FEMA's preparedness for natural disasters since Hurricane Katrina

When Natural Disaster Hits, Are We Ready?
Introduction
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) as part of Homeland Security has defined missions for every type of natural disaster that can impact the U.S.—from winter storms to flooding, tornadoes to hurricanes, earthquakes to wildfires (DHS, 2018). Since Katrina, however, which served as an ugly black eye for FEMA—but a bright moment of opportunity for the U.S. Coast Guard, who demonstrated great spirit of mission in their response (Samaan & Verneuil, 2009)—the U.S. has had to answer serious questions about its emergency preparedness in the face of natural disasters. This paper argues that when natural disaster hits, the U.S. may be somewhat readier than it was in 2005, as the country and its leaders learned a harsh lesson from Hurricane Katrina and its aftermath—but the fact of the matter remains that FEMA is even still coming under serious and harsh criticism whenever a natural disaster occurs, which indicates that, at the end of the day, we still are not as ready as we should be.
Learning the Lesson from Katrina
Katrina was a devastating blow not only to the country’s people and property but also to the country’s reputation. When the levies broke, laying waste to so much of the surrounding region, the nation’s confidence in its infrastructure and preparedness broke, too. Questions and criticisms flew: why was the response from FEMA so slow? Why was DHS caught flat-footed and virtually unprepared for responding to the hurricane at landfall when it had plenty of time to implement at the very least a chain of command? The Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina (2006) A Failure of Initiative told the whole, shameful story in its title. When the next natural disaster struck, would FEMA and the DHS be ready?
Katrina taught the nation a lot about itself, unfortunately—and those in charge of getting the federal agencies ready for the next one had to think carefully about why they failed and what they could do better. The laundry list of sins committed by FEMA, as told by the Select Bipartisan Committee led to the resignation of then-Director Michael Brown. The issues the Committee zeroed in on included: inadequately trained staff, lack of overall readiness, an inexcusable inability to provide shelter, and poor logistics. But the overwhelmingly glaring reason for FEMA’s failure was that for years it had been bleeding professional staff on all sides and becoming a shell of its former self and what it was intended to be. As Lewis (2009) noted, turnover was extraordinarily high at FEMA management positions, and those who stuck around lacked the qualifications needed to be there. It was like a professional NBA team that had been expected to compete for a spot in the playoffs only to be found mid-season limping along at the bottom of the division, purposely tanking in hopes of landing a lottery pick. The fact of the matter was, as the Committee pointed out in 2006, FEMA wasn’t ready and hadn’t been ready for years. And in honesty it was not just FEMA’s fault: it was the fault of the federal government in general. It had become bloated and unsure of itself since 9/11—trying to fight the war on terrorism and in the process forgetting about the important things back home—like infrastructure, preparedness in the face of natural disasters, training, and professionalism.
Thus, when Trump ran for the Office of the President in the election of 2016, he ran on a platform of rebuilding America’s infrastructure—an initiative that must have hit home for millions of voters who still remembered the shoddy condition of the levies before they broke; who still had images of bridges collapsing fresh in their minds, of towns being devastated like what happened in Joplin, Missouri, in 2011 when a category F-5 tornado touched down and took the lives of more than 161 people and injured thousands (Smith & Sutter, 2013). Trump pledged to do for America what many Americans wanted done: more accountability, more preparation, more readiness, more action. Truth be told, much of what Trump wanted and called for had already been set in motion prior to his campaign. FEMA and DHS were already in full-blown recovery mode, having dealt with the fallout of their failure in New Orleans. But they had a long way to go—and there were plenty of natural disasters along the way to allow critics the opportunity to continuously point out where growth and development and all-around better organization, management and preparedness were still needed.
Problems Since 2005: Are We Ready Yet?
FEMA continues to be part of DHS—even though the two really have nothing to do with one another. DHS focuses on terrorism and border security. FEMA specializes in emergency planning and response—not just for natural disasters—but the organization is most certainly not concerned with border security or immigration. Why then was FEMA integrated into DHS? The reason is mostly political: The Department of Homeland Security was created in response to 9/11. With an annual budget of $40 billion and more than 200,000 employees (DHS, 2017), they could not all be looking for Osama Bin Laden—so the only appropriate thing to do seemed to put some of them in charge of managing anything “emergency”-related. FEMA, which had been failing to manage its own affairs effectively for years (Lewis, 2009), fell under its purview—but the fact that the relationship failed to produce effective results should have been an indicator that the match was not made in heaven.
