Diversionary effects of war by US presidents

Government - the Diversionary Effects of War by U.S. Presidents

The world we live in seems to be one of the most important periods in the history of humanity, as no other epoque has seen more development in terms of technology, information, and psychological manipulation. Indeed, this is the result of evolution and revolutions. However at the same time, it can be said that there are some precepts which fail to become dissolute. In this sense, in the 18th century theories have argued what today can be justified. Carl von Clausevitz considered after the French Prussian conflicts that in fact, wars represent just politics conducted with different means. Nowadays, when future offers humanity endless possibilities of traveling, thought, nanotechnology, it also ensures that populations, no matter its degree of intellectual development, can be manipulated, and politicians can consider politics in terms of war, without the traditional dimensions of the conflict in itself.

Precisely due to the fact that politics has been conducted with different means has made scholars consider the role of wars in framing politics, internal and foreign ones. The scope of this analysis is to review the literature focusing on the level to which wars have been used as a diversionary force by U.S. presidents. Is diversionary war being used, as has it been used in the past, to distract the public opinion, the masses, and the analysis from other political issues?

There had been much research into the issue, but the results have been collectively inconclusive, as pointed out by who argues that "the diversionary theory of the use of force must be subjected to more intensive theoretical scrutiny and rigorous testing to determine more precisely its validity." The findings continue to contradict themselves, as there are several points of reference scholars take into account when trying to deal with this topic, from the actual definition of the term to the reasons for which presidents do chose to consider war as internal politics.

There are several questions the review will address:

1) What are the key questions that scholars have attempted to answer?

2) How has the field's understanding of the issue changed over time (if at all)?

3) What have been and are the key disagreements in the field on the topic?

Each question however is prone to major disagreements, not so much from the point-of-view of their considerations (which will be deal with in the answer to question 3), but from that of their similar approaches but different results. These shall be discussed at all three points by stressing the weaknesses of the theories presented.

The subject at hand is important to be considered largely due to the fact that it would offer a wider understanding on the way and means with which war is conducted, thus addressing an issue which is useful for a better image of internal politics and how it is conducted with the aid of foreign politics. It can be said that, regardless of the inconclusive evidence in terms of a coherent literature on the matter, wars are waged and, as a result, internal, domestic politics change. The ratio between these two elements remains to be discussed further.

What are the key questions that scholars have attempted to answer?

Scholars have tried to consider the matter of war as a diversionary force by addressing several points. The first and one of the most important one relates to the actual notion of "diversionary war" in the political context. In this sense, Jack S. Levy considers the matter as being on the same societal level as the "Marxist- Leninist theory of imperialism." He rallies to the concept of the "diversionary theory of war" as being "the idea that political elites often embark on adventurous foreign policies or even resort to war in order to distract popular attention away from internal social and economic problems and consolidate their own domestic political support." Indeed, this idea is generally acknowledge as being part of the notion of "diversionary war."

Another definition of the term also points out the connection of domestic politics to international politics. In this sense, "diversionary uses of force (is) employing force by the commander in chief to distract the public from deteriorating political conditions at home"

In fact, scholars tend to relate war to the conduct of international politics, thus inevitably relating it to the words of von Clausevitz centuries ago. More precisely, Wiliam Baker, when presenting his own views on the way in which the diversionary war theory is discussed, points out the three directions of thought on this matter. He mentions three lines of action, "One school of thought begins with the observation that, for most incumbents, public approval moves ineluctably downward from the first day in office; (...)a second school of thought emphasizes the domestic and international contexts in which the president operates and to which presidential popularity responds (...) the third school of thought accepts this relationship between public approval and environmental stimuli, but emphasizes instead the symbolic nature of the presidency and the potential for ameliorating the negative impact of events in the domestic and international arenas through political drama and effective public relations strategies."

Baker's framing of the notion of diversionary war reflects in fact the idea agreed by most of those who support the notion of diversionary war as a political tool by relating it to the public and the public approval as the most important aspect for the president in offices. It is easy to note that the three lines of thought, more or less, are related to the acceptance of the presidency, be it on the domestic scene (the first and partially the second case) or the international scene (the third case). Therefore, it can be said that one element which is defining for the idea of "diversionary war" is its strict connection with both the domestic policy and the international one.

