Gender and International Relations International

Gender and International Relations

International Relations in perspective

Gendered issues in the realm of International Relations have not been widely discussed, questioned or researched until recently, according to author Jill Steans. The reason for this lack of investigation into gender and International Relations, Steans explains, is not necessarily based on bias against females or chauvinism to any degree. To wit, historically, the study of International Relations has been focused on relationship between sovereign states, and since the "processes" and the "structures" of relations between states were not understood on the basis of gender, there seemed no link in that regard (Steans, 1998, p. 1)

. However, feminist scholars in the field of International Relations have in recent years pointed to the fact that while, "frequently ignored," gender issues are indeed "deeply embedded" in what is generally regarded as the "mainstream" concerns of International Relations (Steans, p. 1). Scholars in the field of International Relations early on believed that the realistic purpose of the discipline was to attempt to understand why wars are fought and to search for strategies and principles that could build and sustain "an enduring peace" (Steans, p. 33). That is what Steans calls the "first phase" of political idealism, the initial foray into International Relations (p. 33).

However, when World War II ended, scholars could pretty much agree that the first phase was a failure, an unrealistic approach to International Relations, hence the next phase was ushered in, a phase dominated by "realism," Steans writes (p. 33). This phase in the study of International Relations addressed the "realities" of states' power in the world; a better grasp of the problems and social issues that were faced by states in terms of seeking out solutions. Steans explains that by the 1960s social scientists, political scientists and scholars abandoned the narrow "reality" approach and instead developed a "range of theories" on International Relations (Steans, p. 33). They borrowed theoretical approaches from other aspects of the social sciences -- hoping to find better insights into why elite states make certain decisions about war and peace. In the 1970s, Steans goes on, many scholars in the field of International Relations zeroed in on the "Qualitative changes" that have been made due to advances in states' technological advances (p. 33). Also in the 1970s a Marxist perspective was employed by some scholars to attempt to understand the "enduring structural inequalities which existed" on the planet at the time.

On page 34 Steans describes the debates that have raged through the last thirty years of so as to what the best approach is to the study of International Relations. The consensus among those scholars was that theories are ideological and they only represent the "political values of the theorist." In other words, theory cannot stop genocide in Africa, aggression in Afghanistan or terrorist attacks in India. Meantime, the feminist approach to gender and identity in International Relations helps to "critique the received wisdom" that the nation-state is the sole significant source of "political identification and allegiance in the world" (Steans, p. 63). That said, the feminist view of International Relations goes well beyond "critique," Steans continues. The feminist perspective is an attempt to bring to the fore the "complex ways in which gender and identity are relevant to understanding the world" (Steans, p. 63).

In addition, the feminist critique of International Relations serves to expose the "ideological exclusivity of the orthodoxy in International Relations," Steans writes (p. 64). Within that context, the feminist critique attempts to highlight "…what is lost, marginalized and excluded in the construction of the nation-state as an actor." Steans' book offers readers the clear impression that it's not just about a demand from feminists that they be allowed into the men's club of nation states. Rather, the feminist approach within the International Relations milieu is in large part designed to show that gender identities are "central" to the building of political identities -- and the feminine approach also raises questions about how identities are "formed and transformed" (Steans, p. 64). In the big picture, raising questions about how identities are formed in a gender-driven study also raises issues relative to how power is achieved in the "construction and ascription of identity" (Steans, p. 64).

Understanding the feminism perspective from liberal to radical

Before coming to terms with the feminism's link to international relations, it is essential to understand where feminists are coming from. Any one who believes that there is one homogenous feminist viewpoint regarding women and international relations is ill informed. Such a view is tantamount to believing all African-Americans are on the same cultural / social page or that every Muslim shares bin Laden's worldview. Steans offers several approaches to feminism, beginning with "Liberal feminism" which is concerned mainly with equal rights and is "content to advocate reformist measures" to address bias against women (p. 16-17). "Marxist feminism" posits that women are oppressed not because of bias or because of ignorance, but rather women's oppression is a byproduct of the "political, social and economic structures" that are aligned with the capitalist system (Steans, p. 18). In other words, it is the "class system" in society -- the fitting in well with society's need for a "reserve army" of labor to be exploited -- that keeps women at the back of the proverbial bus, according to Steans' explanation of Marxist feminism (pp. 18-19).

Steans explains that the "Radical feminism" perspective sees women's oppression as "…the root of all systems of oppression… [and they] are critical of liberal and Marxist feminism" because radical feminists see both as providing a model of women's liberation "which is based on male values" (p. 20). Some radical feminists believe that all male structures should be challenged and that the best values from women's society should be employed in creating a counter-culture that cherishes "female-identified roles and values" (Steans, p. 20). "Socialist feminism" is concerned with overcoming "both class and gender oppression," according to Steans on page 21. On page 24 Steans struggles to describe "Postmodern feminism"; in five pages the author takes many twists and turns in her descriptive narrative, ending up (p. 28) with this summation: "Postmodern feminists value the diversity in feminist thought" and they see the fact of many "feminisms" as proof that women's experiences take many social and political forms. They also espouse the notion that gender is to be viewed "not so much in terms of identity, or social structures, but rather in terms of discourse" (Steans, p. 27).

