The relationship between globalization and democracy

Globalization and Democracy

"Some argue that [democracy and globalization] go hand in hand -- that unrestricted international transactions encourage political accountability and transparency and that politically free societies are least likely to restrict the mobility of goods and services. Others argue that democracies, in which special interests that suffer from foreign competition have voice, are more likely to have closed markets and vice versa" (Eichengreen, et al., 2007, p. 289).

The concept of globalization is seen by some as a new phenomenon, a concept that emerged due to the digital revolution, and due to the remarkable advances in communication and information that link states and companies with a surprising immediacy though they be in far-flung parts of the world. Globalization has been called a curse for the developing world, and it has also been referred to as the path to a better economic future in terms of the marketing of goods and services. But the linkage between globalization and democracy has apparently not been as thoroughly reviewed and critiqued as other aspects of globalization, and this paper delves into the impact -- positive and negative -- to democracy that globalization has created.

The History of Globalisation -- Why it Matters

UCLA Professor David Wilkinson presents an essay in the book Globalization and Global History that puts an historic and contemporary perspective on the concept of globalization that, in a scholarly way, sets the record straight. The most poignant issue he raises at the outset -- after pointing out that globalization is "an enlargement" of "human social progress" or alternatively globalization is an expansion of "human-driven ecological processes" -- refers to processes and time (Wilkinson, 2006, p. 63). "Which…human or human-driven processes have in the past expanded from local to global scope, or are doing it now?" (Wilkinson, 63). After asking that question, the professor launches into an interesting and relevant essay on globalization and history -- and in effect, globalization's current impact on democracy. In this, he takes a positivist viewpoint, indicating what is real rather than what should be happening.

Wilkinson notes that globalization is not a new movement and it did not emerge after the Second World War, nor did it come into being after the Cold War. It is much older than that, he insists. Meanwhile he mentions (cryptically) those who mock globalization. He alludes to the "narrow concept" that some "anti-globalists" see vis-a-vis the potential "nightmare" that every one in the world would be drinking Starbucks coffee, fattening up on McDonald's burgers, shopping at Wal-Mart, or engaging in another slice of life that cultural / global homogeneity brings forth.

On a more scholarly note, Wilkinson explains that the actual globalization of political movements "has been underway since the French Revolution began the export of liberal democracy by force and propaganda" (64). The globalization of "multinational intervention" -- a "landmark" -- goes back to the Boxer rebellion in Manchu China in 1900, Wilkinson explains, when a number of nations intervened in that conflict in China.

Some might say the globalization of warfare began with the First and Second World Wars albeit Wilkinson goes back to the 17th century when the French and British battled in India and in America (65). The author references a number of other events in history that could be referred to as the launch of globalization. In one sentence he settles on a "…5,000-year timescale for globalization as a process" but in the next sentence he references "human history" having begun in Africa when the first primates began scattering to distant location on the planet; and that, he asserts, was the launch of the globalization of the species, a "…prerequisite of all other globalizations, and a mystery and a marvel as well" (66).

Will democracy survive given the possibility of long-term globalization? Physical processes most often have "limits," he remarks. That human / political limit might be: a) a world economy-ecology that responds to explosive population growth with a "long cycle of global famines, epidemics and disporas"; b) a new plague (like the Black Plague) could arrive because of the failure of "high-tech food production systems"; or c) the social pressures likely will continue to drive "social reconfiguration" as has been the case since the dawn of human existence (68-69).

Meanwhile Dr. Joachim Karl Rennstich -- an associate professor of political science at Fordham University -- uses the extended evolutionary world politics (EWP) framework to show that globalization is "essentially evolutionary" and indeed has roots going back to 900 BCE (Rennstich, 2006, pp. 184-185). Globalization is not "a unique occurrence" that began with industrialization in the 20 century, he insists, using a positivist approach. Instead, he traces economic and political processes to the Sung Dynasty in 930 BCE, including the development of paper, of printing, and the invention of the actual mechanical clock (Rennstich, 186). In 1190 there was the "Commercial / Nautical Revolution" (on the Black Sea) and in 1430 ocean trade began. Clearly, the concept of trade on the high seas conjures up images of the beginning of globalization.

The Phoenicians became a leading trading and seafaring power around 1,100 BCE, using their longboats and galleons in the Indian and Atlantic Oceans and the Mediterranean; this has to be seen as a globalizing era in world history, and hence, Rennstich has made his point well.

Everything has gone Global: But has Democracy been left behind?