Nonetheless, there are scholars who are circumspect in making this connection between domestic and international, as a starting point for the definition of "diversionary war." Thus, "although the diversionary theory of international conflict is intuitively plausible and is supported by much anecdotal evidence, quantitative tests generally have failed to establish a systematic link between domestic political troubles and foreign policy adventurism." However, he contends that in order to have a better view of the possible ways war is or is not used in domestic politics is to understand the role domestic politics has in framing international politics decisions. Therefore, regardless of the validity of the assumption that diversionary war is a means for conducting domestic politics, or its applicability on the American case, the general idea relates to the connection between the domestic and international politics.

A second point which is important for the scholars to consider when discussing the issue of "diversionary war" is related to the reason for which diversionary war is used. There are several points to take into account as there is little agreement on the matter.

One of the main reasons stressed in the literature is the use of diversionary war as a means of influencing public opinion. In this sense, it is argued that "presidents have routinely used military force to raise their public approval rating, divert attention from a weak economy, and bolster their party's chances in national elections." The idea is confirmed by Phillips who argues that "no one should be surprised if President Bush sought to divert attention from the budget deficit and savings and loan scandal by taking military action against Iraq, arguing that he would not be the first president to act forcefully abroad for partisan advantage." The media tends to play an increasing role in this matter, as the attention cannot be extended in the same manner to both internal and external considerations at the same time. Therefore, taking into account the fact that an international threat represents the supreme menace to the security and the actual existence of the people of the country, it will receive more attention than the traditional and omnipresent aspects related to unemployment or poor state of the economy.

Another reason for which diversionary war is considered to be used, in terms of support and consideration for the theory is the image of the presidency and the way in which the administration is perceived home and abroad. In this sense, it has been argued that 'among the most important concerns presidents consider when confronted with an opportunity to use force is the need to appear forceful and strong to both international and domestic audience. The president's reputation as a credible protector of the United States' international interests, its allies, and Americans abroad rests in large part on his willingness to take forceful action when such interests are threatened. To do less would be to risk creating an impression of weakness among adversaries, allies, neutrals, and the American public." This would a good aspect to consider especially during the Cold War when the image of the opponent was the most important aspect of the confrontation between the two sides. In this respect, it was not the reality which mattered but rather the perception of that reality. Most of the times during the Cold War, but especially after the fall of the Iron Curtain, the reality showed that the perception of the Russian Soviets as the strongest forces in the world was often not true. Still it motivated the U.S. To consider all sorts of side games to defeat the communist threat, which in fact was not as big as considered throughout the decades.

Diversionary war has its own motivation in terms of psychological impact on the population. People tend to view the international threat as being the ultimate point of reference for danger. The state in itself is the most trusted instrument for the insurance of security, and an international threat constitutes the questioning of this establishment. More precisely, it has been argued that "as the leader of one of the world's great powers, the president of the United States is charged with the responsibility of guiding and implementing policies to protect and advance U.S. interests abroad. This is an onerous responsibility; the fortunes of various presidents have risen or fallen on the basis of the American's public satisfaction with their performances in this capacity. Moreover, the role of engaging one's forces abroad can be simplified by concluding that "an external threat fosters cohesion within a country." Moreover, Morgan and Bickers point out that the ratings of a president tend to rise when he uses military force on the base of the assumption that he is acting as commander in chief for the protection of the American interests' abroad.

The weaknesses to these theories, that the decision to wage war is dependent on the way in which the president is perceived by the public opinion and that it represents a means to conduct domestic politics are pointed out especially by Mernik who argues that the president must have the opportunity to use war as a diversionary technique. This is strongly related to factors such as "threats to the territorial security of the U.S., its current allies, major clients, or proxy states; a perceived danger to U.S. government, military, or diplomatic personnel (...) events that have led, or likely to lead to advances by ideologically committed opponents of the U.S. (...) events likely to lead to losses of U.S. influence in regions perceived as within the U.S. sphere of influence (...) events involved inter-state military conflict of potential consequence.

