Andrea Yates Insanity Defense Insanity

Andrea Yates Insanity Defense

Insanity Defense: The Andrea Yates Case

Case Summary

Born on July 2, 1964, she had a normal childhood and was the picture of success. Andrea Yates (Kennedy) launched successful career as a registered nurse at the University of Texas M.D. Anderson Cancer Center from 1986 until 1994 (Montaldo, 2007). On April 17, 1993, she married Rusty Yates. In eight years of marriage, she produced five children; four boys and one girl (Montaldo, 2007). It was after the birth of her second child that friends say the changes began to occur. She stopped jogging and became isolated. They decided to home school the children, compounding the isolation (Montaldo, 2007).

In 1996, Rusty accepted work in Florida and the family moved into a 38-foot travel trailer. In 1997, Rusty purchased a 350-square foot renovated bus to house the growing family (Montaldo, 2007). Conditions were cramped and this was when Andrea's insanity began to surface. On June 16, 1999, her husband was called home from work to find her shaking involuntarily and chewing on her fingers. The next day she attempted to commit suicide by taking an overdose of sleeping pills (Montaldo, 2007).

She was transferred to Methodist Hospital Psychiatric Unit and diagnosed with major depressive disorder. She was prescribed antidepressants, but refused to take them. Soon after, she began mutilating herself and refusing to feed her children, claiming that they were too fat (Montaldo, 2007). She thought that there were video cameras on the ceilings and said that the characters on TV were talking to her children (Montaldo, 2007). On July 20, 1999, she put a knife to her own neck and begged her husband to let her die. She was once again hospitalized and was catatonic for 10 days. After receiving the anti-psychotic drug Haldol, she immediately improved. Rusty bought a nice house in a nice neighborhood. Andrea began to return to her own self, swimming, socializing, and interacting with her children (Montaldo, 2007). Things looked good.

In March of 2000, Andrea became pregnant and stopped taking Haldol. On November 30, 2000, daughter Mary was born (Montaldo, 2007). Andrea was coping, but on March 12, 2001, her father died, sending her into a digression. She stopped taking liquids and mutilated herself. She would not feed Mary and began frantically Bible (Montaldo, 2007). She went to a different hospital where she was briefly put on Haldol. It was discontinued, because her psychiatrist did not feel that she seemed psychotic (Montaldo, 2007).

Andrea was released, but returned in May. She was released in 10 days and told to "think positive thoughts" and to see a psychologist. Two days after the follow up visit from her latest psychiatric stay, Andrea waited for her husband to leave for work and systematically drowned her five children (Montaldo, 2007). She then took them to her bed and covered them up (Montaldo, 2007). She then called 911 and requested that a police officer come to her house. She did not ask for an ambulance, but for a police officer (Montaldo, 2007). After the police were on the way, she called her husband and told him, "You need to come home... it's time. I did it." When he asked what she meant, she replied "It's the children... all of them" (Ramsland, 2007).

Summary of Arguments

The defense of insanity was obvious from the beginning. In this case, Andrea had a long history of psychotic behavior, attempted suicide, and numerous hospitalizations. She had a record of hallucinations and had been on an anti-psychotic drug for an extended period of time. There were a number of expert witnesses, including former doctors, that would support the insanity defense. The defense attorney had a stack of medical documents which supported the argument that Andrea had a serious illness that caused her to act irrationally, even to the point of putting a knife to her own throat. This appeared to be an "easy" insanity defense from a legal standpoint.

However, Texas law leaves a large gap between insanity and murder. In order for an insanity defense to stand, the defense must prove that at the time of the acts, the person did not "know" right from "wrong," or that they were not aware of what they were doing at the time. These terms are not concrete and unlike other states, Texas does not inform the jury of the proper definitions of the terms involved in the case (Dix, 2005). This is the loophole that both side tried to exploit during both the initial trial and the re-trial.

No one questions the claim that Yates was mentally ill, either before or during the events that took place. However, in the trial, the decision and weight of prosecution's case lied in the ideal that she had some semblance of knowledge that what she was about to do was wrong. Her mental illness undoubtedly had an effect on how she perceived her actions. She felt that ending her children's lives early would save them from eternal damnation (Dix, 2005).

Two key facts led to the decision in the first trial that she "knew" what she was doing, and that it was "wrong." The first is that she took precautions against being interrupted until she had completed the task. She locked the family dog in the cage when the dog raised protests to her actions (Dix, 2005). This demonstrated some form of mental presence and "purpose" to her actions. The second is that she notified authorities immediately after the acts and asked for a police officer instead of an ambulance (Dix, 2005). This was interpreted by the prosecution as an indication that she was aware that what she had done was "wrong." These are the key elements that led to her conviction in the first trial. Even if her sense of knowing that what she was doing was wrong, she was still aware of at least some moral and criminal consequences of her actions. In the second trial, the definition of "know" and "wrong" were once again skewed, leading to the second verdict.

Analysis and Conclusion

This case brings into light the importance of making certain that juries understand the definitions of the terms used in the case. In this case, it appears that in Texas insanity has two different definitions. One of these definitions stems from a clinical state of mind. Insanity also has a legal connotation, which sometimes conflicts with the clinical use of the term. It is easy to call a person insane when they have a history of hallucinations, psychosis and other critical factors that would lead a clinician to determine that the person is "outside" of normal parameters and in need of intervention. However, when this person commits a criminal act, the legal definitions become involved and the issue becomes clouded.

Due to Texas policy on providing juries with the necessary definitions, it is clear that the jury members used two different standards to decide the outcome of this case. In the first case, the legal definition of insanity weighed more heavily. In the second case, the clinical definition of insanity took precedence. This is clearly an area of the law that needs to be clarified. When insanity involves such heinous acts, as performed by Andrea Yates, and it becomes apparent, that criminal law has become involved. There needs to be a standard that invokes the legal definition of insanity over the criminal one. This clarification would help juries to decide insanity cases on a more consistent basis, as definitions would be clarified.