Crime trends and criminological theories in Iraq and Afghanistan

¶ … Causes crime & process change): Choose country (*Iraq Afghanistan) crime (*Terrorism) relevant country. Obtain statistics crime show crime trends a period 8-9 years (e.g. 1995-2009). Then explain, criminological theories (*Conflict Theory Lableling Theory), crime relevant country (context), occurred place (causal factors), increased decreased years (change).

There has been much controversy in the last two decades regarding the issue of terrorism in Afghanistan, given that numerous countries have changed their international policies as a result of acknowledging the terrorist threat in the Middle East. With the Taliban political group holding power for several years before the September 11, 2001, events at the World Trade Center in New York, terrorism has reached a whole new level. It is difficult to determine the exact factors that fueled the terrorism movement in the country, with some of the most influential of them being the drug industry, the concept of jihad, and biased interpretation of Islamic laws.

To a certain degree, one could attribute the terrorist element in Afghanistan to the fact that the U.S. got actively involved in the country during the Cold War, assisting the Mujahedeen movement with weapons and military advices. Even with that, it was virtually impossible for someone to predict that a number of Mujahedeen individuals would later raise arms against the very people who helped them in eliminating Soviet influence from their country.

The purpose of this paper is to follow the evolution of terrorism in Afghanistan from the time when the Taliban movement became one of the most influential political groups in the country and until the present day. In spite of the fact that the Afghan terrorist threat has significantly decreased as a result of the international intervention that began in 2001, there is still a lot of tension in the territory and Afghan terrorism has influenced a great deal of individuals both locally and internationally, making it even more difficult for authorities to effectively fight terrorism, with groups like Al Qaeda (that largely developed its policies in Afghanistan during the Cold War) continuing to exercise pressure in the world. The international response to the September 11 events succeeded in overthrowing the Taliban government in charge of Afghanistan, but it failed to defeat the Taliban insurgency, which persists on influencing the country as a whole and the concept of terrorism. In spite of the fact that they apparently lost influence in the territory, terrorists are thriving in exploiting its drug-producing potential and in promoting their image around the world.

2. Nature and Trends of terrorism in Afghanistan

As they actually influence foreign groups through promoting terrorist ideologies, terrorists in Afghanistan are apparently supported by outside forces in conducting rebellious missions. Afghan terrorists are generally interested in achieving their goals and are virtually indifferent regarding the people who fall victim to their actions. Given that terrorists normally behave similarly, regardless of their background, it is only safe to assume that it would be absurd to relate terrorism as a whole to a particular group or nation. Even with that, people are inclined to believe that terrorists originate in the Muslim world, which is presumably devoted to fighting non-Muslims through every means possible (Ministry of Foreign Affairs -- Islamic Republic of Afghanistan). It would of course be illogical to support such thinking, since just as terrorists do not discriminate concerning the targets they choose when they perform a terrorist act, the general public should not put across prejudice when relating to certain individuals. In order to employ an efficient tactic in fighting terrorism, international authorities need to unite in eliminating its influence, events that are likely to trigger terrorist behavior, and virtually everything related to the concept.

Afghan terrorism is largely successful because the government in Afghanistan is unable to put its power into effect. In spite of the fact that it experienced a steady progress ever since the overthrow of the Taliban government, the contemporary government is still weak and corrupt. Afghans actually have the power to defeat the Taliban faction but given that they observe their own government's incapability to control affairs in the country, they are unenthusiastic about supporting a cause they do not believe in. One of the best examples demonstrating that the Taliban group is still strong in the country whereas the government is weak is the fact that the opium poppy business is thriving, financing terrorism. When concerning the Afghan drug business, "information from the DEA showed that of the agency's 21 high-value targets, 17 have links to the Taliban and that 16 of the 17 are grouped in the country's volatile south" ("DEA's Targets Tied to," 2007, p. A06). Afghanistan has come to be the world's largest producer of opium, with poppies being cultivated at a record level. In addition to fighting terrorism, international authorities also have the mission of putting an end to the country's drug industry. However, matters are delicate, given that some fear that destroying poppy cultures in Afghanistan would only result in influencing more individuals in joining the Taliban group. "About 92% of the world's heroin comes from opium poppies grown in Afghanistan according to the 2007 World Drug Report. Last month, Gen. Dan McNeill, head of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force, estimated that Afghanistan's rampant opium poppy cultivation was funding up to 40% of the Taliban-led insurgency and, he said, the figure likely was low and could reach 60%" ("DEA's Targets Tied to," 2007, p. A06).

