The FBI, Counterproliferation, and Weapons of Mass Destruction

The FBI, Counterproliferation, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
The United States government significantly increased activities in programs involved in the protection of the nation and the world against weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in 2009 and 2010. The Obama Administration, in December 2009, gave a presidential policy directive aimed at countering biological threats with a focus on infectious illnesses whether such threats were manmade or natural. It was the second such directive the Administration had issued. The Quadrennial Defense Review in 2010 emphasized on how WMD’s proliferation was a threat to global security. In April of the same year, the Administration unclassified the Nuclear Posture Review for the first time and it was released alongside the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. The treaty was aimed at lowering the number of deployable US and Russian weapons. Representatives drawn from all over the world met in May with a goal of renewing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. The goal of the treaty is a progressive reduction and eventual elimination of the number of states with nuclear weapons (Mauroni 2010, 58).
The race for nonproliferation started during the Cold War. During the era, conflict theory was relatively rational and enemies were well-defined. After 9/11, concerns about nuclear weapons began shifting from aggressive acts of nation states to the possibility that terrorist actors could take control of some of the stock piles to cause harm. Nevertheless, even though the push for nonproliferation began during the cold war, the regime hasn’t modernized at a rate fast enough to keep up with the growing threats. Counterterrorism and nonproliferation have not yet come together to work as one field and this has slowed down measures to eliminate chances of individual terrorist acts using WMD (Jennings, 2013, 1).
Preventative actions by nations have predominantly focused on nuclear threats. Indeed, biological and chemical threats were not given as much attention as nuclear threats until after the first Gulf War in the 1980s that pitted Iran against the Iraqi Kurds (Pilat, 2009, 15). The threat is real as non-state actors are the ones that have mainly used biological and chemical attacks. In 2006/2007, Iraqi insurgents used Chlorine with traditional explosive devices in an experiment to inflict the most harm possible. While the attack led to the injury of hundreds of people and the loss of death, it was not as lethal as the insurgents had hoped largely because of suboptimal delivery systems. A few days after 9/11, there was an anthrax attack in Washington DC that led to the death of five people and the infection of 17 other people. As per the FBI’s account, the investigation into the attack was one of the most complex operations the bureau had faced. The result of the investigation was that the culprit acted alone and was a government scientist employed in the biodefense lab. Experts concluded that the anthrax had not been “weaponized” after reviewing images of the same attack. Also, tests were done and they ascertained that the powders used in the attack had not been weaponzied.
As threats grow, new threats such as “agroterrorism” are capturing the imagination of the general population and defense experts. Agroterrorism, in particular, involves attacking agricultural targets using biological agents. These attacks can have tremendous health and economic effects as has been demonstrated by the outbreaks of “mad cow” and foot-and-mouth diseases in Europe. This is true even in scenarios where the spread of such diseases is organic and not artificially created. These attacks have the potential to cause a lot of social and economic disruption and lead to the infection of humans with diseases whose spread may be hard to control. The consensus right now is that it is not possible to guarantee total protection against potential agroterrorism as the opportunities and targets for such attacks are very widespread. Therefore, the most effective remedy is a system that detects attacks quickly and contains them before they cause harm (Cameron, Pate & Vogel 2001, 38). It could be easier to develop biological and chemical weapons than to develop nuclear weapons. The concept of Latency as pointed out by Ambassador Ronald Lehman of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories explains this. He explained that it was easier to attain the latent ability to produce chemical or biological weapons than to attain the latent ability to produce nuclear weapons.
Nations of the world have put in place policies as well as legal and political networks to regulate the production of WMDs and related materials at both national and international levels. They have also put in place frameworks to control the spread of such weapons by putting in place trade measures to ensure optimal control of trade of related items by both non-state and state parties (Busch & Joyner 2009, 1). Generally, the nonproliferation regime is essentially built as a network of security commitments, assurances, agreements, norms, voluntary controls, treaties, multi-lateral alliances, and bi-lateral alliances. These networks have been put in place over the past sixty years (Reiss 2009, ix).
This paper looks at the ways the nonproliferation regime can be improved to collaborate better with homeland security as a way of improving the effectiveness of counterterrorism strategy and policy and as a way of revising domestic and international protocols to factor in new threats from non-state actors.