FEMA has regained a little bit of independence since Katrina just to help reduce some of the bureaucratic slowness in decision-making, but it is still under the DHS umbrella—which means it still cannot quite stand on its own. By essentially forcing FEMA to lean on a parent agency, the nation is not only handcuffing its own federal response teams but making them act like cripples, too. The U.S. Coast Guard excelled and surpassed expectations in the wake of Katrina because it acted as an independent, autonomous organization with a single purpose and spirit of mission (Samaan & Verneuil, 2009). This type of spirit, vision, organization and independence is what FEMA still needs to demonstrate to show it is ready for the next disaster.
And the fact also remains that FEMA is not a first responder to a natural disaster. No agency in the federal government is. Local and state actors and agencies are the first responders: they are the ones on the scene, doing the groundwork in preparation for an oncoming storm or in response to one. There is also a lack of coordination between what FEMA can effectively control in the way of prevention and preparation. The separation of federal and state authority necessarily has its perks and pitfalls—and this is one of the latter. Everyone wants the federal government to ensure that their cities, states and regions are safe and secure and can withstand a natural disaster—but they do not want to give up local or state authority and power to give decision-making up to the federal agencies they seek protection from. Thus, FEMA does not have a say in what type of structures get reinforced and or how new ones get built. Local and state authorities do. FEMA can make recommendations—and that is all. This becomes problematic in a big way when critics start lambasting FEMA for not doing more in the event of a surprise disaster—like the Buffalo snowstorm of 2006 that caught the city off-guard: FEMA had actually been in contact with New York state offices in the days leading up to the storm, feeding them information along the way. However, critics argued that this was not enough, as businesses suffered because, it was felt, the federal government did not step in to intervene, get the ready, shut them down, and so on—even though, legally speaking, FEMA had no legal right to do more. The agency is not permitted to tell businesses from state to state what to do, unless the state actually asks FEMA to intervene—and that did not happen (FEMA, 2006). Thus, one can see the problem: at what point is FEMA to be responsible in emergency planning and preparation in the future? Is it there merely to serve as a scapegoat for local planners who fail to take the necessary precautions and actions?
FEMA was also criticized for its role in the response to Hurricane Maria which slammed into Puerto Rico in 2017. But, again, as FEMA pointed out, the agency had been down there ahead of time providing the best available remedies and preventive measures it could with what little it had to work with. When the hurricane hit, it wiped out infrastructure and turned the island upside down. How could FEMA be expected to manage such a situation when, as the agency pointed out, the local political squabbles were worse than those in the mainland U.S. between Democrats and Republicans (Achenbach & Hernandez, 2017)? The reality is that planning and preparation of a local population’s emergency needs depends on having one cook in the kitchen—not multiple local cooks competing for power with a third outside cook attempting to provide assistance, while other cooks take more or less charge of affairs insofar as they are able. Moreover, supplies could not readily be shipped to Puerto Rico from U.S. ports because of a century’s old law called the Jones Act which required that any shipping sailing from a U.S. port to another U.S. port had to be American made, American-crewed, and flying the American flag—and this limited the number of ships who could actually get provisions to the island quickly (McMahon, 2018). Was FEMA responsible for this piece of legislation? Not at all—but, again, when people want to point the finger FEMA serves as a quick and easy target.
Yet, even when FEMA is asked to intervene (on the U.S. mainland no less), the response is sometimes muted and does not meet everyone’s expectations. The Dumas tornadoes of 2007 are a case in point. Senator Pryor was quick to criticize FEMA for failing to send an appropriate number and quality of new trailers to assist in the recover process (Fitzgerald, 2007). That same year, FEMA came under fire for trying to protect its image by hosting a press conference during the California wildfires—only the presser was not filled with reporters and journalists asking tough questions and forcing accountability: instead it was filled FEMA workers pretending to be journalists throwing up easy questions that the FEMA’s deputy could answer safely (Ripley, 2007). It was a public relations stunt that backfired and made the public think the emergency response agency was more interested in managing its own image and brand than in managing what it was actually supposed to be managing—i.e., emergency situations.
Hurricane Harvey showed, too, the extent to which providing aid via a bureaucratic process can truly be enacted speedily and efficiently. Still, FEMA and its leaders are working to make changes so that planning, response and provisions are all coordinated better with local agencies so that lives, property and the environment can be saved and better protected. It is certainly no simple task—and sometimes the achievements that the agency does accomplish get overlooked.
What FEMA Has Done Right
Natural disasters are complex and unpredictable. While it is important to critique our response to them, it is also important to highlight the things that we are doing right. FEMA may receive a lot of criticism for its failings, but not everything it does ends in failure. Therefore, it is worth highlighting some of the successes of FEMA over the years to show that it has made some strides in addressing the shortcomings that were so glaringly revealed in the wake of Katrina.