Labels, challenges and the backlash to feminism

V. Spike Peterson and Jacqui True (Peterson, et al., 1998, p. 15) hit the nail directly on the head regarding attempts to identify a woman, and label her with a particular brand of feminism. They quote Catherine Stimpson: "Every woman is more than a woman. She belongs, as well, to a class, a race, a nation, a family, a tribe, a time, a place" (Peterson, p. 15).

The diversity that women reflect poses substantial challenges to the "feminist praxis," Peterson explains. That praxis is pointed towards a goal of finding a way out of gender oppressions, and because there is no "one feminism," Peterson continues, labels and identities can complicate the movement toward fairness and participation in international relations for women.

Labels can be misleading and even cruel. To wit, calling a woman a "feminist" can elicit negative responses from conservatives and others frightened (or confused) by feminine challenges to the male status quo. An analogy with surfing is appropriate here. A man and woman walk along the beach and look out to sea, and there is a male on a surfboard, riding the waves. "There's a surfer," says the man. His wife adds, "I think surfers are pretty cool." Actually the male on the surfboard doesn't have long blond hair or tattoos. He is an attorney, not a "surfer" -- but because he surfs for his morning recreation, he's a surfer. Surfers have a certain aura about them, and people from Iowa visiting California's beaches look at the surfers and probably think that's all they do. They surf all day. Like pigeons in the park, surfers are always there.

Take the analogy to feminism. A housewife joins a group of women demonstrating outside the Iranian Embassy in New York City. They are protesting Iranian policies that require a woman to wear what they consider "oppressive clothing" in public in Tehran. Women who break this rule are subjected to ridicule or worse, incarceration. The protesting women in New York represent an activist feminist organization; and so every woman -- including the housewife who has never joined any gender-related organization in her life -- in that group is a "feminist" and thus is stuck with a label that, again, brings frowns on some faces, smiles on others.

There are respected academics that growl at the notion that women should participate more fully in international relations. Christopher Coker of the London School of Economics and Politics is certainly in that group. An essay by Steve Smith -- professor of international politics at the University of Wales -- points out how Coker launched "a diatribe" against the newly offered course on gender and international relations at the London School of Economics and Politics (LSEP), Coker's own university (Smith, 1998, p. 57).

Coker's article (published in a very conservative magazine in England) "reflected unease among some of his colleagues" about that new course at LSEP. Moreover, Coker disputes that fact that there is a female alternative to male behavior and Coker insists that "Whether they love or hate humanity, feminists seem unable to look it in the face" (Smith quoting Coker, p. 58).

If feminists are right about the female nature being more peaceful and "less aggressive" than men, then women pose a "far greater danger than men…" to the world and to international relations Coker continued. It was a less aggressive attitude toward international relations that "prevented us from deterring Hitler," Coker went on, referencing (without naming) Neville Chamberlain, England's Prime Minister who reportedly appeased Hitler rather than take a strong stand against the Third Reich.

On page 58 Steve Smith explains that in cases where feminine concerns are being expressed on the public state, people like Coker either feel "rather humble and embarrassed or feel attacked personally." if, like professor Coker, they feel that their patriarchal position has been threatened, they "react aggressively" (Smith, p. 58). The other problem relating to adverse male responses vis-a-vis women entering the international relations milieu is that "Feminist work simply does not relate to the professional agenda of IR," Smith asserts (p. 58). It must be understood that international relations is "so tightly determined," according to Smith, from the "tyranny" of first year texts to the locked-in formats of the leading journals, that any innovating by feminists is "difficult and threatening" (p. 58). On page 59 Smith posits that many of the concerns feminists have are "simply irrelevant" to many scholars in international relations. Those scholars may well accept that women are exploited -- it would be hard not to accept that fact unless one is living in a cave -- but they can't figure out what "most feminist work has to do with 'the real world of international relations'" (p. 59). And in this case, the "real world" is the world that has been given over to the male gender and issues relating to the state.

Not every international relations scholar is as hard-headedly anti-feminism as Coker, but breaking into the field has been a struggle for certain in Australia. Writing in the Australian Journal of Politics and History, Australian Katrina Lee-Koo restates what others have emphasized: busting through the hitherto locked door of the international relations field has been anything but smooth for feminists. Globally the relationship between mainstream international relations actors and feminists has been "uneasy," she understates.

