Sex discrimination and religious accommodation in employment law

Employment Law

SEC. 2000e [Section 701] of Title IIV of the 1964 Civil Rights Act prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of sex, and the company Ms. Riyadh works for has seemed to show a persistent pattern of discriminatory behavior towards women, not just the plaintiff in question. Firstly, women are underrepresented in the company in managerial positions. Secondly, Ms. Riyadh has shown excellence in her job, as demonstrated by the variety of awards she has received and her company's own admission. The company promotes from within, thus it is not because there are more qualified men from 'the outside' and although the company may allege her personal characteristics are incommensurate with their image, it is unlikely that all of the qualified women who have not been promoted have the same demeanor as the plaintiff, again suggesting a pattern of discriminatory behavior towards women.

Furthermore, the idea that a higher-level employee must drink, and engage in masculine bonding to be promoted is itself discriminatory, and the company's complaints regarding Ms. Riyadh's religious garb as a defense for her lack of advancement, despite her high quality of work, seem border on religious discrimination, which violates the 1st Amendment. Employers are not allowed to discriminate on the basis of religion, unless the employee's religious precepts present an undue hardship upon the employer and reasonable accommodations cannot be made for the employee's religious beliefs (Faegre & Benson, 2007). The only legal ground for ABC to defend their behavior is that the plaintiff asked for unreasonable accommodations for her religious practices. But accommodating an employee's lack of alcohol consumption seems like a reasonable accommodation, as her desire to wear a modest form of dress.

Question

With the exception of federal employees, according to the Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988 (EPPA)

29 USC 2001 et seq.;

29 CFR Part 801), employers may not require or request any employee or job applicant to take a lie detector test, or discharge, discipline, or discriminate against an employee or job applicant for refusing to take such a test. As the trucking company is not a federal agency, Candy's job cannot be rendered contingent on her willingness to take such a test ("Chapter: Lie Detector Tests," 2007, EEOC).

Question

This case is contingent on the question of whether employees have an expectation of privacy when sending emails to other employees. Although Paul Jones sent the email from home, he presumably sent his email to the work address of a fellow employee, as it was intercepted. Given that Paul was using an employer-provided email server, not his own, and corresponding with an employee it could be interpreted that he was essentially 'at work.' At present, regarding employee electronic communication, court's decisions turn "on whether the employer had implemented, advised employees of, and, most importantly, enforced an electronic communications policy that states that employee email is the property of the company and subject to search and monitoring" (Sostowski, 2006). In one instance, in Curto v. Medical World Communications the NY State Court's opinion found that plaintiff had an expectation of privacy because plaintiff worked primarily from home, but using employer-owned laptop computers that were not connected to the employer's server, the employer rarely, enforced its monitoring policy, and most importantly plaintiff had taken precautions to protect privileged communications, thus showing that the plaintiff sought and had a reasonable expectation of privacy (Sostowski, 2006). These conditions were not met, as Paul Jones did not take added precautions to protect his privacy, therefore he should lose his case.

Question

Such a measure clearly goes against the National Labor Relations Act which "extends rights to most private sector employees and their employers, stating that employees have the right to form, join, support or assist unions, also known as labor organizations, who may bargain collectively with the employer on the employees' behalf seeking to modify wages or working conditions" ("What are my rights as an...employee,...employer,...union?" 2007, NLRB). Employers are not permitted to harass or discourage employees from joining unions. Threatening employees publicly regarding union membership is clearly threatening behavior in this instance.

Question

This case centers on what constitutes a reasonable expectation of privacy. Murray was working in a public location, at his place of employment, not his home, thus his contention that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy and should not be monitored falls flat. "Except in instances of wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping, there are no specific laws prohibiting many forms of surveillance, such as cameras. The only real concern is with common-law privacy rights...a key issue will be he individual's expectation of privacy. For example, a hidden camera in a restaurant reception area is OK -- there is no expectation of privacy in such a public setting. However, as surveillance moves into more private areas, where an individual may have a reasonable expectation of privacy, the issue becomes more problematic. Where surveillance is not secretive, but rather is out in the open, the basis of any claimed expectation of privacy quickly evaporates" (Fitting, 1995:1).

In this instance, as the employee was working out 'on the floor' and not, for example, in a restroom or a concealed area, his expectations of privacy are not reasonable, thus his employers were within their rights to monitor him. Murray is no different than an individual being monitored in a department store, for all practical purposes, even though he was not explicitly notified that he would be under surveillance during working hours. However, Murray may have a case that he has a reasonable expectation to privacy in his locker, unless he was explicitly informed that employee lockers were regarded as company property and were subject to unwarranted searches at any time. Otherwise, Murray's private locker could be interpreted as an area where he had a reasonable expectation of privacy, and thus cannot be searched without a court warrant.