Google's Project Kennedy: unifying design across products and platforms

¶ … Business: Google Glass

Design for Business: Analysis of Google Glass

Google's rapid dominance of online search, contextual advertising, mobile operating system and application development initially created a polyglot of visual languages, design guidelines and paradigms. Products looked, operated and interacted inconsistently with each other, a strategic weakness that Larry Page quickly addressed when he was appointed CEO in January, 2011 (Google Investor Relations. 2014). An initial project to unify all design, development and user experience standards into a single, cohesive platform, code named Kanna, had failed (Hamburger, 2014). Undaunted by that failure, Larry Page made consistency of design guidelines, visual languages and the development of cohesive, company-wide design frameworks and direction his top priority. Called Project Kennedy, Mr. Page quickly initiated a company-wide redesign of all Google products and services to a common standard, which was particularly challenging when the variations in Apple iOS vs. Google Android mobile operating systems were taken into account (Hamburger, 2014). Larry Page also chose to seek outside design expertise and created the Google Creative Lab (Google Investor Relations. 2014). During the company-wide redesign, the Google Creative Lab would prove to be instrumental in providing expertise and alleviating potential areas of design debate.

The three critical success factors that led to Project Kennedy's success include the following. First, executive sponsorship of this corporate-wide redesign program was essential for it to succeed. Google's cultural fabric is designed to flex for innovation yet be strong and scalable enough to support rapid, unconventional and often nonconformist ideas (Iyer, Davenport, 2008). This attribute of the Google culture, tightly interwoven deliberately by senior managements' support of innovation (Klie, 2010) is critically important for the success of any strategic, widely defined design initiative. Project Kennedy succeeded because Larry Page provided a transformational vision of how Google would be more agile and responsive to users, while also delivering an excellent user experience (Hamburger, 2014). Project Kanna most likely failed because it took a more compartmentalized view of the design process and the project leaders failed to define a compelling vision for how all of Google could benefit from the major effort a company-wide redesign initiative is. The first critical success factor of Google's success with Project Kennedy was the transformational leadership and clear vision Larry Page provided, which mobilized departments to work together and make the vision a reality. He infused ownership into the company to improve by doing all this. The second critical success factor was the level of collaboration that was attained during the Project Kennedy attained internally. This was particularly relevant given how different the challenges are for designing Google Maps for the Apple iOS vs. Google Android operating systems is (Hamburger, 2014). Both teams succeeded by having open, frequent discussions of how to best manage variations in how each operating system responded to Google programming commands for maps, for example. The third critical success factor was the ability of the diverse team of designers, developers and programmers to arrive at a consistent, corporate-wide visual language (Hamburger, 2014). Once this was achieved, redesign efforts accelerated as all development teams had a common foundation to work from and debates over direction where most likely minimized or eliminated altogether.

The Google Glass New Product Development Process

Google's new product development process is predicated on having smaller, faster-moving teams of highly qualified professionals collaborate with one another vs. relying on large-scale teams that are common in software development today (Steiber, Alange, 2013). Google chooses to do this for several reasons. First, it allows for greater agility and responsiveness in managing to their innovation frameworks. Second, Google has found smaller teams are more effective at translating the theoretical value of user-driven innovation, user-centered innovation, user-generated innovation and design-driven innovation into practice (Iyer, Davenport, 2008). Third, smaller teams have a multiplier effect in terms of making the benefits of exploration, iteration, experimentation, abductive reasoning, human-centered design and holistic or systematic thinking deliver results during the new product development process. Fourth, taking this approach to team formation and goal definition to align with the interactive model of innovation ensures the highest level of collaboration and communication possible (Silliker, 2013). All of these elements taken together are the catalysts of the innovation framework at Google.