In Australia the relationship was not even established until well after American and European feminists began making noise in the field. The problem is not radical or otherwise pushy feminists; the problem has been the resistance of mainstream international relations scholars, according to Lee-Koo (p. 424).

The result of this recalcitrance on the part of the field's establishment has resulted in a kind of "subfield" -- a level of scholarship beneath the mainstream in the field, Lee-Koo writes. A kind of a second string, in a sports context. This isn't a terrible or scathing rejection of feminist contributions to the field and yet the feminist impact thus far has been at best "limited" and at worst "non-existent" Lee-Koo explains (p. 424). Lee-Koo quotes Terrell Carver, professor of political theory at Bristol University, who asks a highly pertinent question: are scholarly feminists and mainstream scholars in international relations "even in the same world?" (p. 424). Lee-Koo goes on to suggest that because feminist interventions into international relations is seen as threatening the male establishment, there have been "deeply discriminatory" responses, even misogynist in tone, of the women who have offered scholarship. This is truly troubling.

Radical feminism and International Relations

Meantime, Charlotte Hooper (2001, p. 48) describes the more assertive path taken by radical feminists as they propose ways to "overthrow" the "masculinist privilege" vis-a-vis international relations.

The radical feminists "accept all the qualities associated with the feminine as women's natural domain" and they "privilege these qualities over the masculine" (Hooper, p. 48). However edgy and contentious this position is, Hooper goes on, it nonetheless has been "significant" in significant and has been "successful" in bringing many women's health and sexuality issues "to the forefront of mainstream politics" (Hooper, p. 48).

That having been pointed out, Hooper goes on to state that despite the fact that radical feminist campaigns have succeeded in bringing attention to women's international issues, and in the process have improved some women's lives, radical feminism has "done nothing to dismantle dichotomous thinking" (p. 48). Hooper obviously feels that dichotomy is in the way of real reform vis-a-vis women and international relations.

She also believes that the radical feminist model for change should have built an effort to transcend (she uses "dismantle dichotomous thinking") the old juxtaposition of masculine / feminine. Instead, radical feminists used an essentialist approach. That is, they attempted to replace the rule of "violent and 'masculine' men with the rule of peace-loving 'feminine' women" (Hooper, p. 48). In fact what they did was to "reinstate masculinist dichotomies in reverse" (Hooper, p. 48). On page 50 Hooper references the research by Spike Peterson and Anne Sisson Runyan (1993) who believe that women are either accused of "propping up the status quo by supporting masculine agendas" or if they don't join the status quo and appear to be acting "like women" they then are accused of "reinforcing the traditional feminine stereotype" (Hooper. P. 50). Peterson and Runyan (1993, p. 71) (quoted by Hooper) offer this viewpoint:

"As long as female political actors are perceived either as traditional women or 'invisible women' (because they are acting like men), gender expectations are not really disrupted. Paradoxically, even when women wield the highest state power, by continuing to behave in gender-stereotypical ways, they reinforce rather than challenge the politics of gender…There is no simple, one-to-one relationship between the presence of women in power and the extend of feminist politics…"

Hooper believes that if there was a substantial increase in the number of females fully participating in the public side of international relations and international politics that would still not assure a change in the way politics is practiced (dichotomous masculine / feminine dynamics) (p. 50). And even if somehow feminine characteristics could be imported into the international relations milieu, that would also not redress the imbalance in gender representation, Hooper goes on, especially if women remained underrepresented in positions of power (Hooper, p. 50).

An forceful discussion of feminism and the state

Catharine a. MacKinnon's book, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State, asks some extremely pointed questions that are germane to this paper. To wit: What is state power? Where, socially does it come from? How do women encounter it? What is the law for women? How does law work to legitimate the state, male power, itself? Can law do anything for women? (MacKinnon, 1991, p. 159).

No sooner does she ask those questions than she adds, "In the absence of answers, feminist practice has oscillated between a liberal theory of state on the one hand and a left theory of the state on the other" (p. 159). In other words, as of 1991, there were no answers and no solutions, to women's lack of clout in the international relations milieu. As regards the two theories MacKinnon references, they treat the law as "the mind of society: disembodied reason in liberal theory, reflection of material interest in the left theory" (p. 159).

She follows questions with more questions, such as, "Is the state constructed upon the subordination of women?" And "Can such a state be made to serve the interests of those upon whose powerlessness its power is erected?" (p. 161). Again, she has no answers specific to those queries, but posits that "…feminism has been caught between giving more power to the state in each attempt to claim if for women" and "leaving unchecked power in the society to men" (p. 161).

