Gallipoli the Ethics of Gallipoli

Gallipoli

The Ethics of Gallipoli

The campaign at Gallipoli is not one of the better-known features of the First World War, especially outside Australia and Turkey. Historians and scholars have different opinions regarding the purpose, chances for success, and reasons for ultimate failure in this campaign, some of which are tangentially touched on in the Per Weir film, Gallipoli. Several of the battles as depicted in this film and according to many accounts of the true history of World War One were engaged in by battalions of Australian soldiers not because they were especially important in and of themselves, or because a high degree of success was perceived, but rather because a diversion was needed for more important maneuvers by British troops elsewhere in the region. The exact nature of these battles and the campaign as a whole has profound effects on the way this campaign is perceived in various ethical frameworks.

As John Stuart Mill eloquently and succinctly explains in, "What Utilitarianism Is," utilitarian ethics are derived form the principle that the greatest good to the greatest number of individuals is the hallmark of an ethical act or decision. As such, the diversionary tactics and sacrifices of the Australians at Gallipoli might be said to have been ethical, if it contributed to the saving of lives elsewhere and the overall success of the war effort (assuming that the Allies are fighting an ethically just war in the first place, of course). The film depicts the battles as largely senseless and the sacrifices as useless, however, meaning that the only people really affected by these battles were those that died and the ones they loved and were loved by, meaning that the battle cannot be considered ethical as it has only negative effects.

Immanuel Kant uses a far more complex argument in defining and defending his ethical framework in "Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals," but its application to this scenario is actually remarkably simple. Kant basically asserts that all acts are either ethically good or bad, and that this judgment does not depend upon the scenario in which the action is taking place or the ultimate effects of the action. Killing someone, for example, must be considered morally wrong, otherwise killing would always be right and we would all be dead very quickly. The campaign in Gallipoli, then, and indeed all warfare and any other situation wherein one man kills another, whether in a state-sponsored and approved manner or not, is inherently wrong and ethically unacceptable. This moral absolutism runs into problems when others aspects of the situation come into consideration -- it is wrong to disobey orders, for instance, and the fact that those orders command something that is ethically wrong doesn't influence the ethical violation of disobedience; it is also wrong not to prevent death, and this is supposedly what these soldiers are doing for others -- whether or not they succeed has nothing to do with the ethicality of their actions, according to Kant. This is one of the reasons that such absolute ethical theories are not often employed.