Considering that the Taliban political group was linked to the Mujahedeen movement, the international public was initially inclined to support it when it took power in 1994. However, conditions in the country became critical as it became clear that the new government was not interested in respecting international laws and that it solely wanted to impose a tyrannical interpretation of the Qur'an. Even though the rest of the world did not officially express its disapproval toward the ways of the Taliban faction until September 11, 2001, Mullah Omar's refusal to extradite Osama Bin Laden was essential in influencing the international public in becoming determined to remove the Taliban government from Afghan leadership. While most people considered the Taliban threat to be no longer present consequent to the success experienced during Operation Enduring Freedom, a great number of Taliban combatants blended into the Afghan crowd, only to emerge later, better prepared to deal with the international control forces in the country through concealing themselves (Afsar, Samples & Wood, 2008).

The rise of the Taliban cannot be properly defined by a historical moment; however, "the Taliban emerged as a force in Afghan politics in 1994 in the midst of a civil war between forces in northern and southern Afghanistan. They gained an initial territorial foothold in the southern city of Kandahar, and over the next two years expanded their influence through a mixture of force, negotiation, and payoffs. In 1996, the Taliban captured Kabul, the Afghan capital, and took control of the national government" (Kaplan and Bruno, 2008). The fact that the United States contributed to their rise is relatively wide known and acknowledged. They were financed by special agencies and through different means in order to insure their stability against the soviet intervention. However, the fact that they used terrorist means to gain political control of the country was an uncalculated effect, given the fact that the Taliban regime has been accused and convicted with evidence of having harbored Osama bin Laden, the mastermind of the attacks from 9/11 (Kaplan and Bruno, 2008).

Terrorism came to be considered a new threat to the national security but not necessarily in the sense history saw it before. State terrorism now included the global facet of international life in the sense that globalization plays an essential role, one which national states cannot control due to its complexity. The connections between different terrorist factions around the world are instant and communication is now available in every corner of the world. This aspect makes it difficult to counter attacks on the national security and threats represented by terrorism supporting political factions. The American invasion in Afghanistan registered immediate and comprehensive results as the Taliban regime did not put a fierce opposition. However, after the two months of war, the most difficult part was the reconstruction of the country taking into account all its aspects, from political to the civil society (Jalali, 2003). Most of the times, in modern wars waged for the liberation of a nation from a despotic rule, the challenge is represented by the need to reconstruct the political, economic, and social apparatus in order to avoid the power vacuum which would reduce the country to its status ante.

3. Theoretical explanations

The general theoretical and practical belief is that the United States, given its political, economic, and in the end, ideological supremacy, "can and should seek peace, reform, and security for the region simultaneously, while continuing to buy Arab oil" (Dunne, 2004). Therefore, taking this aspect into account, the general theoretical point-of-view is that the U.S., in effect, is acting in the spirit of the rule of law, as a promoter of democracy, human rights, and international peace.

The more pragmatic approach however is related to the aspects which are not offering the expected results. In this sense, given the current situation in Afghanistan, it is believed that the war effort undergone in 2001 was limited in its results. Despite the fact that the expenses in itself were not considerable in comparison to the following war in Iraq, the invasion in Afghanistan represented the first war conducted under a new theoretical framework, that of the pre-emptive strike.

This political and military approach is part of a wider and more complex set of measures aimed at reducing the risks of a replay of the 9/11 events. In this sense, even before 9/11 "the government implemented provisions that extended from the negotiation of international agreements, military strikes against state sponsors of terrorism, and the creation of decontamination teams, to changes in immigration procedures, advances in surveillance, and an increase in the severity of penalties associated with terrorist attack" (Donohue, 2001). After the attacks and during the intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq, these measures tightened. At the same time in Afghanistan after the end of the war special plans were set in place to recreate the political spectrum and the governing society. From this point-of-view, it must be stated that the two main levels of analysis focus on the political class and the civil society in the context of an imposed model.

The model was that of state reconstruction. The Interim Authority which offered an official legitimacy to the state reconstruction process was largely supported by the United Nations. In this sense, "Afghanistan represents a radically different model in the panoply of UN peace operations (…)UN mission remains intimately involved with the Afghan Transitional Administration and therefore with the peace process that put it in place" (Chesterman, 2002). However, despite the efforts, the organization set in place needed more time than expected to gain a certain sense of legitimacy in front of the civil society.

The most important aspect which must be taken into account when discussing the factors which led to the "mess" present today in Afghanistan is the lack of legitimacy of the political spectrum as well as that of the forces came to establish it. Indeed, the elections held in the recent years pointed out a change in the mentality of the population in the sense that it offered the comfort of a democratic framework of exercise. Still, the fact that at the time of the intervention in Afghanistan there was still a strong support for the Taliban, it was rather difficult for the United States and its allies to gain the legitimacy needed in order to secure the support of the majority of the population.