Even with an opportunity to wage wars, empirical studies have pointed out, as suggested by Mernik, that in 213 occasions in which these opportunities were present, no military action was conducted. This comes to point out the fact that there are some aspects which are determinant for the decision to take a military action. Indeed, as Mernik stressed, there are three main points to take into account when considering military action: the interests of the Americans, the image of the president on the domestic field, and the limitation for confrontation with the Soviet Union. While the first two are still applicable, the third one focused precisely on the Cold War era. However, the statements are considered in order to counter statements made during the Cold War, when a direct confrontation with the Soviet Union would have raised serious questions for the resolution of the lingering side conflicts that took place after the end of the Second World War.

The major discontent concerning the idea of using international force to distract the public attention from domestic problems is that even when all the elements were present, such as a positive perspective on the president, and an increasing approval rate, the decision to actually use military force was not taken.

Another weakness considered by those arguing against the use of diversionary war is that according to major theories arguing the cohesion of groups around the possibility of a threat cannot be fully supported. In this sense, it is argued that the nation-state represents the expression of a wide diversity of groups. In this sense it is rather difficult to comprehend the unity of all the groups making up the state in order to give legitimacy to a foreign policy decision. More precisely, Clifton and Bickers argue that "it is not clear that the assumption that external enemies rally internal support is as well founded as it first appears. Levy (1989) points out that the argument draws heavily from the sociological literature showing that an external threat increases the cohesiveness of a small group (e.g., Simmel 1955; Coser 1956). Extending these findings from small group behavior to organizations as large and complex as nation-states is, at the very least, problematic. States consist of many groups that may be seriously at odds with one another and, in some cases, may even feel less enmity toward foreign groups than toward competing domestic interests." Therefore, the outcome may actually be opposite to the aim of unity behind a certain international threat.

This discrepancy in the theory is given in particular to the different points of reference taken by scholars. In this sense, it is pointed out that the weakness of this idea is given by the lack of a substantial survey. More precisely, only certain groups are taken as reference, and not the entire population. This can be argued by considering that what is important is the majority and not the unanimity; however, it cannot be said, according to Clifton and Bickers, that an intervention outside the borders of the United States insures a definite level of acceptance for the president and its administration.

Another point which comes to consider a weak aspect of the theory regarding the diversionary war theory is related to the possibility of the president and commander in chief to take on unilateral decisions. While the supporters of the diversionary war consider that in fact the decision to go to war is not dependent necessarily on the opportunity to do so, others suggest that in fact the desire and opportunity to go to war for political purposes depend on the personality of the president. More precisely, "every president makes decisions and establishes his foreign policymaking processes differently. While institutional pressures and limitations exist for every president, the process and presidential 'style' especially during military decisions appear to be strongly based on a president's individual preferences."

It cannot be argued a generalized opinion on the matter of choice for the military intervention as a means of increasing its public support. There are several examples in which presidents did not intervene, not because they failed the opportunity to do so, or because the public opinion would have disapproved of its intention, but rather because it was not the best solution for the conflict at hand. One of the most eloquent examples in this sense was the Kennedy administration's decision not to enter in conflict with the Soviet Union during the Cuban Missile crisis. Indeed the situation represented a threat to the national security of the American population and during that period the nuclear threat was the worst case scenario for any administration. Despite the fact that the approval ratings for President Kennedy were comfortable, he refused to enter open conflict with President Khrushchev, a decision many disagreed of after the de-escalation of the conflict. From this point-of-view, it may seem plausible that not all opportunities for intervention are taken in order to boost the domestic support. Critic theory points out that the decision is also depending on the personality of the president and its decision making perspectives.

Moreover, this aspect is important because it also offers a counterargument for those who support the idea that diversionary war is also conducted to maintain the prestige of the American presidency. Kennedy's example is again worthy of mention.

Finally another weakness which stretches not only to the actual reasons for the use of force as a diversion but also to its actual definition is the limited data available for analysis. In this sense, James Meernik points out that "most data sets on the political use of military force contain data pertaining only to situations where force was used and not to those occasions where presidents refrained from deploying the military." Moreover, Meerick stresses that "we have no way to evaluate presidential decision making when a use of force was considered, but not utilized. We are forced to assume that presidential decision making in a quarter when no use of force took place is analogous to decision making in a crisis where no force was used."

