This paper looks at Ayer's theory on moral judgments and examines the claim that he offers: that moral judgments are nothing more than opinions and that they don't demonstrate any actual truth to them. This paper will look at the support Ayer gives to this theory and will explain why it is mostly incorrect.
Ayer on the Nature of Ethical Judgments
Ayer makes a truly original and remarkable statement about moral judgments and ethical judgments which some scholars have summarized as a phenomenon called emotivism. Within this theory, there is the belief that moral judgments aren't necessarily truthful; they're an expression of sentiments of approval or disapproval (Ayer). Thus, according to this construct saying something like murder, stealing, lying or cheating is "wrong" merely expresses how the speaker feels about it. But to say that something is "wrong" because the speaker doesn't necessarily like something, doesn't mean that the action described is wrong. The only truth exhibited is in the sentiments of the speaker. As Ayer explains, "[I]f I say to someone 'You acted wrongly in stealing that money', I am not stating anything more than if I had simply said, 'You stole that money.' In adding that this action is wrong, I am not making any further statement about it, I am simply evincing my moral disapproval about it. It is as if I had said, 'You stole that money,' in a peculiar tone of horror, or written with the addition of some special exclamation marks. The tone, or the exclamation marks, adds nothing to the literal meaning of the sentence. It merely serves to show that the expression of it is attended by certain feelings in the speaker" (Ayer). According to Ayer, the idea of stealing, lying, cheating, hurting others and the "wrongness" implied in these actions is not factual, simply an expression of the moral judgment of the speaker. There is no right or wrong to it.
As certain scholars have found, Ayer's basis for emotivism is based on the following principles: the verification principle, the narrowness of ethical statements, and something which is referred to as non-cognitivism. According to Ayer, the verification principle is as follows: "A synthetic proposition is meaningful, and hence can be true or false, only if it is empirically verifiable. All literally meaningful propositions are either analytic -- true by definition -- or else empirically verifiable" (Ayer, 123). Hence, the moral judgments that people utter about killing or hurting others are simply not empirically verifiable. While they may play on the sensibilities and heart strings of members of society and may cause us horror or revulsion, they are still not things which can be verified in their "wrongness." As Ayer explains, ethical statements simply cannot be translated into messages of fact (123). This is a result of their synthetic quality, which makes them untrue by definition (123). As a result of this, they have a certain degree of non-cognitivism which means that they're not exactly meaningful and have neither truth nor falseness ascribed to them (123). Thus, in line with non-cognitivism is emotivism which means that a moral judgment is simply an emotion.
As other scholars explain, Ayer's theory is nothing more than a case of moral subjectivism. This means that when one encounters an ethical judgment such as the ones expressed as examples for the purpose of this paper, the only truth one encounters is that they communicate the attitudes, thoughts, feelings, and opinions of the person speaking (Pollard). This is viewed as a type of moral relativism (also known as individual relativism since it views and shapes morality as being in connection to the individual. This view of morality, is a type of meta-ethical theory which expresses a perspective on the nature of ethics, and what types of behaviors can be viewed as right vs. wrong. "Some say moral subjectivists conceive moral judgments such as 'It's wrong to torture hamsters for fun" as like aesthetic judgments such as 'Rodin's The Thinker is Brilliant', 'Strawberry ice-cream is my favourite' or 'Peter Andre is a dream-boat'" (Pollard). These examples show the inherent sense of subjectivity apparent in moral judgments.
However, some of the most fundamental objections lay in the fact that critics of this theory argue that one simply can't equate an idea like "murder is wrong" to a sentiment like "chocolate ice cream is delicious." These critics argue that these two subjective statements are light-years apart and demonstrate Ayer's problem with the way in which he views the world. As one critic explains, expressing things like "Metallica is the best band" and "Julia Roberts is the best actress" are merely opinions which vary throughout the world. "Murder is wrong" is too an opinion, but this opinion is viewed as almost universal throughout the world and reflects a certain cultural temperature and viewpoint on the sense of universal morality. While it's true that not every single person would agree about the morality of stealing, lying and cheating, most would. These united opinions actually reflect the moral temperature of the times and show that in fact, most people agree on the morality of certain acts, and that these acts are not at all subjective as one might argue. This point naturally contradicts and addresses Ayer's claim that his theory is supported by the notion of disagreement: "Even clear-thinking people commonly disagree about moral issues. These differences reveal differences in subjective attitudes" (Pollard). For example, why the country might be entirely divided on the nature of abortion and whether it is right or wrong, most individuals will be able to agree that murder (in the most general sense) is wrong.
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