In response to Hurricane Harvey, FEMA and other agencies learned the necessity of pre-planning the paperwork to get over the hump of bureaucratic red tape as quickly as possible. FEMA helped speed up the process of getting military services to the local area by getting pre-written authorizations approved ahead of time so that when the hurricane landed with the expected force authorities anticipated, the military could respond with a simple phone call. In essence, this is exactly the type of quick response that people require—and if the federal government is able to deliver it, great—but if not, people can be left in the lurch, sitting and waiting for external help that is too slow to arrive to be truly effective (Philipps, 2017). FEMA’s preparation ahead of time for Harvey showed that it had learned at least one lesson from Katrina—the need to get arrangements figured out before the disaster struck, especially if one could see it coming.
Indeed, this is one of the ways in which the nation’s ability to prepare for and respond to natural disasters has improved since Katrina. FEMA directors are now required to actually have experience in handling disasters—which was not the case in 2005 (Philipps, 2017). Another federal agency, the Department of Health and Human Services, now requires all hospitals receiving federal money through Medicare and Medicaid to have emergency plans and preparations in place as a condition for receiving that money. This ensured that local area hospitals were ready to face the consequences of Harvey (Philipps, 2017). In short, lessons have been learned and progress made. Things are still not perfect, as crises like that experienced in Puerto Rico in 2017 show.
But FEMA is not and should not be viewed as the last or only resort. As the Joplin tornado disaster of 2011 showed, FEMA is not the only way for the nation to respond to the problems presented by natural disaster. Yes, FEMA helped in Joplin by providing 600 shelters for the homeless—but churches and local organizations also helped by providing thousands more. Overall, the city recovered quickly and efficiently largely thanks to volunteer efforts, which altogether not only helped the city to overcome the disaster in a meaningful and communal way but also helped to save the city some $17 million (Smith & Sutter, 2013; Joplin Proud, 2016). This of course can be compared to the millions that are lost or inefficiently used by federal agencies all the time—and it shows that really when it comes down to it preparing for and responding to a natural disaster is first and foremost a local priority and it depends on the mission and spirit of mission of local actors. The community members of Joplin showed exactly what is needed to respond to a natural disaster—care, community, and commitment—and that is something no outsider is going to bring.
Conclusion
Are we ready for when natural disasters strike? It can be said the nation is better prepared now than it has been in the past. But there is still a long way to go. Infrastructure needs updating, coordination needs to be practiced and ensured; leadership is a must, and efficiency and accountability have to be promoted. The nation has improved somewhat in its response and planning to natural disasters since Katrina. There is still room to grow.




References
Achenbach, J. & Hernandez, A. (2017). FEMA administrator: Puerto Rico’s politics,
lack of unity, hindering hurricane response. Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/fema-administrator-puerto-ricos-politics-lack-of-unity-hindering-hurricane-response/2017/10/09/f1711996-ad10-11e7-9e58-e6288544af98_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.eef2e6bc0e3e
DHS. (2017). Budget-in-brief. Retrieved from
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/FY2017_BIB-MASTER.pdf
DHS. (2018). Natural disasters. Retrieved from https://www.dhs.gov/natural-disasters
FEMA. (2006). FEMA Replies To Unjustified Claims Regarding FEMA's Response To
Early Snowstorm In Western New York. Retrieved from https://www.fema.gov/news-release/2006/10/17/fema-replies-unjustified-claims-regarding-femas-response-early-snowstorm
Fitzgerald, R. (2007). Ark. Pols blast FEMA for response. Retrieved from
https://usatoday30.usatoday.com/weather/storms/tornados/2007-03-08-fema-response_n.htm
Joplin Proud. (2016). Joplin Disaster Recovery Summit. Retrieved from
http://www.joplinproud.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/JoplinProud-SummitProgram-8.5x11-WEB.pdf
Lewis, D. E. (2009). Revisiting the administrative presidency: Policy, patronage, and
agency competence. Presidential Studies Quarterly, 39(1), 60-73.
McMahon, C. (2018). Double down on the Jones Act? Journal of Maritime Law &
Commerce, 49(2), 153-195.
Philipps, D. (2017). Seven hard lessons responders to Harvey learned from Katrina.
Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/07/us/hurricane-harvey-katrina-federal-responders.html
Ripley, A. (2007). Why FEMA fakes it with the press. Retrieved from
http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1677166,00.html
Samaan, J. L., & Verneuil, L. (2009). Civil–Military Relations in Hurricane Katrina: a
case study on crisis management in natural disaster response. Humanitarian Assistance: Improving US-European Cooperation, Center for Transatlantic Relations/Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD/Global Public Policy Institute, Berlin, 413-432.
Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane
Katrina. (2006). A failure of initiative. Retrieved from http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/15feb20061230/www.gpoaccess.gov/katrinareport/mainreport.pdf
Smith, D. & Sutter, D. (2013). Response and Recovery after the Joplin Tornado:
Lessons Applied and Lessons Learned. Independent Review, 18(2), 165-188.