Research Question
a. Primary Research Question
In what ways can the nonproliferation regime connect and collaborate with homeland security as a way to improve counterterrorism strategy?
b. Secondary Questions
a. In what ways can revisions be made to domestic and international protocols so that they reflect the magnitude of the threats by non-state actors?
b. Is there a place for traditional tools of diplomacy in good counterterrorism strategy? In what ways can the United States use diplomatic strategy to prevent domestic terrorism?
c. How can investments be optimally made in counterproliferation programs to improve homeland security?
Significance of the Study
There seems to be a gap between the theory surrounding nonproliferation regime and its real-world application in the prevention of terrorism using weapons of mass destruction. It appears experts in terrorist activities and scholars focusing on nonproliferation have had two different paradigms when assessing the same threats. One group looked at the threat from a nation-state paradigm while the other looked at it from a criminality and security paradigm. While nonproliferation and WMD discussions are essentially the head and tail of one coin, the discussions have been approached as if they have no close relationship. Even in policy, the two are still run as two different missions and this creates disconnect in strategy and implementation that may be easily exploited by terrorist actors.
Thesis Statement
The existing nonproliferation regime does not adequately address terrorist activities involving WMD. Without bringing discussions and strategy formulation in the two camps of counterterrorism and nonproliferation together, there will continue to be gaps that can be exploited by terrorists. There is need for the United States government to put in place effective strategy that can fully address all the threats posed by WMD as well as related the weapons that may get into the hands of non-state actors. A comprehensive arms control initiative can be very useful in helping reduce the opportunities terrorists have in developing or acquiring WMDs. Such an initiative should be clearly spelt out in writing and should be a collaborative effort among all concerned security agencies. When such initiatives are combined with international protocols, the resultant effect will be an arms control strategy that is far superior to the detection and defense protocols being run independently by singular government agencies.
United States security agencies have made a lot of progress in the fight against traditional terrorist activities. However, there hasn’t been as much progress on WMD terrorism. While some progress has been made on domestic detection of threats as well as in nonproliferation efforts at the international level, a lack of consistency at both levels has led to big gaps that pose serious threats to both domestic and international security. Going forward, there is need for a more collaborative effort between all concerned agencies that stresses on consistency in both policy and actions. The filling of such gaps will help nations curb most of the threats posed by non-state actors (Jennings 2013, 6).
Methods of Evaluation
There is need to put in place frameworks that can integrate domestic and international security efforts more effectively. To this end, there will be a policy analysis to identify the alternatives and options available. The data for this analysis will be sourced from various academic fields including military science, political science, history, and security policy. Also, data will be sourced from official testimony and public statements that have been made by credible government and security officials. Instead of using a quantitative analysis, a qualitative analysis will be done to explore the subject of WMD terrorism partly because there are limited data sets that can be subject to a quantitative analysis. As is the goal with most qualitative analyses, the goal of the exercise will be to identify synergies and patterns that can lead to results greater than their individual parts in the event they are combined (Levi 2009, 9).
Qualitative analysis is appropriate because of the limited number of incidents that have been recorded involving WMD terrorism. Further, because of classification and other factors, it is not easy to get all the evidence and data from the known incidents. Therefore, most of the current debate on these issues is being done using incomplete information (Ogilve-White 1996, 43). This analysis will use publicly available knowledge and will not seek any classified documents. Among the open source knowledge that this analysis will have access to is diplomatic agreements, international protocols, and national and international policy. Generally, law enforcement agencies do not publish details about security breaches and vulnerabilities as well as intelligence actively aiding criminal investigations.





References
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Cameron, Gavin, Pate, Jason & Vogel, Kathleen. (2001). “Planting Fear: How Real is the Threat of Agricultural Terrorism?” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, 57(5), 38-44.
Jennings, Elain. 2013. U. S. proliferation policy and the campaign against transnational terror: Linking the U.S. non-proliferation regime to homeland security efforts. Master’s Thesis. Naval Postgraduate School.
Levi, Michael. 2009. “On Nuclear Terrorism.” Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
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