Referring to the possibility of scholars to predict the use of force in terms of time periods he argues that little is known about the way in which possible uses of force were deterred and resulted in non-violent situation. More precisely, it is the matter of having the information at hand for both cases in which force was used and was not used. Therefore, information appears more visible for the situations in which war was in fact waged and covered by the media. Therefore, it is rather difficult to consider the degree to which temptations were resisted and other situations in which war was the elected choice.

How has the field's understanding of the issue changed over time (if at all)?

The issue has been widely debated especially since the period of the Cold War. However, after the demise of the Soviet Union, the existence of an ultimate enemy was put into question. In this sense, the focus of the analysis changed over time, not necessarily from the point-of-view of the theoretical aspect, but most importantly in terms of the points of reference.

In this sense, there are several considerations made by scholars who try to set a line between the influence of the domestic policy and the international one. Therefore, William Baker notes that "the popular presumption that presidents will turn to military adventurism to divert attention from dismal economic conditions, faltering popularity ratings or pending electoral misfortune is well represented both historically and in the mainstream media, and owes much to the in-group/out-group hypotheses found in the sociological literature." However, in the Cold War era, the idea of presidential acceptance was considered a side effect, taking into account that the threat of nuclear conflict was more important for the public opinion as an element of threat to the actual survival of the population. Still, the theory of in-group/out group can also be used in this time frame as well. Thus, also known as the conflict-cohesion hypothesis, it argues that conflict with an "out-group" increases the cohesion and political centralization of the "in-group." This dynamic is a positive case for the social and psychological aspects of the diversionary use of force.

While little could have been said in terms of theory during the Cold War, after the first Gulf war, scholars have tried to point out the possibility of the use of diversionary force as a means of distracting the public opinion. In this sense, Baker underlines the fact that as opposed to the Cold War actions when few questioned the interventions of the U.S. In terms of diversions, after the Cold War, these came to be important questions, also due to the information that became available. Thus, "Later research however has found evidence to suggest that domestic politics does play some role in the foreign policy decisions of national leaders. In recent decades, statistical evidence has suggested that presidential uses of force may indeed redound to the benefit of the chief-executive public approval ratings." Even more, he stresses that the issues related to the connection between the internal and foreign policies can be deceiving, taking into account the experience of President Bush in the reelection process, when, despite the fact that he registered an important approval rate during the Gulf War, he failed to win the reelection. This comes to point out that the relation between the in-group / out group is not very well determined and the use of force does not necessarily mean the approval of the public opinion, neither in the past nor in the present.

Another aspect which is important to consider as an issue to have changed in time is the actual theoretical perspective on the matter. In this sense, it can be said that the Cold War era was dominated by the realist state behavior. More precisely, this entangled a very calculated state behavior, as "many international relations theorists have treated (and tested) the diversionary hypothesis as a universal dictum of state behavior rather than as a partial explanation of some foreign policy decisions." However, the liberal line of thought, especially after the end of the Cold War which was not foreseen by the realists consider the importance of policy making and decision making in terms of the internal environment as well. Politicians tend to take into account the influence of the public opinion more than before, when the idea of security was considered to be beyond other decision making considerations.

Another aspect which is important for the way in which the perspective on diversionary war has changed is that nowadays, state behavior inside and outside depends on different level of discontent and appreciation. In this sense, it is fair to note that Clifton and Bickers argue on the way in which certain level of domestic discontent can be the reason for diversionary behavior and not war. Therefore, they ask the question of the proportionality of going to war as opposed to the level of internal conflict. More precisely, "most studies, following Rummel's (1963) lead, have sought to determine whether, over some specified period of time, those countries experiencing greater internal conflict also experience greater external conflict. if, however, all states engage in diversionary tactics, but have different internal conflict thresholds for doing so, it would be possible for empirical results based on such tests to be completely wrong." In this sense, it is difficult to consider a comparative set of analysis. As stated in the literature, some states may have different levels of supporting internal conflict, and at the same time, accepting international war as a diversionary means of conducting politics. However in case of different levels of acceptance, it is rather hard to consider a general belief that states use diversionary means to avoid consideration of internal difficulties. Therefore, from this point-of-view, the discussion cannot have a clear cut conclusion.

