Geely Chinese Autos What Is the Issue/Problem

Geely Chinese Autos

What is the issue/problem for Geely?

By about 2006, as it made its first appearance at the Detroit Auto Show, Geely decided to be a trailblazer of sorts for the Chinese automotive manufacturing sector (text, page?

In particular, what it was doing was setting its sights on making itself one of that nation's standout original equipment manufacturers, enabling it and China as a whole to be more flexible to the fast evolving global purchasing markets. Many Chinese companies wanted to exercise their own levels of influence over the automotive sales market because it was already known that China would be the purchasing market of choice within just a few years (AlixPartners, 2011). Even though Chinese automobile manufacturing was growing well, for the most part companies in that nation were strong because they were partners of larger outside companies directly associated with Chinese initiatives (text, page?

). Geely was effectively taking for itself the opportunity to capitalize on what were well-known SWOT elements and doing so by using them to direct the forces of advancement that Porter and others have seen as being directly tied to customer appreciation and value.

So What? Why does this matter for Geely?

Management of Geely undertook a straightforward assessment of their circumstances and the market conditions and went public with how they were going to change their place among car making leaders (Geely Corporate Website, 2010). For example, prior to going public in Detroit, they would openly proclaim that they were the only Chinese company doing its independent research and development on transmissions manufacturing (text, Case 25). From about 2008 until 2010, these efforts started to unravel. The economic meltdown of U.S. sales should have enable Geely to advance rapidly.; but instead the American bailout and its impact on the economy shuffled the deck. GM, Ford and Chrysler found themselves in a different situation with public money to support their reorganizations. This gave the U.S. companies a new set of core competencies ranging from better pricing strategies to viable electric or hybrid designs. These advances would enable their customers to regain confidence at the same time that Geely was trying to overcome the perception that their "cheaper" cars were still of low and unacceptable quality. Geely would soon find that it could not directly compete on these levels even with strong SWOT elements; it had to do more and better assess other options.

Now What? The today and for tomorrow.

In early 2010, Geely set itself to adapt to these new dynamic conditions by confronting the forces of competition in other ways. For one thing, it bought the Ford Motor Company's Volvo component, giving it immediate European and safety credibility (Fangfang, 2010). That $1.8 billion sale corresponded perfectly to China's overall push toward becoming the world's largest producer. The company's own corporate presentation at this time identified its progressive strategies as centering on fundamental directives relating to sales volume expansion, new products (the company has 42 new models being readied by about 2015), its own rehabilitation of its existing facilities, a concerted effort to improve customer service and brand appeal, and a reinvigorated effort to turn to other global and strategic partnerships (Geely Company Website, 2010).