Battle of Fredericksburg Is One

Battle of Fredericksburg is one of the most important episodes of the American Civil War. It represented a significant change in the overall equation of power between the forces of the Union and those of the Confederacy. The failure of the unionist attempt to take advantage of a favorable terrestrial position in relation to the Confederate armies has been motivated by historians as representing the result of both the lack of personal leadership qualities and of the general state of disarray which was characterizing the unionist army at that moment. Moreover, some argue that the disastrous outcome of the Fredericksburg campaign was also due to the political pressure that was exercised by Lincoln, as the president was pushing towards immediate and efficient results, without considerable regard for the realities on the ground.

Taking all this into consideration however, most historians agree that the main character responsible for the tragic outcome of the battle was General Ambrose E. Burnside who can be seen as the connection between all the elements mentioned.

There are several decisions that are questionable concerning the tactics involved in the development of the battle.

Firstly, there is the issue of the Unionist Army's reorganization and reorientation after the taking over of the command by General Ambrose E. Burnside. "Burnside's first act catapulted the chiefs of three corps to the level of grand division commanders" (Gallagher, 1995, 3) He would eventually lead an army made up of three Grand Divisions: the Right, the Center and the Left Divisions. (Burnside, 1862) The Sumner Right Division numbered 31,659 soldiers; there were 40,396 soldiers in the Center Grand Division commanded by Joseph Hooker, and 46,897 soldiers in the Left Grand Division of William Franklin. This structure would be used in a reorientation of the plans that had constituted the battle strategy of Major General George B. McClellan who had been relieved of his command because of poor and unsuccessful results in the campaign. Burnside decided to shift the orientation of the war tactics by deciding on a route towards the Confederate's capital, Richmond. It is rather debatable weather this aim would have been indeed successful, hadn't been for the subsequent impediments. The issue however is to what extend did the General acted in his own initiative and whether the political pressure exercised by the President had any effect on the hasty decision.

It was a well-known fact that neither army was decisively ready to engage in a new series of battles seeing the casualties suffered by both sides at Antientam Creek.(Palfrey and Sears, 1996) However, President Lincoln, himself subject to public and political pressures, "needed a victory before the end of 1862 (because) he had spent much of the year reassuring the Northern populace that the war was going according to plan and ultimate success was guaranteed" (O'Reilly, 2003, 3) and demanded that action be taken immediately, as "he had relied on McClellen to restore the Union but after eighteen months of turmoil, (...) he looked anxiously to Burnside to provide a quicker route to success" (O'Reilly, 2003, 3); therefore, Burnside, despite the fact that he didn't feel competent to accept the position so persistently offered by Lincoln, arguing that "no one, including himself was competent to command the Army of the Potomac" (O'Reilly, 2003, 2) decided to take it and made a plan that would rely mostly not so much on the realities on the ground, but rather on the eventuality of the opponent's future moves. He would later justify his actions when, after the disaster of Fredericksburg, he wrote that "I hoped, by rapidly throwing the whole command over at that place, to separate, by a vigorous attack, the forces of the enemy on the river below from the forces behind and on the crests in tile rear of the town, in which case we should fight him with great advantages in our favor." (Burnside, 1862) However, such a maneuver to change the course of an action prepared in advance and based on rather precise previous information demanded a series of solid background details on the exact location of the adversaries, but most importantly, it had to be based on the certainty of the existence of basic technical support.

From this point-of-view, Burnside's decision to change the course of action seriously outlined his lack of experience and his rather limited military perspective. Moreover, it was quite obvious that neither he, nor Lincoln thought in terms of military capabilities but rather were subject to political goals and therefore did not take into consideration the actual success probabilities or the advice received from Generals more experienced in the matter of military deployment.

Secondly, linking cause to effect, it can be said that this lack of coordination did in fact play a major role in determining the final outcome of the battle. After having decided on a course of attack that would involve building three bridges over the Rappahannock River, Burnside encountered a different technical problem that forced his plans to go array. Apparently, the engineers who were supposed to build the bridges did not receive the instructions but too late for the entire army to take advantage of the surprise element that the sudden change in the war approach would have created. There was in fact poor communication at the level of division and management, caused by both the limits which technology imposed at the time and by the reluctance most service men manifested towards Burnside, as Marvel suggests "the appointment of Burnside as commander of the Army of the Potomac was met with universal dismay, at least in the army." Citing Warren Hassler he notes that "Burnside was probably the most incompetent of all the generals then serving with the army of Potomac." (Gallagher, 1995, p 1) Therefore, again, personal qualities proved to have played an important role.

Another factor that had a big influence on the outcome of the battle was the inability to adapt to the changing conditions that were imposed by the different unexpected events. Burnside's plan was based on the bridges that would have been built; however, when this did not occur in the determined time frame, it was obvious that there would no room for maneuvers in a winning position. Therefore, it was rather reckless to construct a strategy relying on an uncertainty. Still, the pontoons would eventually reach the Capital, but the confusion of the means of transportation to the battle field further delayed the evolution of the action, as "one train would start on the morning of 16 and 17 November and that General Halleck (General -in-Chief) was not inclined to send another train-by land "(Stackpole, 1991, 97).

The necessity of the pontoons was quite understandable, as they were important for managing to cross the river, especially on the treacherous weather in December. Nonetheless, as it turned out, they were not necessarily indispensable, as Generals Franklin, Reynolds and Smith, al under Burnside's command decided to take the matter into their own hands and attack the adversaries, should the situation impose it. This came as a result of the vulnerable position of the Potomac Army in which the commander had put it. Because the initial plans failed to come through, as the bridges cold not be set in place in suitable time, the plan could not have been modified, but at the same time, the political authority in Washington demanded that action be taken, and therefore Burnside was forced to go ahead with his initial plan. Nonetheless, this decision placed the army in a very vulnerable position and in close range for the Confederate Army. Despite the fact that Burnside did launch the three pontoons, this was not an inspirational move, as the adversaries retaliated from their positions. "On the night of the 10th instant, the enemy commenced to throw three bridges over the Rappahannock, two at Fredericksburg and the third about 1 1/4 miles below, near the mouth of Deep Run." (Lee, 1862) Burnside's decision relied on his consideration that the enemy army would split and thus become weaker. However, he did not take into account his exposed position as well. Therefore, they came under fire, as the position of the latter proved to be much more advantageous. This was indeed the result of a miscalculation and of bad judgment.

At the same time, the disaster of Fredericksburg was also the result of a misuse of available forces. The conditions of the battle were indeed determined by the natural characteristics of both the terrain and the weather, as Burnside himself tried to explain "But for the fog and unexpected and unavoidable delay in building the bridges, which gave the enemy twenty-four hours more to concentrate his forces in his strong positions, we would almost certainly have succeeded; in which case the battle would have been, in my opinion, far more decisive than if we had crossed at the places first selected." (Burnside, 1862) Before deciding to launch the attack, a better mental image of the surroundings would have been imperative. According to all war tactics, this is done with the help of reconnaissance missions that would inform of the whereabouts of the enemy's location. Still, Burnside did not make use of his possibilities and therefore assumed the Confederate Army's position. Taking into account the limited visibility, the fog and the conditions in the area, mistakes were inevitable. Therefore, his decision not to take full advantage of his available resources also proved important for the outcome of the battle.