However, these nuances tend to appear especially after the Cold War because the public opinion has become more important in the state and there are more states which take these matters into account. The fact that the number of democracies has increased is also a factor to be taken into account. Especially with regional wars, the public opinion in small countries has an increased power in the eyes of the international community particularly because the level of democracy has increased and its area has expanded. Therefore, if during the Cold War period, these aspects were hidden under the nuclear threat, nowadays, should diversionary means be used, they should be proportional to their aim inside the country, to the level in which they try to influence public opinion in their own country.

From this point-of-view, there are several levels of diversionary means, not necessarily implying violent action, but a political use of the war. It is considered that diplomacy should be the first measure to be taken. but, as Hendrickson suggests, the realist line of thought considers the national interest to be above the moral values diplomatic means entangle. In this sense, "the national interests and not the moral values should guide American foreign policy (...) nonetheless diversionary theorists have a difficult burden to meet. Diversionary uses of force are those military strikes that are used for mostly political rather than strategic purposes. By definition a diversionary use of force should be conducted when diplomacy remains a distinct option over military action. American military strikes or even threats should be disproportionate to the degree of threat experienced from the 'enemy'. Thus, in a diversionary use of force, the military strike on a foreign target will appear to be military premature, with American strategic (military) interests lacking."

The problem of a premature strike was not an issue during the Cold War particularly because of the constant threat that represented the nuclear power. At that moment, any action could have been justified as being a means of intimidation and a step towards the eventual victory of the western line of thought. However, in a new security environment when the threat is not visible, the idea of a premature strike is more and more an issue for debate, especially taking into account the new preemptive security policy. Therefore, from this point-of-view, it is rather clear that changes in terms of the way in which even diversionary wars are carried out have taken place at a theoretical level.

What have been and are the key disagreements in the field on the topic?

Throughout the years there have been major disagreements on the topic and even today, there is no definite conclusion on whether presidents of the United States used and are using diversionary war as a means of conducting domestic politics as well. However, the major disagreements focus on several key aspects.

One of the most important one is related to the causal relation between the internal conflict and the external one. On this matter, "Blainey (1973), for example, raises a fundamental question regarding the direction of causality specified in diver- sionary theories. He agrees that governments suffering from internal turmoil are more likely to become involved in wars, but not because their leaders seek external enemies to divert attention from internal troubles. He argues that states with domestic problems fight often because they are frequently the target of attack by other states seeking to take advantage of the weakness brought on by the domestic turmoil. It is also conceivable that the causal relationship is reversed; that is, the occurrence of foreign conflict may contribute to domestic conflict (Levy 1989)." In this sense, it is argued that on the contrary presidents do not make the war, but rather the situation in the country attracts it.

This confusion between the cause and effect of the diversionary wars is also pointed out on a milder tone by Wright who considers that "the direct relationship between political revolution and war, whether as cause or effect is in fact such a historical commonplace as to need no elaboration." The scholar addresses the extremes of the two sides: on the one hand, the revolution is the final development of riots and public discontent, whereas war represents the final step in international confrontation. However, it is difficult to consider the relation between the two in terms of cause and effect, if one is determined by the other or the latter is determined by the former.

At the opposite end of this idea lies the perception that in fact presidents and the administrations make their own international crisis in order to divert the public opinion from domestic issues. In this sense, it was presented in the media the indication that presidents tend to fabricate or to use low level threats as means for electoral attention. More precisely, "In August 1992, with the president trailing Governor Clinton in the polls, the New York Times (Tyler 1992) reported on page one that the Bush administration was planning a military confrontation with Iraq timed to coincide with the Republican national convention" However, this assessment is rather difficult to justify especially taking into account the fact that the mechanisms for eventually protecting the public from abuses from the president are rather strong. Therefore, "if it could be proven in a single instance that a president used America's armed forces for partisan purposes, there would be justifiable calls for impeachment."