Adverse selection in online auto auctions: Wolf and Muhanna's eBay Motors study
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Electronic Markets and Adverse Selection
Adverse selection is based on an asymmetry of information between buyer and seller, where the seller has the knowledge advantage regarding a products' condition and value. Given this asymmetry or imbalance of information between buyer and seller, the seller is intent on getting the best price for mediocre or even poor merchandise, while the buyer must judge the product's quality based on a below-average price relative to perceived quality. When adverse selection exists in markets, the higher quality, higher priced products are driven out of the markets while low-priced products positioned only on information the buyer chooses to share crowd out higher priced models. According to the classic work of Akerlof (1970) and his article The Market for 'Lemons:' Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, the author states that given the asymmetry or imbalance of information between buyers and sellers, buyers will gravitate their prices towards the lemons. Car buyers focus on the differences in distance between lemon cars and high quality ones, and without perfect knowledge of the car's condition, drive prices down. Wolf and Muhanna (2005) have tested four hypotheses of the principles of adverse selection as they pertain to online auto auctions on Ebay Motors website. Their findings are covered in the remainder of this paper.
The following table provides an overview of their hypotheses, statistical models, conclusions and selections of independent and dependent variables.
Table derived from Wolf and Muhanna (2005) Ebay Study
Hypotheses
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