MacKinnon is adept at injecting familiar feministic barbs referencing sexuality and gender into her narrative about women and international relations; this strategy awakens any reader who may be close to napping through her narrative and serves to define MacKinnon as an assertive writer with anger just a couple taps on her keyboard away. To wit: "Undisturbed, meanwhile, like the assumption that women generally consent to sex, is the assumption that women consent to this government" (p. 161). And on page 167, after explaining the unfairness of -- and the results of -- state actions (e.g., war, belligerence, and aggression), she writes: "Women as a whole are kept poor, hence socially dependent on men, available for sexual or reproductive use" (p. 167). Leaving no doubt as to her views vis-a-vis gender as a determinant of state behavior, and yet getting that last machete jab into the heart of the bastard who lines up the wars for the state, she concludes (p. 170): "However autonomous of class the liberal state may appear, it is not autonomous of sex [i.e., gender]. Male power is systemic. Coercive, legitimated, and epistemic, it is the regime."

A gendered reproduction of the state in international relations

Most feminist scholars specializing in international relations write about gender in terms of "gender and the state" and their research moves from analyzing "sexist stages to patriarchal and later to gendered states" (Kantola, 2007, p. 270).

As the research proceeds, gender is no longer a "variable" but rather it becomes a "social construct" (Kantola, p. 271). Johanna Kantola, a senior political lecturer at the University of Helsinki, suggests that feminists researching gender eventually shift their focus from the exclusion of women in important state positions to "understanding the gendered structures of these institutions" and attempting then to transform those institutions (Kantola, p. 271). She makes two important points on page 271: a) the state is not just a set of institutions but rather a process; and b) "Not only do states construct gender, but gender constitutes the state." Hence, this state vs. gender / gender vs. state dynamic cries out for research on the exact processes that continue producing existing gender hierarchies in states, Kantola continues.

The author repeats the thought put forward by other scholars referenced in this paper, that scholarship should first study actors at the local level ("bottom-up") and not necessarily the elite members of the state's ruling bureaucracy. Social movements, individuals and multi-national corporations should be the first phase of any study involving feminism and international relations, according to Kantola. Secondly, she asserts that additional sites (beyond the state) should be researched, sites like the household, the economy, cities and the "civil society" (p. 272). A thorough way to study international relations in terms of the effect on the feminine gender is to get down into the community, and observe women in factories and the wives of military men, Kantola explains on page 273 of her essay.

Besides, it makes good sense to start any research project at the ground floor, where people and institutions are easier to approach and study. Going the other route -- trying to get into the halls of power at the highest institutions in the state -- will be problematic in any event. There has been nothing in the literature critiqued in this paper suggesting that not only is it a solid feminist approach to international relations from the grassroots up (and not the top-down) but it is a far more pragmatic strategy to begin at the bottom. Why? Because people and groups at the community and neighborhood level are easily accessible, they are generally responsive to reasonable inquiry, and local people are thrilled that someone with lofty intentions and a social conscience would wish to learn about them, care what they think and identify with their needs and aspirations.

Is the state a person? Feminists think not Feminists reject the idea -- "the fiction" -- that the state is a person. On page 277 Kantola points out that when states are indeed discussed as persons, or actors, they are frequently given "human characteristics" like identity, interests and beliefs, and rationality. Kantola references Alexander Wendt (2004, 291) who argues that states as persons are in fact real because they are "intentional purposeful actors"; the state has an identity and the defence of that identity is "in the national interest" (Kantola, p. 277). But feminists argue that if the state has an identity, it is a masculine actor, built on the values or "aggressiveness" and "rationality," Kantola stresses. She gives a few examples of these states with masculine identities: "rogue states" are serious problem cases, "uncontrollable masculine" states; "night-watchman states" are masculine states with minimalist intentions (p. 277). On the other hand, there are feminine epithets that are used, Kantola continues, to "deligitimize states." One example would be "nanny states" (feminine welfare states that "inhibit competition" and lower market values).

Why "just war" needs feminism now more than ever

Linking feminism to war seems an oxymoron at first glance. Just about every theory used or alluded to in this paper asserts that with feminism as a moral objective, wars could be stopped or not started in the first place. Meantime professor Laura Sjoberg explains that in any discussion of international relations the subject of war will come up, and some wars are justified and others are not. That war is a "necessary evil" in some cases rings true for certain cultures in certain situations, Sjoberg writes.

Her feminist reinterpretation of the "just war" theory holds that the "added normative strength and explanatory power" from the perspective of feminism is what that theory needs "…now more than ever" (Sjoberg, 2008, p. 44). In her research, Sjoberg, a political science professor at the University of Florida, found 130 books through amazon.com that speak to the "just war" theory vis-a-vis the U.S. occupation of Iraq. She had read 58 of them, she claims, and of the 58 thirty-six authors rated that war in Iraq "unjust," sixteen found the war to be "just" and six did not have an opinion as to just or unjust (Sjoberg, p. 2).

