Fire at Watts Bar Hydroelectric

Fire at Watts Bar Hydroelectric Plant

In 2002, a fire at a hydroelectric plant in Tennessee caused by damaged electrical wiring could have resulted in the outage of electrical service to numerous businesses and residents in the area. In addition, the real danger could have been the malfunctioning of the dam and spillway resulting in flooding and damage to the surrounding areas.

The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the effectiveness of the NFPA 550, Guide to the Fire Safety Concepts Tree in helping to prevent future fires and contain the damage of any other fires. Could the NFPA 550 have prevented the Watts Bar Hydroelectric Plant?

On September 27, 2002 at 8:00 AM, the Tennessee Valley Authority's Watts Bar Hydroelectric Plant in Spring City, Tennessee experienced a fire in the cable shaft and control building. Arcing between a cable and a metal grate due to damaged insulation that surrounded an electrical cable caused the insulation to catch on fire. Fortunately, the operational and electrical systems were able to be restored within hours.

According to Gil Francis, Media Contact for the Tennessee Valley Authority, in the January 3, 2003 press release, "TVA is still determining the exact cost of the damage and the repair and replacement of equipment, but the cost is estimated to be between $25 million and $30 million" (Francis, 2003, ¶4). TVA is the largest public power producer in the United States, with self-financed power systems which supplies power to numerous big industries and 158 power distributors that serve 8.3 million consumers.

The NFPA 550, Guide to the Fire Safety Concepts Tree is designed to evaluate the lack of adequate fire protection or the excessive coverage of the fire protection system. The analysis as described William E. Koffel, P.E., FSFPE of Koffel Associates in the Fire Protection Engineering magazine article, "A Methodology to Analyze the Concept of Balanced Design," states, the fire impact can be managed by either managing the fire or managing the exposed. The fact that the diagram contains an "or" gate indicates that one need only manage the fire or manage the exposed. However, the use of the "or" gate also assumes 100% effectiveness and reliability associated with the chosen strategy, assuming that the fire safety objectives are to be achieved in all reasonably credible fire scenarios (Koffel, 2002, ¶5).

The concept evaluates all scenarios that can happen and any failures that can occur with the fire safety and prevention equipment.

Conclusion