Cultural Relativism: Drawbacks and Defenses

Cultural Relativism: Drawbacks and Defenses

Morality appears to us as a concrete term which is underscored by certain rational assumptions about the universe. And yet, our own experience tells us that that which one considers to be vice may, to another, be seen as virtue. The reverse may also apply. Thus, it is rather difficult to reconcile that which does in fact define our cause for moral behavior, though all figures of importance to the historical discourse on philosophy have ventured a framework. Today, it is increasingly popular in scholastic contexts to speak of moral differences persisting between differing geographical locales, where cultural distinctions entitle a certain latitude in terms of that which should be considered morally correct. Indeed, this is an ideology which has emerged in response to the dangerous moral hygiene enforced by universal standards such as those which had historically tied religious codification to moral authority. This would allow the colonialist perspective, for instance, that the native populations of continents such as Africa and the America's were savages in need of Christian salvation. However, this discussion will focus on the problematic nature of moral relativism as a response to this destructive approach. Moral relativism itself is a force which when applied to cultures entitles certain behaviors that rationally do affiliate with violations of core human rights and, when applied to individual dispositions, allows non-intervention when others display socially destructive behavior.

None of this removes the challenge from qualifying moral relativism, which in many ways is intended to promote progressive perspective. In a study by Tilley (2000), we are given a somewhat non-committal definition on the subject. Tilley notes that "we often hear that 'morality is relative to culture' or that 'right and wrong vary with cultural norms.' These are rough formulations of cultural relativism, a theory with multiple charms, appearing rigorously scientific to some, fashionably postmodern to others." (Tilley, 501) Tilley's perspective here requires us to consider moral relativism within an historical framework. Such is to note that today, this is a perspective that exists in order to allow the more comfortable diplomatic affiliation between nation-states. Indeed, as economic motives persist in the development of globalization strategies today, moral relativism is a perspective which allows a nation of one philosophical disposition to interact free of conscientious objection with a nation of a vastly different philosophical disposition. For instance, the application of moral relativism to the fundamental abuses of human rights perpetrated by nations rules by extremist theocratic order allows the United States, a self-proclaimed Constitutional democracy, to engage in deeply intermingled economic alliance with monarchical and religiously extremist rogue states such as Saudi Arabia. This discussion will indeed return to the challenging issue of religion-based relativism.

For now, in consideration of globalization, we note that its advocates view globalization as the inherent effect of technological advance, with natural market tendencies serving as the prime impetus for expansion beyond traditional nation-state parameters. The International Monetary Fund, a primary institution in the implementation of globalization efforts, notes that the process "refers to an extension beyond national borders of the same market forces that have operated for centuries at all levels of human economic activity -- village markets, urban industries, or financial centers." (IMF Staff, 1) at the core here is the assumption -- historically associated to the types of biases which are rampant in anthropology -- that the leading forces in connecting the world are themselves equipped with a moral superiority justifying the promotion of the associated way of life.

Tilley's essay contributes to the notion that a core conflict here is the use of moral relativism as a way to excuse yielding the economic benefits from philosophically untenable relationships. Tilley's interest is declared as being "to adequately formulate cultural relativism, and I distinguish it from the relativism of present-day anthropologists, with which it is often conflated." (Tilley, 501) to this point, Tilley dedicates a discussion on the internal conflicts of globalization, which tends to reinforce the negative ethical gaps between nations by validating the associations forms of leadership.

In one way, globalization is seen as an evolution of market behaviors, with our technological capabilities and a degree of cultural relativism breaking barriers to inter-state commerce. The controversy in definition, however, is drawn from the divergence between that which globalization aspires to accomplish and those occurrences which are the actual repercussions thereof. And in the case of globalization, such instances of cultural relativism as those which allow child and slave labor to persist in corporate pacts between developed and developing sphere nations, for instance, are justified by theoretical assumptions of cultural difference. This points us to "the dependency thesis; that is, that morality is not a matter of independent rational judgment but is causally dependent on cultural context. Therefore, the particular morality of a people cannot be other than it is: the truth or falsity of their moral beliefs does not really arise." (Holmes, 18) This allows moral inaction even as nations such as the United States help to strengthen the economic resources of exploitive world leaders and corporats ions.

Again though, we are struck by the core conflict in the theory of cultural relativism, which is that it works to promote a detachment from the threat of moral absolutes. Quite certainly, this is an appropriate way for an ethically developed society to cede itself of responsibility in questioning the ethical properties of a differently developed society. However, by using this premise as a way to bypass any form of definition with regard to moral parameters, there is a significant danger that the allowance of false moral absolutes will win out. Indeed, in a theocracy such as the aforementioned Saudi Arabia, for instance, the promotion of moral certainties associated with radical readings of the Q'ran leads to behaviors the run largely askew of the human rights principles of the world community.

This points us to the conflict of the diversity thesis, which "badly overstates both the variety and the extent of ethical relativity. In any case it in no way implies either that moral practices ought to vary as they do or that moral beliefs cannot be true independently of how people actually behave." (Holmes, 18) for instance, we consider the recurrent question of the Islamic faith and how it should be addressed by the western perspective. Naturally, the current level of combat engagement between Islamic and Western cultures suggests that the two forces are deeply at odds over the issue or moral relativism.

A study by Abu-Lughod (2004) "explores the ethics of the current War on Terrorism, asking whether anthropology, the discipline devoted to understanding and dealing with cultural difference, can provide us with critical purchase on the justifications made for American intervention in Afghanistan in terms of liberating, or saving, Afghan women." (Abu-Lughod, 783) it is the premise of the Muslim woman authoring the article that the assumption of deep gender imbalance in such pointedly theocratic states as Afghanistan is based on a lack of cultural relativism. Here, she provides a degree of defense for the perspective.