Why the difference in opinion regarding whether that war is just or unjust? Sjoberg's argument is not at all innovative or unique: using the same exact standards, different war theorists are coming from diverse moral, cultural, religious, political and intellectual places (p. 2). And because of the changes in the world as regards reasons wars are launched, and the "combination of the frequency with which leaders violate just war standards… [and] the difficulty interpreting just war mandates," many theorists are declaring the just war theory dead (Sjoberg, p. 3). Morally, to permit war "without constraint" of a justification or a valid purpose, amounts to "an ethical stamp of approval for the extermination of the human race," she writes (p. 3). But to argue that war is "never permissible" justifies "all oppression," she goes on. So given her belief that the just war concept is no longer workable in a world of terrorism and nuclear weapons, she insists (p. 3) that a new theory of when and how a war would be acceptable is "an ethical imperative."

Naturally, given that this article is feminist in origin, any tinkering or editing with the just war theory should have a feminist slant; Sjoberg's theory is a redefined, sharpened version of the old theory only this time feminine values of "care and empathetic cooperation" should be embraced (p. 3), she asserts. The author takes great pains in this article to apply her revised / feminist just war theory to current conflicts that the U.S. is involved with -- Afghanistan and Iraq. Setting the stage for her launch into explaining how a feminist-based just war theory is needed, Sjoberg takes strong issue with the dying theory as it has been understood up to this point in time. The construction of women as "beautiful souls" has hitherto served as a "moral justification" for war. The great male warriors are not out there not fighting because they need to prove their mettle but rather they are fighting to protect the women and children back home (p. 5). This justification has been repugnant to feminists, who see that it "props up gender subordination" (Sjoberg, p. 5).

Another aspect of the just war theory that has been found to be faulty from the point-of-view of feminism is that it relies on "a gendered understanding of human decision-making" and moreover, the old just war theory posits that no state's understanding of justice "is universally applicable" to the conflict at hand, whatever and wherever that may be. That said, Sjoberg insists that a feminist approach to a just war would involve, as noted before, empathy and care. What does she mean by empathy? She explains that empathy is the "willingness to enter into the feeling or spirit of something and appreciate it fully"; that is, to hear the voices of others "and be transformed by our appreciation of their experiences" (p. 6). To do those things, listen and be open to others' experiences, is to engage in community building by giving due consideration to others, she continues. "Relationality" can then be transformed from a "handicap to a tool for social emancipation" (p. 7).

A skeptic reading Sjoberg's narrative could easily see her new just war theory as too utopian, too liberal and not realistic. When it comes to one state, say, North Korea, belligerently, aggressively attacking another state like South Korea, is it realistic to believe that by injecting a feminist approach -- by "hear[ing] the voices of others" -- a more sane, peaceful solution would be achieved? Can there ever be "empathetic cooperation" between the communist north and the capitalist south when it comes to Korea? Putting that question aside for a moment, Sjoberg dips back into the polluted well of the existing just war theory, noting that it "discourses abstract human suffering by limiting both accountability for war damages and the language we use to describe it" (p. 7).

Meantime an ethic of "care" can change the question of a war's casualties from an abstract calculation to an "emotional attachment" and from a political question to an "interpersonal" question (Sjoberg, p. 8). Instead of facts and numbers relating to the number of dead and wounded, a feminist interpretation of a just war theory would recognize war as "an emotional experience" and the victims of war -- including civilians and soldiers -- would be seen as "human beings with dignity" (Sjoberg, p. 8). While these ideas are refreshing on the one hand and seemingly unrealistic on the other, a feminist take on just war would recognize "the wide spectrum of humanitarian impacts of war and conflict" (Sjoberg, p. 8). By that Sjoberg means that in addition to dead soldiers and hospitals overflowing with the wounded, war takes a toll in terms of "economic deprivation, gender subordination" and "ecological degradation" -- and a feminist approach to just wars would take that part of a war's aftermath into deeper consideration (p. 8).

The feminist interpretation of just war standards does not include a "laundry list" of what is acceptable and unacceptable in making war and fighting in a war, Sjoberg. Rather, the feminist approach insists that belligerents must show a "just cause" to beat the drums of war; they must have "authority to declare war"; they should have the "right intention in choosing war"; they must go to war "only as a last result"; and lastly, the belligerent state must have "a reasonable chance of success" (p. 8). Moreover, there must be, in a feminist just war approach, careful discrimination between combatants and non-combatants, "immunity for non-combatants, proportional use of force" and the use of "intrinsically heinous means" must be eschewed (Sjoberg, p. 8). In her conclusion (p. 15), Sjoberg asserts that the feminine just war theory provides "moral thinking" as to the lives of all those affected -- not just the soldiers in battle.

