Four question framework for research analysis

Military -- Naval Questions

In What Ways does Sea, Naval and Maritime Power Aid in the Prosecution of the Land Battle and Enhance the Ability of States to Project Power Beyond their Shores?

The efficacy of Sea, Naval and Maritime Power for land battles and projection of power is created in multiple roles, often carried out in tandem with land and air forces, to prevent wars and to win wars, as the case may be. Historically in war, navies have been employed in outright naval and amphibious warfare.[footnoteRef:1] in addition, they have transported troops and related materiel such as weapons, ammunition, equipment and supplies.[footnoteRef:2] for example, from January to June of 1944 alone, Allied navies transported nearly 9 million tons of supplies and 800,000 troops across the Atlantic Ocean for D-Day, history's largest amphibious invasion.[footnoteRef:3] Navies opposing these transports have been used to intercept and seize or destroy troops and all related materiel that were being transported.[footnoteRef:4] Navies have also been used to blockade key enemy cities[footnoteRef:5], monitor and report enemy movements[footnoteRef:6] and as mobile bases for air warfare.[footnoteRef:7] Navies were also used to establish and/or replenish key bases on land.[footnoteRef:8] in these multiple roles, sea, naval and maritime power have historically been used to obtain, destroy or preserve valuable resources such as oil from the Middle East[footnoteRef:9] and to effect landings and troop transports that enabled the World War II Allies to capture and control Tunis, bomb Sicily, protect convoys to and from Malta, attack the supply lines of Irwin Rommel and ultimately defeat Germany's Afrika Korps.[footnoteRef:10] Wartime sea, naval and maritime power act as dynamic arms vitally extending the reach of a nation to enhance its own power and its allies' power while crippling its enemies. [1: Paul Kennedy. Engineers of Victory: The Problem Solvers Who Turned the Tide in the Second World War. New York, NY: Random House, 2013, p. 41.] [2: Paul M. Kennedy. The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery, 2nd Edition (Paperback). Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 2006, p. 314.] [3: Richard Overy. Why the Allies Won (New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1997), p. 146.] [4: Kennedy, Engineers of Victory, p. 7.] [5: Kennedy, the Rise and Fall, p. 114.] [6: Kennedy, Engineers of Victory, p. 259.] [7: Ibid., p. 14.] [8: Ibid., p. 10.] [9: George Baer. One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U.S. Navy, 1890-1990. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993, pp. 155-6.] [10: Ibid., p. 166.]

In times of relative peace, sea, naval and maritime power are used to secure a nation against attack, assist its allies in their economic sea trade and military defense, promote stability and peace across waterways, and enhance capabilities of strategically spanning the globe.[footnoteRef:11] These functions allow a nation to prevent war as well as win war, if necessary.[footnoteRef:12] for example, the United States Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard forged a Maritime Strategy in October of 2007.[footnoteRef:13] This Strategy currently provides layered maritime defense of the United States, as well as disaster relief, humanitarian relief and conventional tools of maritime war[footnoteRef:14] by: using "forward deployed, decisive maritime power" to deter and/or contain area conflicts to prevent their globalization[footnoteRef:15]; deterring war among the world's major powers[footnoteRef:16]; securing victory in war[footnoteRef:17]; significantly assisting in the nation's homeland defense[footnoteRef:18]; contributing to building and maintaining international partnerships among nations[footnoteRef:19]; and enhancing its six core capabilities of forward presence, deterrence, sea control, power projection, maritime security, and humanitarian and disaster responsiveness.[footnoteRef:20] in this way, sea, maritime and naval forces are being used to secure global peace, security and prosperity. [11: Ibid., p. 426.] [12: Scott B. Borgerson. The National Interest and the Law of the Sea: Council Special Report No. 46. New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations, Inc., 2009, p. 24.] [13: United States Navy, United States Marine Corps, United States Coast Guard. "A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower." www.navy.mil Web site. October 2007. http://www.navy.mil/maritime/MaritimeStrategy.pdf (accessed April 4, 2013), p. 5.] [14: Ibid.] [15: Ibid., pp. 9, 11-12.] [16: Ibid., p. 10.] [17: Ibid.] [18: Ibid.] [19: Ibid., p.11.] [20: Ibid., pp. 12-14.]

2. Question #2: Compare and Contrast Greek and Roman Naval Warfare

Greece was composed of fragmented city-states that did not build an extensive road system tying them together. The political and economic fortunes of Ancient Greece were tied to the Sea.[footnoteRef:21] the Mediterranean Sea, in particular, was the center of Greek life[footnoteRef:22] and maritime power was a "critical force" in Ancient Greece[footnoteRef:23] due to the "fundamental requirement" for sea power in that area of the world.[footnoteRef:24] in the Archaic Period, Ancient Greece's initial maritime power was critical but also "sporadic."[footnoteRef:25] During the Classical Period, Athens in particular "pursued a policy of naval imperialism"[footnoteRef:26] and this Period saw the development of "siege warfare" in which the Greeks -- particularly the Athenians -- developed the skills to wage war on the open sea.[footnoteRef:27] in the Hellenistic Period, the scope of warfare was enlarged considerably, as whole areas of land were now in dispute. Consequently, there was an "ancient naval arms race"[footnoteRef:28] in which various kings extending beyond Greece fought for control of mainland Greece, islands of the Aegean, western Turkey and southern Syria.[footnoteRef:29] [21: EH.Net and C. Michael Hogan. "Economy of Ancient Greece." www.eoearth.org Web site. May 1, 2010. http://www.eoearth.org/article/Economy_of_Ancient_Greece (accessed January 17, 2013).] [22: Chester G. Starr. The Influence of Sea Power on Ancient History. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, Inc., 1989, 7.] [23: Ibid., 6.] [24: Ibid., 8.] [25: Starr, 8.] [26: Simon Hornblower. "Greece: The History of the Classical Period." In the Oxford History of Greece & the Hellenistic World, by John Boardman, Jasper Griffin, & Oswyn Murray, 142-176. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, Inc., 1986, 151.] [27: Ibid., 163.] [28: Simon Price. "The History of the Hellenistic Period." In the Oxford History of Greece & the Hellenistic World, by John Boardman, Jasper Griffin, & Oswyn Murray, 364-389. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, Inc., 1986, 374.] [29: Ibid., 376.]

The Mediterranean was also highly important to the Romans.[footnoteRef:30] in contrast to the Greeks, however, the Romans built an extensive, paved road system that made land travel far easier, physically united Italy and helped centralize power. Roman access and power was far more balanced, Rome did not need to control the sea in order to conquer and Romans relied more heavily than did the Greeks on land forces.[footnoteRef:31] Nevertheless, Rome built up an imperial navy that was effective against such threats as piracy,[footnoteRef:32] was well-balanced and lasted essentially through the life of the empire.[footnoteRef:33] the Roman imperial navy remained such a significant force that when the empire finally fell, the conquering forces came by land rather than by sea.[footnoteRef:34] Comparing the warfare waged by Greeks and Romans, the Roman mastery of the land allowed it to have a far more balanced land/sea military than the Greeks, who were forced to rely heavily on naval forces. [30: Starr, pp. 7-8.] [31: Ibid., p. 8.] [32: Ibid., p. 73.] [33: Ibid., p. 68.] [34: Ibid., p. 7.]