U.S. Foreign Policy -- Middle

U.S. Foreign Policy -- Middle East

What is the U.S. foreign policy with reference to the Middle East following the uprisings in that region of the world commonly known as "Arab Spring"? This paper delves into issues surrounding the position of the United States now that leadership dynamics have changed in the Middle East, and new realities are being presented. The biggest threat for the U.S. vis-a-vis the Middle East has not resulted from the Arab Spring however; it is the ongoing menace, Iran, and the possibility that Iran will successfully develop nuclear weapons.

In the December 10, 2011 edition of the respected publication, the Economist, the author refers to the 4,500 Americans that were killed in the "eight-year misadventure" in Iraq and posits that the next phase of U.S. foreign policy might better be played out in Asia. While the U.S. has already indicated it will in fact make its presence more visible in Asia, no one in Washington, or in the Obama Administration, really believes that the U.S. can or will "…turn away from the wretched Middle East immediately," the Economist asserts.

The present thinking among those in the administration (whose names are not published) is that because of the "Arab awakening" in the Middle East, America now has a chance to make new alliances. Instead of backing brutally corrupt rulers like former Egyptian president Mubarak -- which the U.S. had done for years principally because he helped broker a peace arrangement with Israel -- the U.S. now will entertain diplomatic relations with the new Egyptian government. This may be tricky though because signs are pointing to the radical hard-line "Muslim Brotherhood" movement making strong gains in early electoral returns in Egypt.

And notwithstanding the rallying cry for democracy and freedom in Egypt, Libya, and elsewhere in the Middle East, the politics that will be reflected by the new leadership in key countries is up for grabs, and there no doubt will be serious challenges for the U.S. In terms of whom to trust and what manner of diplomacy to embrace. In the Economist piece the author asserts that "…the dictatorship of Bashar Assad is about to collapse, and that will pull down the evil axis of Iran, Syria and Hezbollah." However, even the Arab League's attempted intervention into Assad's campaign to kill his own citizens failed, so that situation is in flux.

The most "wretched" of all the controversial states in the Middle East is Iran, which Western leaders believe is working toward the development of nuclear technology. President Obama has worked harder on the Iran situation that "…he gets credit for," including his coaxing of allies to impose "unprecedented" sanctions against Iran, the Economist article continues.

On the subject of Iran and its nuclear program, Nikolay Kozhanov, former attache in the Russian embassy in Tehran, has written a scholarly article in the journal, Middle East Policy. He makes some interesting points about the sanctions that the U.S. has put in place -- supported by the UK and the entire European Union (France, Germany, and 25 other European countries) -- which includes cooperation in boycotting the purchase of Iranian oil, and other pressures on Iran's financial institutions.

Among the salient points Kozhanov offers in the article is that Iran can "mitigate the negative influence of U.S. sanctions" by establishing an "appropriate system of international relations" (Kozhanov, 2011, p. 145). In order for Iran to build those international relations it would need to: a) have an impact on the attitude of Iran's main trading partners towards the U.S.; b) assess correctly the readiness of America's partners to back up the sanctions; and c) engender the support of minor trading partners ("black knights") to increase their willingness to trade with Iran as the big players leave in obedience to the U.S. led sanctions (Kozhanov, 145).

The Russian writer uses some of the space in his article to review the history of U.S. sanctions against Iran, and mentions a brief thaw in the bitterness between the two countries. That came in 1998, when a team of American wrestlers visited Tehran and were welcomed with flowers. In that moment of detente, the U.S. lifted the ban on exported medical and agricultural goods to Iran, and allowed imports (dried fruits, caviar, and carpets) from Iran into the U.S. But along came the new Iranian president, hard-liner Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who took up the slogan "Death to Israel and the U.S.A." And made radically provocative remarks, saying, for example, the Holocaust is a lie. He vowed to build a nuclear weapon, and notwithstanding his later denials, right now the biggest threat to America's ally Israel, and to stability in the Middle East, is Iran's nuclear program. And of course, posing a lethal threat to peace is the man many suspect would launch a nuclear strike against Israel if he had the weapons, Ahmadinejad.

Among the big challenges for Arab Spring nations that hope to emerge from the turmoil with democratic institutions in place -- and for U.S. interests -- is that while polls show "broad support" for democracy, even "sophisticated and educated Arabs" like journalists have "…an uncertain mastery of democracy" (Muravchik, 2011, p. 30). The educated in Egypt and elsewhere know "…still less about economics" which is troubling because economics is a "necessary adjunct to any democratic system" in a "relatively free market" (Muravchik, 30). The reason for the lack of understanding of economics, Muravchik explains, is that "great pools of wealth abound" in the Middle East but little of it is created "through human labor or ingenuity" -- it simply "seeps from the ground."