Gender and International Relations -- Ann Tickner's perspective

Looking at another feminist aspect of war, renowned feminist thinker Ann Tickner offers a fresh approach that is compelling and worthy of study. The sense that war and military aggression is always a male-driven event is widely accepted in any study of international relations. But it goes deeper than just the fact of the male gender beating the drums of war, designing the munitions and carrying out the slaughter. It goes into perceived loyalty to -- and love of -- country. According to author Tickner, Professor of International Relations at the University of Southern California, giving one's life for one's country "has been considered the highest form of patriotism" and yet it is an act "from which women have been virtually excluded" (Tickner, 1992, p. 28).

The unfortunate implication is that women can never be true patriots at the same level as men albeit there are no long lines of women waiting for their chance to die in a hail of bullets and shrapnel on the battlefield. Tickner's point is that while men create the state's military infrastructure and defend it with their weapons and their lives, the role of women has been "ambiguous"; females have been defined as "…those whom the state and its men are protecting," hence women have had "little control over the conditions of their protection" (p. 28).

Realistically, she writes in her book (Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving Global Security) the world is not now and likely never will be a peaceful, dependably secure place (p. 31). Hence, since the world's states cannot be sure of the intentions of other states, they arm themselves in an attempt to reach some semblance of security. But because states arm themselves they ." threaten someone else's security" and as a result that "sets in motion a vicious cycle which results in the spiraling procurement of armaments and the possibility that war could break out at any time" (Tickner, p. 31).

Meanwhile, Tickner makes poignant and original observations about the terrible destruction of the environment that has occurred globally over the past century -- and how gender-driven states have contributed to the downgrading of the planet's ecosystems. Typically, Tickner's deliberate and scholarly narrative focuses on key arguments posed by other scholars and crafted into sensible positions along the way. She observes that there is a powerful link between "…the oppression of women and the domination of nature." That connection is of course based on "patriarchy" in the field of international relations, Tickner goes on. The gender-dominated modern state system has had "an uneasy relationship with its natural environment" largely because "natural resources and geographical spaces have been viewed as resources for increasing state power and wealth" (Tickner, p. 98).

Indeed, the "inattention to environmental problems and the silencing of women in international relations may be more than coincidental," Tickner asserts on page 98. And yet Ticker realizes that embarking on an investigation into ecological distress caused by aggressive state policies risks -- to the detriment of women -- goes against some feminists' beliefs. Some feminists are "suspicious of ecology and ecofeminism because they regard the age-old connection between women and nature, which both have espoused, as a basis for women's oppression" (p. 98).

Socialist feminists, in particular, criticize the tendency of ecofeminists to "essentialize women and naturalize their reproductive and domestic roles," Ticker explains. That tendency, the socialist feminists assert, perpetuates the chauvinist bias that places women in stereotypical roles as mother first, intelligent, active woman second.

In a much more recent essay, written thirteen years after the book that was critiqued above, Ticker discusses the background and history of international relations as a field of study. She takes care to present a thorough and objective analysis of the various methodologies that scholars have embraced in trying to rationally understand the nature of and reasons for the vast difference in approaches to international relations (IR). "Feminists have asked whether it makes a difference that most foreign policy leaders are men and why women remain so fundamentally disempowered in matters of foreign and military policy" (Tickner, 2005, p. 2177).

Feminists have questioned, since their entrance into the IR debate in the late 1980s, why the foreign policies of states are "so often legitimated in terms of typically hegemonic masculine characteristics," Tickner continues on page 2177.

Moreover, one of the questions that has been the most visible in scholarly feminism -- "why wars have been fought mostly by men" -- has not been asked hitherto in IR and indeed probably could not have been asked with the "epistemological and methodological boundaries of positivist social science," Ticker wrote (p. 2177). By that Ticker means that positivist social science theories (leading up to the 1970s and even the 1980s) views of IR are outdated. The view that many feminists take is that when examining IR the investigation should be from the bottom-up rather than top-down. The author asserts that in the 21st Century feminist theory vis-a-vis international relations begins with the lives of "individuals on the margins who have never been the subject" of previous research. The everyday experiences of women should be linked with the "constitution and the exercise of political and economic power at the state and global levels" (Tickner, p. 2178).

The strategy Tickner utilizes often is to bring in another scholar to the discussion, and without blaring out her (Tickner's) total agreement with that scholar, show the style and substance of the other scholar's presentation -- which leads the reader to deeper understanding of Tickner's narrative and hypotheses. To wit, on page 2184 of her essay Ticker reviews and critiques the feminist work of author Charlotte Hooper, who claims in her book Manly States (2001) that notwithstanding that masculinity is a "topic of central importance in international relations" it has not received a great deal of "systematic attention" (Tickner, p. 2184). Hooper's central question, Tickner explains, centers on the role that IR theory and practice have in "shaping, defining, and legitimating masculinities" (Tickner, p. 2184). Hooper insists that students and scholars cannot begin to understand international relations without first understanding the "implications of the fact that it is conducted by men" (Tickner, p. 2184). "Masculinities are not just domestic cultural variables but the products of men's participation in international relations," Tickner writes, paraphrasing Hooper (p. 2184).