With the fall of the Berlin Wall, new horizons, new hopes, and new markets were to open up in a democratic world. This was the "…unchallenged victory of the market and democracy," writes Yves Meny, professor at the European University Institute in Italy (Meny, 2010, p. 259). However, the transition from Cold War paranoia and tension to western values "…did not lead to moderation, but the opposite." (Meny, 260) and while "everything has become global" -- the marketing of goods, the circulation of ideas, money, values and people -- Meny believes that the issues and problems have followed the same pattern" (260).

In other words, democracy has not been part of the globalization package, and globalization has been taken from the hands those who "masterminded" and "initiated" modern globalization, Meny continues, adding that globalization is now at warp speed and moving in a direction nobody is "…able to control" (260).

Global Governance and Democracy

A group of prominent scholars and policymakers are presenting the idea that "global governance" (an apparent product of the politics of globalization) is "inherently undemocratic" simply because it tends to undermine "popular sovereignty" (Goodhart, et al., 2011, p. 1047). This tension is real, the authors argue, because global governance can undermine constitutional government by "ceding legislative authority to unelected and unaccountable entities" (Goodhart, 1047). Goodhart, a political science professor at the University of Pittsburgh, points to the European Union as an example of global governance, which seems to the "new sovereigntists" (those fearing usurpation of democratic power) to be eroding democratic control and individual freedom (1048).

And while Goodhart and colleague do not agree with the new sovereigntists (some call this group a bunch of "cranks" that lack "intellectual credibility"), Goodhart understands that part of the viewpoint they extol is basically correct. That said, Goodhart believes that global governance, if pushed too far into sovereign nations' doings, can in fact undermine popular sovereignty as "a viable conception of democracy" but it is not doing that and in fact, in a globalized world that is increasingly interdependence needs a new kind of democracy. The new sovereigntists' views are normative while Goodhart's are more along the lines o positivism. Basically, Goodhart argues that in a globalized world, global governance arrangements (such as certain actions and components of the United Nations) can strengthen constitutional democracy, and it can do this by "…limiting the power of special interest, securing individual rights, enhancing the quality of democratic deliberation, and increasing capacities to achieve important public purposes" (1051).

In concluding, Goodhart explains that while globalization is not easy to define in simple terms, at a "minimum it connotes increasing global interdependence," which, when aimed towards a more democratic world order, can only be a good thing (1055).

The English School

Andrew Linklater describes the English School as an approach to international politics (from the distinctly British perspective) that embraces the idea that sovereign states do form a society, but that society is "an anarchic" society in that the citizens do not have to bow down to a "higher power" (Linklater, 2009, p. 84). The English School can be described in general as more positivist than normative in that it sees states as they are rather than what they should be. Linklater believes that members of the English School "seem distinctively realist at times" and moreover the English School argues that international relations is based on gravitating towards "the middle ground, never wholly reconciling themselves to either point-of-view" (that is, realism or idealism) (85).

What does the English School believe about globalization and democracy? First of all, in recent years the English School has taken a more "explicitly normative stance on questions of poverty and human rights" which is something of a departure because during the Cold War years the English School stressed the importance of "…order rather than justice or prosperity" (Linklater, 88). Secondly, the modern society of states -- this being the first "truly global one" -- does not depend on an "international political culture" in the same way the European society of states depended on a shared political culture in the nineteenth century (Linklater, 90). Moreover, there is a "growing consensus" in the West vis-a-vis the need for "democratic government" in the international community, or at least some kind of constitutional safeguards for "human rights" (Linklater, 97). If democracy is to be promoted in the developing nations, to "…achieve justice for the peoples of the Third World," there has to be a "radical redistribution of power and wealth from the North to the South, Linklater explains (101). One of the hopes for global stability is that the international community must take responsibility for states "…which are no longer economically or politically viable" (Linklater, 102).

Conclusion

At the top of this paper Eichengreen explains that there are competing arguments as to whether globalization promotes (or helps) democracy, or not. On page 293 Eichengreen notes that the idea of globalization leading to the positive promotion of democratic ideas is not new, but in fact Kant (1795), Schumpeter (1950), Lipset (1959) and Hayek (1960) all had the same belief: free trade and capital flows, and a fair distribution of resources, does raise incomes and does in fact lead to the kind of economic development (in any country, rich or poor) that "fosters demands, for democracy." That is the philosophy that this paper embraces. Although conflicting views of globalization and democracy are presented, the bottom line for this paper is that globalization is not the culprit that some believe it is, and in fact, given the dynamics that Eichengreen puts forward, globalization can and does enhance democratic values.