Foreign Policy and Russia

Russia's National Security Strategy

According to Isabelle Falcon, in Russia's view, it was necessary to update its national security strategy following the events that unfolded in Ukraine and the crisis that followed in Moscow. Russia adopted a new military doctrine on 25th Dec 2014, was signed by the president a year later and Russia adopted the new foreign policy concept on 30 of November 2016[footnoteRef:1]. [1: Isabelle Facon, "Russia's national security strategy and military doctrine and their implications for the EU," European Parliament, 2017, doi: 10.2861/635490.]

The updated documents highlight several key issues that reflect the traditional view that Russia holds about the world and its vision. They underscore the country's status as world powerhouse; and that its sovereignty must be respected. They also point out that Russia's foreign policy must be independent of the outside world. The general message that the documents send is that the outside world is full of chaos, dangerous, volatile and marked by stiff competition for resources including competition for Russia's resources control, trade routes and political power over its associates and major world powers. The documents emphasize Russia's need to maintain its political influence in the post-soviet times. The implication here is that Russia must control the political and military set up around its borders, including that of its neighboring countries[footnoteRef:2]. [2: Ibid., 6.]

Keir Giles, points out newer elements observed in the documents updated. The prospect of making Russia stronger comes at a price. There is formidable opposition from other world powers. These powers reject the stance taken by Russia's new foreign policy documents. Part of the security strategy, interestingly, is to educate children in school to become responsible Russian citizens based on traditional, cultural and social values of the state of Russia. Traditional Western powers have lost their grip on the economic front and are now making persistent attempts to reposition themselves and maintain status quo in the new world. Such moves cause instability in international relations, turmoil regionally and on the global front[footnoteRef:3]. [3: Keir Giles, "Russia's National Security Strategy to 2020," ETH Zurich, June 2009, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/154909/RusNatSecStrategyto2020.pdf..]

Military Strategy for Russia

National security strategy is the science and art of allocating and applying military force in order to achieve national intentions in times of both peace and war. Ends are pointed out as the reasons for the objectives or the strategies for achieving them. In order to achieve strategic reach, there must be military power, economic sustenance, alliances and diplomacy combined. Ways denote how the resources of a country are applied. The means are the tangible and intangible available resources. Thus, a combination of Means and Ways give room to device strategic reach[footnoteRef:4]. [4: Richard Yarger, "Towards a Theory of Strategy: Art Lykke and the Army War College Strategy Model," Air University, 2010, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/army-usawc/stratpap.htm.]

Russia has actively conducted operation in what were the former states of the Soviet Union in order to deter NATO and EU from influencing these countries. The analyses of the conflicts by westerners have highlighted the various forces that Russia and the Russia Federation Armed Forces has used to achieve its ends in these states. It has been reported to exploit cyber forces in such countries as Estonia, conventional military forces in Georgia and its Special Operations Forces in the Crimea region of Ukraine. They also sought to establish how SOF, Airborne and naval divisions worked as rapid response units.

FRAF has shifted its offensive approaches and adopted an operational style so as to achieve its intentions in countries nearby. It has established regions in which it has spread its influence within the countries that were part of the former Soviet Union. They seek to protect Russian interest and that of Russian minorities abroad. Russia, in 2003, drafted and released a white paper that supported the policy. It indicated a shift in the way the military thought and defined a new concept for its operations on the military front. This new concept was powered by the need to integrate operational, strategic and tactical elements of the force. An important aspect of the strategy was the swift disruption, destruction, and control of economics, communications, political and infrastructural elements. These moves are meant to disable the enemy from commanding and controlling their operational lines. Russia seeks to achieve this end by using its proxy forces stationed within the enemy's fold by using the cyber-attacks and networks[footnoteRef:5]. It is evident that the current Russian military concept uses both military and nonmilitary methods to engage in a synchronized way fast across both informational and physical domains. They intend to apply both direct and asymmetrical actions in the process. Russian forces create chaos, disable the enemy economically, seize important installations and terrain, mitigate the capabilities of the enemy and isolates leadership controls of the enemy before seizing control. [5: A.J.C. Selhorst, "Russia's Perception Warfare," Militaire Spectator 185, no. 4 (2016): 148-164, http://www.militairespectator.nl/thema/strategie-operaties/artikel/russias-perception-warfare. .]

Although Russia makes use of its conventional forces in the operational concept that it adopts, and one that is superior and almost guaranteeing success, it is hesitant to employ the forces for victories within its near abroad interests. Russia wants to embrace psychological victory among its foes in the near abroad targets. It does not wish to escalate violent combat in these areas. Russia seeks to use its reflexive control to assume the second and third order influence to annex target areas. The psychological impact of concealment, suggestion and disorientation must overcome provocation. It will lead to exhaustion in the end perception of despair and paralysis among the military and political leadership. The created perceptions, which may be misleading, set the enemies up for the eventual phase of the doctrine forwarded by Gerasimov, the resolution[footnoteRef:6]. [6: Ibid., 164]

U.S. Interests and Objectives Regarding Russia

The difficult relationship between the US and Russia has little to do with the existing differences but the inability to break from the mistrust by both sides. Therefore, in order to propagate the interest of the US with regard to Russia, the US should use a mixed approach. It should employ a selective stance when engaged with Russia[footnoteRef:7]. The US needs to explore new relationship horizons since these two countries are not really enemies in principle any more but in fact partners, potentially. [7: Allison, Graham, Robert D. Blackwill, Dimitri K. Simes, and Paul J. Saunders, "Russia and U.S. National Interests: Why Should Americans Care?" Digital Access to Scholarship at Harvard, October 2011, https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/20057953/Russia-and-US-NI_final-web.pdf?]

In its discussion of tactical nuclear arms with Russia, the US should initially focus on the negotiation of consolidation, measures for verifications as opposed to reductions. For as long as it is feasible, the effort to achieve wider goals versus the issue of relationship with Russia, should be given priority compared to expanding NATO in fashions that could interfere with the more important US priorities. The US should push Russia to facilitate greater investment in the energy sector and clarify to Moscow that mistreatment of Western and US companies damages the ideal investment conditions and its image internationally. They should also highlight how such actions undermine relations between the two countries[footnoteRef:8]. [8: Ibid., 21-22.]