Having smaller, faster-moving development teams vs. competitors is considered one of the main competitive advantages Google has, as the senior management teams often speak of making speed of development and delivery a core competitive advantage (Google Investor Relations. 2014). The seven phases of the new product development (NPD) process at Google include the following: idea generation; idea screening, concept development and testing; business analysis; market testing, technical implementation; and product launch. Google relies heavily on an integrative approach to consolidating only the best aspects of each innovation theory mentioned, while relying on their interactive innovation model framework (Silliker, 2013). Product development, hardware engineering, software development, and most importantly industrial design, are each integral to each phase of the Google NPD. What differentiates Google's interpretation of the seven-step NPD process is their strong emphasis on taking a hybrid approach to user-driven innovation, user-centered innovation, user-generated innovation and design-driven innovation. By having each member of the small development team active in each phase, Google is also able to make collaboration a catalyst of greater communication and trust (Klie, 2010). This is evident in the discussion of the design team at the 2013 Google I/O Conference (Google I/O Developer's Conference, 2013) and the insights shared by the lead industrial designer Isabelle Olsson regarding the NPD process for Google Glass (Hamburger, 2014).

Google has also engineered their NPD process to allow for continual experimentation, iteration, and the opportunity to modify core design elements quickly. This "fail fast" mentality is credited with having Google Glass quickly progress from a prototype that had functionality yet lacked usability. Google's approach to capitalizing on a series of innovation theories and then unifying them in a framework supports the agility and scalability of their NPD process (Cho, 2009). This can be seen in how the transition of Google Glass happened so rapidly yet team cohesion and product visions remained intact. When Google's senior management teams speak of speed as a feature and time-to-market, this is the aspect of their business model they are speaking of (Google Investor Relations. 2014). The high value Google places on iteration is exemplified in the lessons learned from the successful Kennedy Project (Hamburger, 2014) and is also reflected in how the industrial design elements of Google Glass are integral to every phase of the NPD process (Google I/O Developer's Conference, 2013).

The Role of Designers in the NPD Process for Google Glass

Google is very focused on creating teams that excel at communication, collaboration and are able to interpret and turn concepts into prototypes quickly (Klie, 2010). Google Glass exemplifies the company's approach to structuring teams by initially having a product, software and industrial designer form the core Google Glass team (Google I/O Developer's Conference, 2013). As Google's design philosophy is firmly based on the hybrid integration of user-driven, user-centered, user-generated and design-driven innovation theories unified by their own approach to interpreting the Interactive Model as mentioned in our course, industrial designers are often the de facto leaders of these groups. Accentuating industrial designers' role as de factor leader is how tightly user-centered design is interwoven into the company's culture (Silliker, 2013). It is common to find industrial designers at Google with master's degrees in human-computer studies or ergonomics being assigned to projects that have significant risk. This was the case with Google Glass, who was assigned Isabelle Olsson as lead industrial designer. As her decisions regarding user experience and user design form the constraints software engineering, led by Charles Mendes and product design including project management led by Steve Lee, must adhere to, she defines the current and future roadmap for the Google Glass product line.

Isabel Olsen has often said the initial product prototype looked like a "phone attached to a scuba mask" (Google I/O Developer's Conference, 2013). She immediately redefined the design objectives of Google Glass away from the purely functional to lightness, simplicity and scalability. These three design objectives in turn drove multiple iterations of user design sessions and the continual refinement of the product concept. Isabel Olsen immediately also realized that Google entering in the wearable technology arena was one fraught with risk. She also set the design parameters of ensuring Google Glass would have an intuitive, immediate and intuitive user experience, one that could easily be modified to the user's specific needs. She says that taking a "reductionist" approach to development is what led to the success of the design overall (Google I/O Developer's Conference, 2013). In a 2014 interview, she remarked how the initially the design team began sketching the first prototypes by hand, then drew them in Adobe Illustrator or another available 2D program. Figure 1 shows the outcomes of these initial efforts to design Google Glass.

Figure 1: Initial hand-drawn prototypes of Google Glass

Source: (Pallister, 2014)

Figure 2 shows Isabel Olsen wearing the first Google Glass prototype she was given at the beginning of the project. Today's Google Glass design is in large part due to her influence and leadership of the development team's efforts at delivering a more effective and valuable user experience. In conclusion, Google Glass would not have survived and become a viable product without the leadership of Isabel Olsen as Lead Industrial Designer.

