Evaluating Success in Critical Incident Management

¶ … Management

On March 11, 2004, an explosion ripped through Madrid's commuter train system. The attack occurred just three days before a general election that was very close. Originally, the government blamed Basque separatists for the incident. However, within a few hours a militant group linked to Al Qaeda claimed responsibility for the attack. The reason why is because of Spain's support for the Iraq War. (Shemella, 2011, pp. 156 -- 209) (Bennett, 2007, pp. 43 -- 44)

After the bombing, is when the police stepped up their surveillance and realized that a secondary attack was about to take place. This happened on the morning of April 2nd when the same terrorist cell failed to set off a device on a high speed train called AVE. The evidence that was collected from the scene allowed law enforcement to identify an apartment that the group was using as their headquarters. After raiding the location, 29 individuals were arrested and charged with the bombings on the Madrid subway system along with the attempted attack on the AVE line. In 2007, 28 of the defendants were convicted of the attacks and sentenced to prison terms ranging from 5 to 40 years. These events are showing how the bombings and subsequent investigation were a series of failures as well as successes in critical incident management. (Shemella, 2011, pp. 156 -- 209) (Bennett, 2007, pp. 43 -- 44)

How the Madrid Bombings are Showing Critical Incident Management Mistakes?

In spite of the successes experienced by law enforcement, the Madrid Bombings are considered to be a failure. This is because the terrorists were able to detonate four separate devices in a coordinated attack on March 11, 2004. Then, the group was able to go undetected for nearly a month after the attack and prepare for a second bombing on the rail system. The only reason the AVE attack was not successful, is because the bomber made a critical error by not attaching the explosive to the trigger. This caused a malfunction in the device (giving the police time to disarm it and analyze it for clues). Once this happened, is when investigators were able to determine who was involved with both plots. (Shemella, 2011, pp. 156 -- 209) (Bennett, 2007, pp. 43 -- 44)

These different elements are important, because they are showing how the inability of law enforcement to react is a sign of complacency among Spanish officials. This limited the focus of the police vs. actively investigating and preventing further incidents. The main reason why the group was able to avoid detection is from their lose affiliation with Al Qaeda. The way that this occurred, was to have limited contact with the group. At the same time, any kind of funding activities were going through intermediaries on a localized level. This made it harder for the police to determine what activities the group was involved in. These factors are showing how the operation was a failure for not understanding the changing nature of the threat. Instead, law enforcement focused on using other tools that were utilized in the past to monitor these events (i.e. large financial transactions and more of an international role in supporting cells). The fact that they were able to move away from these tactics is what helped to make the attacks such a catastrophe. (Shemella, 2011, pp. 156 -- 209) (Bennett, 2007, pp. 43 -- 44)