Tickner is clearly fascinated with Hooper's investigative skills when it comes to the prestigious British weekly, the Economist. Hooper is convinced following her detailed examination of Economist issues (dating from 1989 to 1996) that the newspaper is "saturated with signifies of elitist hegemonic masculinities" (Tickner, p. 2185). In other words, Hooper is somewhat chagrined that a popular, trusted, respected internationally known business publication basically promotes the old male-driven hegemony.

This should actually come as no surprise to informed researchers who have used the Economist for research purposes and are generally aware of the gender-driven nature of high-toned business publications in the UK and elsewhere. That said, Hooper's investigation into the Economist reveals that it is aggressively pushing the notion that the business world is in a "Darwinian struggle." And the Economist's consistently employed description of states as "rational competitive masculine actors fit the models of both realism and liberalism" -- descriptions which are academic worldviews referenced by respected business publications globally -- reinforces forms of "hegemonic masculinities" (Tickner, p. 2185). Hooper's challenge, Tickner explains, is to "uncover and challenge these gendered constructions" and to make the IR discipline truly reflect its "gendered foundations" as an initial step toward the process of changing those gendered foundations (Tickner, p. 2185).

Understanding feminism / masculinity from a feminist perspective

As for Hooper's approach in her book (Many States: Masculinities, International Relations, and Gender Politics), the author makes the case that prior to understanding the feminine view of international relations, a researcher must first understand that "masculinity is the valued term" and that femininity is "merely a residual category" (Hooper, p. 43).

If that sounds like a bitter feminist raking men over the coals, it is not supposed to be seen that way because reading Hooper one gets the distinct impression that she is trying to be fair if not totally objective. She goes on, insisting that that with masculinity the "valued term" femininity then becomes merely "a foil" for masculinity -- the "Other" used in order for masculinity to define itself through juxtaposition (Hooper, p. 43).

The header for this section of Hooper's book is called "The Feminist Critique of Masculinism," and the author is nothing short of brilliant in that effort. Many if not most look at the world through the prism of masculine / feminine, Hooper explains. And the dichotomy of masculine / feminine is reinforced through numerous dichotomous pairs, which operate in similar contrasting contexts, Hooper asserts. Some of those -- with the former term having a masculine connotation and "always constructed in relation to its opposite" -- are worthy of a place in this paper, if for no other reason than a clear delineation of male / female from a feminist perspective. It is worth noting that the majority of feminist authors and scholars this paper has reviewed seem to be not merely agitating for a place at the international relations table, but rather they seem to be building a case towards a full understanding of what must change in order to bring women into the international relations milieu. Quoting a few of Hooper's masculine / feminine dichotomies will bring her hypothesis into focus:

"Hard / soft, rational / irrational, strong / weak, tough / tender, culture / nature, mind / body, dominant / submissive, science / art, tough / tender, culture / nature, competitive / caring, objective / subjective, public / private, active / passive, inside / outside, abstract / concrete, independent / dependent, aggressor / victim, Self / Other, order / anarchy, war / peace, and prudence / impulsiveness" (Hooper, p. 43). These dichotomies are either used to directly describe masculinity and femininity, respectively, or, Hooper continues, "they are otherwise associated with them" (p. 43) in some meaningful way.

Teaching gender in International Relations

"Feminisms" have a great deal to contribute to the field of International Relations, according to Julie Mertus, writing in International Studies Perspectives (Mertus, 2007, p. 323).

Mertus, associate professor at American University, writes that "feminisms" are actually strands of feminism that contribute "methodology" and "a deep normative critique" to the field of International relations (Mertus, p. 323). Feminisms are critiques on society that call attention to the unjust circumstances of women on the global landscape, Mertus explains. The liberal feminist receives impetus from traditional themes of liberal theory, such as individual rights, the rule of law, and the belief that international relations approaches "must be responsive to women" (Mertus, p. 323).

However, Mertus' feminisms need to go farther into the realm of international relations than merely critiques; to wit, feminists must embrace a methodology that seeks to understand the exercise of power from the perspective of "little" actors and structures "at the bottom," she insists (p. 323). Rather than try to understand the gender structure of NATO, for example, or of the Yugoslav Army, Mertus continues, she instead listens to the little people -- that is she listens to village women leaders, grassroots organizations that oppose military conscription. "Unlike some of my peers," Mertus suggests (pp. 323-24), "I am interested in…examining how specific local actors use or resist the theory." She is not interested in applying her feminist theory on IR to "an abstract" but rather to hands-on research with people at the bottom rung of the ladder of power.