Figure 1: Isabel Olsen, Lead Industrial Designer, Google Glass at Google I/O 2013

Source video from:Google I/O Developer's Conference. May 15 -- 17, 2013

The Impact of Google Glass on the Company's Financial Performance

Google Glass has not attained the level of financial results that Google intiaially forecast (Google Investor Relations, 2014). Google's internal estimates are that the product could be worth as much as $3.27B by 2017 or 3.7% of Google's estimates $86.4B projected revenue for that year (Google Investor Relations, 2014). Google cites industry analysts that have estimated 64,500 Google Glass sets will be sold by 2017 if the price points was dropped from the cost-prohibitive $1,500 per unit to $349. As of December, 2014 Google is apparently unwilling to experiment with the price elasticity of the device however. According to internal estimates and those of financial analysts following the company, there is the potential for Google Glass to be a $3B business within the next two years if pricing and marketing are coordinated more effectively (Ritson, 2013). Google's continual efforts to bring Google Glass into the mainstream have been for the most part unsuccessful (Google Investor Relations, 2014).

What's needed is a more focused approach to their Google Explorer program on vertical markets. The Google Explorer program began selling Glass to the general public and initial forecasts were bullish, with high demand forecasted (Albanesius, 2014). The public beta of the program didn't materialize however, as many skeptics and cynics had forecasted nearly two years ago (Bajarin, 2013). What Google Glass lacks today is a more concerted, laser-like focus on specific vertical market needs (Banks, 2013). There is only a nascent effort today at breaking into vertical markets with little focus from the development community. With demand lacking for Glass, developers have slowly begun to abandon the platform (Koebler, 2013).

The lack of demand and the backlash from many consumers with regard to privacy continue to limit the market acceptance of Glass. There are bars and restaurants in San Francisco who today forbid patrons from wearing Google Glass, which has led to journalists creating Google Glass etiquette guidelines (Dumenco, 2014). No one wants to be considered a "glasshole" either, which is a person who obtrusively uses Glass to record conversations and pays more attention to the device than the person they are talking to (Dumenco, 2014). As a result of these concerns, Google recently band facial recognition software development on the platform (Poeter, 2013).

For Google to succeed with Google Glass it will need to find more industry specific applications including manufacturing (Gould, 2014), healthcare (Halamka, 2013), transportation and logistics (Mlot, 2014), made-to-order industrial equipment intelligent, wearable technology (Moscaritolo, 2014), field service (Soubra, 2013), and retailing including bar coding sensors and planogram support in stores (Strange, 2013).

All of these vertical markets need to be managed to a series of analytics and dashboards showing shipments and revenue by vertical market to further fund future development. Google Glass will succeed in the enterprise first and then eventually find adoption in broader society. Google miscalculated the societal backlash to having a camera always-on within a pair of glasses, capable of recording and immediately posting video to the Web. These technical aspects of the platform are perfect for enterprises however who require an intensive level of monitoring form manufacturing shop floors for example

Conclusion

Google's senior management team continues to be very deliberate in their approach to create a tightly woven culture of innovation that has the potential to accelerate new product development while ensuring excellent design. Unlike all of their competitors, Google's initial project teams include senior-level industrial designers, often with advanced degrees in human-computer interaction and ergonomics (Pallister, 2014). A core belief and value of the Google culture is that user-centered design is essential for the success of each application, product or service and the company's future success depends on this being consistently achieved (Iyer, Davenport, 2008). Of the many factors that contribute to Google' success from a design standpoint is the foundation created by the hybrid integration of user-driven, user-centered, user-generated and design-driven innovation. In studying Google's reliance on innovation theories, it's also evident that industrial designers have significant freedom to define new products thanks in large part to the pervasive adoption of the interactive model of innovation. Google has deliberately built its innovation processes and frameworks on the interactive model of innovation to provide designers with the agility, flexibility and freedom to create exceptional products that deliver excellent user experiences. With these scalable yet stable foundational elements in place, industrial designers are able to deliver exceptional products including Google Glass.

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