Gideon's trumpet and the right to counsel

Gideon's Trumpet -- not a trumpet of the will of the majority

The primary theme of the book Gideon's Trumpet, as opposed to the case "Gideon v. Wainwright" itself, is that the victory of the defendant was a victory for democracy. This is why the author Anthony Lewis asks the rhetorical question: "Is it consistent with democracy to let nine men appointed for life and directly answerable to no constituency to make ultimate decisions about the direction of our society? How free should a judge feel to set above the will of the people's elected representatives the principles that he finds in the Constitution? How does he find them, given the vague words and the conflicting interpretations of them by judges of the past?" (Lewis, p. 84) These phrases of Lewis suggest that Clarence Earl Gideon's triumph was a triumph of the inherently democratic impulse of the American system. Gideon, an ordinary man, finally gained the right to have professional counsel to assist him in his defense in a court of law. Until Gideon's case before the U.S. Supreme Court, not every defendant in America was unequivocally given this right.

However, another important reminder provided by Gideon's case is that the rights of defendants, particularly people who are accused of crimes by the respected representatives of the law, are never popular with the majority of the American public. "Winston Churchill once said that the true measure of a civilized society is how it treats people accused of crimes." ("Gideon v. Wainwright," 1963) Although a defendant is presumed innocent until he or she is proven guilty in a court of law, this is not always true in the court of public opinion, one of the reasons it is so difficult to find an objective jury in a high-profile case. Even in an ordinary legal case, it is difficult for a jury to mentally set aside the assumption that defendants come from disreputable backgrounds, as did Gideon. Even today, nothing angers the tabloid-reading public more to hear that a defendant who is very likely guilty has been freed, because the police did not read him his Miranda rights, or because the police improperly gathered the evidence on which the state's case rested without obtaining a legally valid warrant. In short, protecting the rights of criminal defendants will never be popular in a democracy, nor is it ever likely to be supported by the majority of the American populace. But, as observed by the Supreme Court in its decision, lawyers are rights, not luxuries, and even unsavory people have the same rights as the blameless and the innocent. ("Gideon v. Wainwright," 1963)

Herein lies the true, democratic impulse of the case -- if Gideon had been a wealthy man who was able to afford a good lawyer, he would likely never have been convicted of a crime. Of course, the decision of the court did not make the American justice system a level playing field for all defendants. A rich man or woman is often able to obtain a better lawyer than a poor person who can only afford to use the busy public defendant appointed by the court. Still, "Gideon v. Wainwright" made the justice system fairer to all defendants, regardless of their income level. Even if the decision might not be popular, wrote the court, "from the very beginning, our state and national constitutions and laws have laid great emphasis on procedural and substantive safeguards designed to assure fair trials before impartial tribunals in which every defendant stands equal before the law," and because these procedures are often very complicated to understand, "this noble ideal cannot be realized if the poor man charged with crime has to face his accusers without a lawyer to assist him," when he or she is striving to make a credible defense before a judge or jury. ("Gideon v. Wainwright," 1963)

Justice, and the work of the nine men (today, eight men and one women) on the court, is not always about the will of the majority of the American people, it is often about the rights of the individual. A case that demonstrates this principle even more vehemently is that of "Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka." In this instance, the school children of Topeka who were Black were denied the right to go to the same schools as their White counterparts, regardless of where they lived, the desires of their Black parents, or where their Black parents paid taxes. The will of the majority of the White residents held sway, until a dedicated band of activists and lawyers gave voice to the desire of the Black community to have equal rights for their children in Topeka.

The Supreme Court's interpretation of the community triumphed over prejudice, even though that prejudice was expressed by the will of the majority. "The plaintiffs contend that segregated public schools are not 'equal' and cannot be made 'equal,' and that hence they are deprived of the equal protection of the laws," wrote the court. ("Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 1954, p. 488) "Does segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race, even though the physical facilities and other 'tangible' factors may be equal, deprive the children of the minority group of equal educational opportunities? We believe that it does," even though the majority of the population of the state of Kansas might think otherwise. ("Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 1954, p.493)