At the same time, the limited power of president Karzai to erect his country without help from donor conferences did not ensure him the legitimacy needed to move the country forward. Indeed, after decades of war, it was unlikely an independent Afghanistan would emerge; however the legitimacy of the population is essential for the strength of the government (Nye, 2005).

Another important aspect which led to the current situation in Afghanistan is the image of the United States and of its allies. The United Stated, regardless of the new status as leader in the fight against terrorism, is still portrayed in some circles as being the oppressor on the one hand, and the one which supported the Taliban during the U.S.S.R. war. Therefore, is rather difficult to consider the change of the image in the collective mentality. Moreover, the subsequent intervention in Iraq, without the support of the united Nations and without the vote over a resolution in the Security Council only aggravated the already built collective image. Notwithstanding the Coalition of the Willing which intervened in Iraq, the U.S. is seen as the triggering force for the disarray present in the neighboring country.

Terrorism has come to be one of the most debated topics in the present, as more and more groups are associated with this term and with Osama Bin Laden in particular. The masses are likely to think about factors like Bin Laden and Afghanistan when hearing the word terrorism. Just as any other domain, terrorism was severely affected by globalization, thus the reason for which most people relate to Afghanistan when they discuss the topic. "Social conflict theory applied to terrorism studies suggests that terrorism has a constructive purpose such as acting as a catalyst for necessary and positive social change, or forming a channel through which to express and alleviate political, social and economic inequality" (Franks, 2005). This can mean that terrorism can largely be considered to be a response to a particular group's desire to impose its social, political, or economic points-of-view. Conflict is not abnormal in the contemporary society, with terrorism being nothing more than an extreme form of conflict involving a recognized social order and an aggressive group. Whereas the Taliban success in 1994 can be considered to be a form of revolutionary terrorism (considering that the Taliban faction was primarily interested in changing the Afghan society), the terrorist attacks performed by Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups based in Afghanistan can be considered to be a form of reactionary terrorism (contemporary Afghan terrorists are apparently interested in destroying the Afghan society) (Franks, 2005).

Before they actually started to commit terrorist acts, some people in Afghanistan discovered that they had a different perspective concerning their position in regard to the world and that the international community was willing to use force in order to impose its points-of-view on the terrorist cells in Afghanistan. Given that a number of individuals in Afghanistan were identified as being terrorists, it was only a matter of time before they started to engage in anti-social aggressive activities. The international committee contributed to the construction of the Afghan terrorist group through the fact that its reaction was obviously meant to destroy terrorism, making it clear that it considered the Taliban government indirectly responsible for the September 11 terrorist attacks. If terrorism were to be comparable to addiction, terrorists do not consider themselves to be terrorists until "when a significant other (another user) labels him/herself as an addict" (Hamlin). Considering that a series of individuals in Afghanistan (most of them belonging to the Taliban government) were unfairly labeled as terrorists, it is only normal (according to the social labeling theory) that they eventually come to get engaged in committing terrorist acts. Terrorists were not born with terrorist convictions and the general public is to a certain degree responsible for the fact that some people in Afghanistan actually became terrorists. Because they have the authority to recognize particular groups as being related to terrorism, social control agents have to be particularly careful about linking some people to terrorism, since this can result in those respective people joining terrorist ranks because they have no alternative and because they were already identified as belonging to the group. "There is a basic difference between rule breakers/rule breaking behavior and deviants / deviant behavior. The term deviant is reserved for those who have had the label successfully applied to him and deviant behavior is that behavior so labeled regardless of whether or not any norms had actually been violated" (Hamlin). Many individuals opposed the international intervention in Afghanistan because they could not accept their country's invasion. This opposition connected them to terrorism and made them responsible for harboring terrorists, even though they merely wanted to protect their possessions.

Even if they were not related to the Taliban faction or to any form of terrorism, some people in Afghanistan were inclined to perform immoral acts against the nations that invaded them simply because they could not cooperate with an international force lead by the United States. Numerous Afghans believe the U.S. To be partly responsible for the fact that the Taliban government experienced a rise in influence in the 1990s and thus believe that it would be absurd for them to behave as if the U.S. freed them.

4. Recommendations

Although the international forces that took part in Operation Enduring Freedom tended to believe that it was extremely easy for them to defeat the Taliban government, this is not necessarily true. Given that the Taliban faction immediately appeared to dissolve as a result of Afghanistan's invasion, it most probably did so with the purpose of reconsolidating its positions and returning more powerful than ever. It was not until the later years of the international force's presence in the territory that it became clear that the Taliban group had to be recognized as an insurgent force, and not as the leader of Afghanistan. The war on terrorism only managed to generate a great deal of chaos, as it came to take place on the streets of Afghanistan rather than on organized battle fields and Afghan civilians are the ones to lose the most out of the enterprise.