Graveyard Afghanistan in the Graveyard

Graveyard Afghanistan

In the Graveyard of Empires: America's War in Afghanistan (Jones, 2009), the author Seth G. Jones provides an up-to-date and well-researched analysis of what has happened or failed to happen in America's efforts in Afghanistan. He examines not only the role that American forces have played in the conflict but also the role that other NATO forces have played as well. In the space of over 400 pages he provides a summary of other nations' fighting inside Afghanistan and also attempts to answer why the American efforts there may eventually prove futile as well.

Jones does a commendable job of reviewing the chronological history of other conflicts that have been conducted within the Afghan borders. Jones takes the reader through a series of conflicts that begins with the Greeks and ends with the American experience. Since ancient times, the Greeks, Persians, Mauryans, Moghuls, Kushans, Huns, Sassanids, Arabs, Mongols, British, and the Soviets have all engaged themselves militarily inside Afghanistan and all have met with limited success. The author is quick to acknowledge that the reasons for this lack of success varies but that the universal fact is that little has been gained by attempting to alter events inside Afghanistan through military means. The range of factors offered by Jones for this continuing failure include the geography, terrain, uncertain borders, and tribal ways of the Afghan people that combine to create an ideal environment for guerilla warfare to which traditional military forces have had difficulty adjusting and the Afghan people are seemingly content to live in the style that has characterized them for centuries.

Jones spends a great deal of time addressing the problems that the Soviets had in their involvement with Afghanistan. Again the guerilla fighting methods used inside Afghanistan foiled the efforts of the Soviet armies. In their Afghan experience the Soviets were able to establish a military stronghold inside the larger Afghan cities but once the Soviets attempted to venture out into the rural areas they became fodder for the Afghan guerillas. The Pashtun guerillas, aided by their superior knowledge of the terrain and their strong integration with the local population, were able to successfully disrupt the Soviet supply lines and the overall movement of the t troops enough to frustrate the general morale of the Soviet armies. Similarly, the American led Coalition forces fighting inside Afghanistan encountered the same difficulties when they first began operations there.

The principal focus of Jones' book is on the recent insurgency that has occurred in Afghanistan that has seen an increase in violence in the area and a corresponding increase in military casualties. Jones offers three arguments for this increase in insurgency. First, he attributes it to the fact that Pakistan has emerged as a safe haven for al Queda and the Taliban. Due to the fact that both groups are able to rely upon the sanctuary of Pakistan they have been able to increase their guerilla efforts across the border in Afghanistan knowing that they can escape to the safety of their Pakistan hideaways. Additionally, Pakistan affords them the luxury of having a base of operations free from Coalition forces' interference. Second, the continued inability of the Afghan government to exhibit any form of effectiveness contributes to a general feeling of uncertainty in the minds of the Afghan people. A government characterized by corruption, drug trafficking, bribery, and extortion at the local, provincial, and national levels has caused the citizenry to maintain a neutral position between the central government and the insurgents. The citizenry is reluctant to support either position entirely not knowing who the ultimate winner might be. From the American perspective, this scenario is not totally unlike the situation that they faced fighting in South Vietnam. The third problem relates to America's failure to concentrate its military efforts in Afghanistan. Because of the Iraq War the forces in Afghanistan were, in Jones' opinion, totally inadequate in numbers to withstand the escalating violence of the Afghan insurgents. Jones' places the blame for this last problem at the feet of a number of individuals including Paul Wolfowitz an Douglas Feith, top officials in the Defense Department during Donald Rumsfeld's tenure as Defense Secretary.

The insurgency was the result of the Pentagon's early Afghan policy. Insurgency, which is a political-military campaign by non-state individuals seeking to overthrow a government through the use of unconventional and conventional strategies and tactics, was allowed to develop under the protection of the Pakistan borders and the Afghan insurgents quickly became quite violent as they used suicide bombing, improvised explosive technology, and global communications perfected by the Iraqis and Hizbullah. Jones argues that the American effort in Afghanistan had been properly manned and financed from the beginning the insurgency movement may have never had the opportunity to rebuild in Pakistan.

The author does not limit his criticism to two Defense Department underlings but broadens his comments to the general philosophy adopted by the Department during Rumsfeld's tenure. Jones argues that the Pentagon decided to become engaged in Afghanistan using a "light footprint," and that Rumsfeld's philosophy that American military forces should not be used as an instrument of nation-building. This light footprint approach was the Pentagon's way of avoiding the heavy engagement policy utilized by the Soviets. The Pentagon, under Rumsfeld, felt that heavy engagement was the source of the problems that the Soviets encountered in Afghanistan and that by taking a more limited position in Afghanistan the Coalition effort would be more successful. Unfortunately, Jones argues, the initial few years of America's presence in Afghanistan characterized by the use of too few troops, cumbersome command structure, air attacks on civilian areas, and the positioning of forces near population centers caused the American effort to become bogged down similar to the way that the Soviets had been and it resulted in American forces ignoring the insurgency movement that was gestating in Pashtun areas in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Rumsfeld believed that a limited involvement would better allow Afghanistan to eventually protect itself with its own national army and police. Jones praised the change in American policy that resulted in increased concern in protecting the Afghanistan citizenry, developing a stronger local security system, and attempting to undermine the Taliban infrastructure that existed in the country and abandoning the more traditional military approach that America adopted in the first few years of its presence.

The beauty of Jones' book is that he is does not just offer criticisms of American policy but he also offers some suggestions that he feels might be helpful in ensuring that the efforts there are successful. Jones suggests that America's efforts in Afghanistan should include ending the corruption that has characterized all levels of government there for many years. Doing so will require that competent and legitimate governments are established from the ground up. He also suggests that the border sanctuary situation with Pakistan must be eliminated. As long as such situation is allowed to continue, Jones argues, the al Queda and Taliban forces will remain a threat inside Afghanistan undermining the efforts of the Coalition. Finally, security inside Afghanistan must be strengthened. The inability of the Afghan government to provide key services to local communities, especially in rural areas, have weakened the support of the national government and the citizenry has been forced to look elsewhere for security. In order for any measure of stability to be established inside Afghanistan its forces must be capable of performing on their own without American or Coalition support.

Jones strongly argued that the greatest step forward in Afghanistan is the fact that the efforts in Afghanistan have now been placed at center stage. With the War in Iraq winding down, Afghanistan has emerged as the top priority and this, Jones argues, should serve to improve America's chances of success there. The Iraqi War not only decreased the number of available forces it also undermined the Coalition alliance and caused tensions between those forces. With only one front these tensions should be lessened and a more cohesive effort should be expected by the various forces comprising the Coalition.