As a teacher, Mertus embraces three feminist approaches to presenting international relations theories and concepts to students. Her first approach, "equality feminism," searches for ways in which women are "invisible" in any international relations analysis. Her second feminist approach to international relations is to go beyond "adding women" to power structures and instead points the finger on the many assumptions of "international policy analysts" are "distorted in a manner that privileges men" (p. 324). The second of Mertus' approaches to teaching international relations is a re-framing of generic feminist protests. Indeed, she writes that issues considered pivotal in international relations are those "assumptions about who and what counts and how the game is played," and of course they "…reflect the interests of the powerful" (i.e., the masculine) while the less powerful (i.e., the feminine) are pushed to the margins" (p. 324).

Her third feminist approach basically amounts to her objection to the "typical top-down analysis" from international relations' scholars. That approach ignores the individual and human tensions as well as grassroots social movements while giving great attention to states, sovereignty, power, security and conflict.

Women are relegated to the role of victims in times of war

When scholars, journalists, government bureaucrats, human rights organizations and others allude to protecting non-combatants in times of war, they often refer to "innocent civilians" but what they are really implying is "women and children" (Carpenter, 2005, p. 296).

Gender essentials such as this one stick in the craw of R. Charli Carpenter, author of several books on the laws and ethics of national security and professor of political science at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst. The first point of Carpenter's thesis is that the emphasis on groups that are particularly vulnerable to the violence of war obscures the "gender-based vulnerabilities that draft-age civilians males face in armed conflict" (p. 296). In other words, men suffer too, and in fact "…civilian men and older boys are most likely to be directly killed in a war or civil strife" (p. 319). Secondly, Carpenter suggests that by presenting women exclusively as victims of war, the media and others basically obscure the role women play as peacemakers, as leaders in rebuilding "war-torn societies" and as community leaders "facilitating mediation and reconciliation" (p. 324). How could women serve in those roles if they are all dead, maimed, raped and left without food or shelter in bombed-out villages?

Yes, Carpenter agrees, women and younger children are particularly affected by the long-term, indirect effects of war -- "in part because they tend to be disadvantaged socially during reconstruction" (p. 319). They are also affected because they are "more likely to survive" the immediate aftermath of the conflict. The author objects to the breathless, over-hyped media reports after and during brutal conflicts. "The starving widow, the disheveled rape victim, the refugee columns of elderly women in kerchiefs" -- these images are portrayed by television because "They want a story and the story is about the relationship between good and evil," Carpenter writes (p. 317). A UNICEF official told Carpenter that televisions images such as the one described above are there because the story is "…about bad men with guns and good, innocent women and children who suffer and they are starving and raped. it's a hell of a story. You don't want to complicate it" (p. 317).

Carpenter is particularly galled by the distorted facts that emerge from war zones. For example, the statement that "Belligerent parties deliberately inflict violence on civilian populations, and women and children are killed" (Save the Children, 2002, p. 8, referenced by Carpenter, p. 319) leaves out the males, young and old, who also suffer due to conflicts.

As to the vulnerable male gender during and after war, these individuals, left out of the matrix because they are not women, children and the elderly, face risks of "forced recruitment, arbitrary detention, and summary execution" (Carpenter, p. 296). This gender essentialism, in Carpenter's view, undermines the "moral logic of the civilian immunity norm" on which the so-called laws of war are based. In her conclusion, Carpenter asserts that many civilian advocates are coming to recognize the "misleading and potentially counter-productive aspects" of the distorted gender-based imagery presented during and after wars; e.g., a) it's only women and children that suffer; and b) women are rarely seen as part of the settlement and/or rebuilding because they are victims only.

As repugnant as this misleading trend is, Carpenter fully understands why it persists: when vulnerable people (think women and children) are not perceived as victims, "there is a strategic disincentive to expend resources advocating on their behalf, however invalid those perceptions" (p. 327).

Women and war -- Jean Bethke Elshtain

Any discussion of women / feminism and international relations inevitably includes how and why women would approach violent conflict differently than men have done over the many centuries of hostilities. In her book, Women and War, Jean Bethke Elshtain

invokes William James' theory of war and how to avoid it. In 1910 James, sometimes referred to as the "father of psychology" in the U.S., warned that the war against war "…is going to be no holiday excursion or camping party" (Elshtain, 1995, p. 230). Sounding like a feminist pacifist, James went on to explain that "…military feelings are too deeply grounded" in society to be altered by those desirous of peace. War is life, and history "is a bath of blood," James is quoted by Elshtain (p. 230). Unfortunately war is "bred…into our bone and marrow," James explained. He also hit the target as far as Elshtain is concerned, when he explained that there is but one alternative to war -- "a moral equivalent of war" (Elshtain, p. 230).