Global terrorism: causes, impacts, and counterterrorism strategies

Global Terrorism

Strangling Terror:

A Policy Memo on the Problems, Strategies, and Recommendations of Terrorism Funding

Terrorism is a threat of the modern age. The increase in influence of the non-state actor in the 21st century is most evidently shown by the vast network of non-geographically-based terror cells, they are able to maintain their connections through several means of money transfer and secure banking between intermediaries. To make matters worse, there is a constant supply of fresh financial donors to the cause of terrorism. Shadowy figures who inhabit every dark crack of the world, seeking to expand the capabilities of the network through recruitment of young men to fight. When in pursuit of terrorists, it is often very important to track money flows into terror havens. Money transactions form a web between terrorist cells, easily traced due to several measures put in place by the United States after the events of 9/11.

Problem:

The terror networks of the world rely on money transfers for funding. Despite causing havoc and death around the globe, terrorists are able to still receive donations from supporters around the globe. These networks work out of nations less friendly to the U.S., and therefore it is impossible to cut off flow from banks in these nations. The Gulf States in particular are wary of allowing any U.S. intervention into domestic affairs. Furthermore, money transfers are received in multiple currencies, the Euro and the Dollar being the most common, but also Swiss Francs, British Pounds, UAE Dirham, and the Russian rubles. This means tracing money will be more difficult, and therefore a plan to investigate terror financing across all currencies must be perceived.

The problem of donations into terror cells is a problem between states and financial rules adopted for international money transfer. There is still a problem of money movement outside of the banking structure, in the form of Hawala. Hawala is a system of middle men who take payments between clients, for a small fee. The middle men are trusted members of their community, and therefore large sums of money move between nations without a single credit or debit into a formal banking system. The middle man is a traditional role played in the Arab world, and has extended itself into terrorist networks. The primary defense against Hawala middle men is to discredit the terrorist networks among the Arab community, alongside revealing middle men who accept payments between terrorist financiers. Because the business of the middle man is based entirely on reputation, there is a heavy price to be paid for submitting oneself to operating a Hawala network in the eyes of liberal and moderate Muslims.

Strategy:

The U.S. Intelligence community has formulated some strategies to stem the flow of money into terrorist cells. Many of these strategies for domestic terrorism come from the PATRIOT Act and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The PATRIOT Act advances electronic surveillance authority for law enforcement, permits the government to detain suspected terrorists, monitors domestic financial transactions, and expands the monitoring of foreign students. (Combs, 2006, p. 249). The PATRIOT Act is unique in that it allows for these measures to be conducted within the U.S., by law enforcement officials. CIA operatives have been using these tools for decades in foreign lands, but U.S. citizens have always been protected from surveillance by the CIA. These tools give law enforcement everything they need to conduct effective policing and overarching security to the nation from domestic terrorist threats.

To address the particular problem of international financial flows, the tactics of pointing out organizations to foreign governments has worked well. Since 9/11, the U.S. has successfully stopped terror financing with the help of such countries as Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom, and other European nations, as well as organizations like the United Nations and the Financial Action Task Force. (Vardi, N. 2010). This strategy has limited al-Qaeda's funds from what they were in the 1990s, and the entire structure of the organization has changed as a result. Al-Qaeda was once a very top-down organization, but as financing for this is expensive, the core of al-Qaeda has given more autonomy to its various cells. This autonomy usually comes with instructions on what targets to hit, but with no available source of financing for the cell. This weakening core is not necessarily a sign of al-Qaeda becoming weaker, but more likely that it is simply adapting to the conditions on the battle field. It only takes a small amount of explosives in a particularly sensitive location for al-Qaeda to achieve maximum effectiveness in its terror campaign.