of all. Skinner held that language is a responsive process; meanwhile, Chomsky believed that language was a complex and creative element that went beyond basic communication and action responses.

Stephen Krashen's (1981) theories are based on the fundamental ideas of learning a second language. The central tenant of his theories is based on the idea that second language acquisition is a slow process of assimilation rather than something that can be drilled into a student or a process that requires excessive rote learning and repetitions. He writes,